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Ohio and other states recently adopted major tort reform laws, limiting the
ability of injured individuals to recover damages for their harm. These reforms
followed in the wake ofpublic outcries against large punitive damage awards,
rising insurance rates, and perceptions that careless plaintiffs, responsible for
their own injuries, had flooded the courts with frivolous claims. For many
politicians and members of the public, tort reform seemed a reasonable response
to a crisis in the tort system.
Scholars, on the other hand, have long questioned the existence of a tort
crisis. Most individuals who suffer personal injuries never file lawsuits. Only a
small percentage of filed claims proceed to trial. And both win rates and
average verdicts are low for most personal injury claims.
Until recently, little empirical information was available to address this
controversy over the need for tort reform. This Article uses data collected from
Franklin County, Ohio, to examine jury verdicts rendered during the twelve
years before Ohio adopted tort reform in 1996. These findings suggest, as
scholars long suspected, that jury verdicts are modest in most personal injury
lawsuits. High verdicts in a few high-profile cases capture headlines, but the
majority of decisions favor defendants or pay small amounts to plaintiffs.
In addition to exploring the implications of these findings for the tort reform
debate, this Article demonstrates how empirical research illuminates legal
issues. Sound empirical research can help legislators and other policymakers
choosejust rules of law.
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INMRODUCTION
Business and insurance leaders repeatedly denounce the United States tort
system. Critics charge that careless plaintiffs, responsible for their own injuries,
seek to shift blame to deep pocket defendants. Much of this ire focuses on
product liability and medical malpractice lawsuits.1 Politicians exchange tales of
the psychic who recovered a million dollars from her doctor, claiming that a
CAT scan destroyed her psychic powers, and stories of the woman who won
several million dollars from McDonald's after spilling a cup of coffee on
herself.2 Advertisements and media stories tell consumers that their health care
costs will rise and that essential products will disappear from the market if
I For examples of sources attributing the tort crisis primarily to medical malpractice and
product liability lawsuits, see, e.g., TORT POLICY WORKING GROUP, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY
GENERAL, AN UPDATE ON THE LIABILITY CRIsIs (1987); TORT POLICY WORKING GROUP,
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL, REPORT ON THE CAusEs, EXTENT AND POLICY
IMPLICATIONS OF THE CURRENT CRisIs IN INsuRANCE AvAILABILry AND AFFORDABHiY
(1986). See also STEVEN K. SMrH ET AL., BUREAU OF JusTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE, CIVIL JUsTICE SURVEY OF STATE COURTS, 1992: TORT CAsEs IN LARGE COUNTIES
1 (1995) (medical malpractice and product liability claims "are a primary focus of tort reform
activity"); Deborah R. Hensler, Trends in Tort Litigation: Findings from the Institute for Civil
Justice's Research, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 479, 493 (1987) (distinguishing "three worlds" of tort
litigation and noting that the second of these, typified by product liability and medical
malpractice claims, includes the "high stake" claims that concern defendants so heavily).
2 STEPFEN DANIELS & JOANNE MARTIN, CIVIL JuRIES AND THE POLITICS OF REFORM 5
(1995) (tracing the evolution of these and other "horror stories" about the tort system); Steven
Brill & James Lyons, The Not-So-Simple Crisis, AM. LAW., May 1986, at 1, 12-14 (analyzing
favorite tort anecdotes); cf. Theodore B. Olson, Was Justice Served?, WALL. ST. J., Oct. 4,
1995, at A14 ('The civil justice system seems... demented, with freakish punitive damage
bonanzas for persons who pour coffee on themselves or ricochet golf balls into their own
foreheads.").
Media reports often distort the "facts" of these horror stories. The CAT scan story, for
example, derives from an actual trial. The judge in that case, however, disallowed the psychic's
claim for interference with her psychic abilities. The plaintiff recovered damages based on the
permanent brain damage she sustained from the negligent administration of a contrast dye
administered before the CAT scan. See NEIL VIDMAR, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE
AMERICAN JURY 11-12 (1995). Similarly, most renditions of the famous McDonald's verdict
omit the following facts: (1) the plaintiff was parked in her car (not driving) when the coffee
spilled; (2) the plaintiff was hospitalized for eight days with third degree bums; (3) at the time
of her accident McDonald's had already received more than seven hundred complaints from
other people scalded by the restaurant's coffee; (4) McDonald's served its coffee at a
considerably hotter temperature than other fast-food restaurants; (5) the plaintiff offered to
settle the case for $20,000; (6) the trial judge reduced the punitive award to $480,000; and (7)
the parties ultimately settled for an undisclosed amount. See Is Lawsuit Reform Good for
Consumers?, 60 CONSuMER REP. 312 (1995).
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runaway verdicts don't cease.3
Scholarly studies of the tort system paint a different picture. Most research
suggests that plaintiffs file relatively few lawsuits compared to the estimated
incidence of injury, that only a handful of those suits proceed to trial, that
plaintiffs lose the majority of product liability and medical malpractice trials, and
that verdicts are modest.4 According to empiricists, punitive damages are rare in
these and other fields of tort law.5
Where does the truth lie? As reformers on both the state and national level
weigh new constraints on the tort system, it is essential to separate fact from
fiction in the tort debate.6 Yet little comprehensive data exists about tort verdicts.
In many jurisdictions, it is difficult to obtain an accurate census of all jury
verdicts--much less to compile detailed information about the cases behind
those verdicts. Sophisticated analyses of recovery rates, controlling for a variety
of factors, have been virtually nonexistent.
This study offers the first comprehensive look at product liability and
medical malpractice verdicts in a representative urban county over a twelve-year
period. The database includes every jury verdict rendered in the county's court of
general jurisdiction during that time. The study also incorporates a wealth of
detail about each case, including: (1) demographic characteristics of the plaintiffs
and defendants; (2) ratings of the injury severity and type of alleged fault; (3)
information about trial resources; and (4) details of settlement offers and
3 See, e.g., DANIELS & MARTIN, supra note 2, at 7. For a discussion of other tort myths
cultivated by the media, see, e.g., Marc Galanter, Real World Torts: An Antidote to Anecdote,
55 MD. L. REV. 1093 (1996); Michael J. Saks, Malpractice Misconceptions and Other Lessons
about the Litigation System, 16 JUST. SYs. J. 7 (1993).
4 See infra notes 228-93 and accompanying text.
5 See infra notes 258-64 and accompanying text.
6 For a summary of recent tort reform laws, see AMERICAN TORT REFORM ASSOCIATION,
TORT REFORM RECORD (Dec. 31, 1996) (summarizing reform measures enacted from 1986
through 1996); AMERICAN TORT REFORM ASSOCIATION, 1997 TORT REFORM ENACMENT'S
(1998) (summarizing statutes adopted in 1997); AMERICAN TORT REFORM ASSOCIATION, 1998
STATE TORT REFORM ENACTMENTS (1998) (summarizing statutes adopted January through
June 1998). See also STATE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM (Roger Clegg ed., 1994) (summarizing
reforms and offering strategies for reformers); Martha Middleton, A Changing Landscape,
A.B.A. J., Aug. 1995, at 56 (summarizing both changes in state law and ongoing reform
efforts).
In 1994, Republicans featured tort reform as part of their "Contract With America."
Congress approved extensive reforms of product liability law in 1996, but President Clinton
vetoed the final bill. See Thomas A. Eaton & Susette M. Talarico, A Profile of Tort Litigation
in Georgia and Reflections on Tort Reform, 30 GA. L. REV. 627, 629 n.2 (reviewing legislative
history and content of proposed statute); Kenneth Jost, Tort Issues Resurrected, A.B.A. J., Mar.
1997, at 18. Despite this setback, tort reform remains one of the Republican leadership's "top
10 priorities" in Congress. Id.
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demands. These data permit complex statistical analyses of product liability and
medical malpractice verdicts (the recoveries at the heart of the tort reform
debate) over a full twelve years.7
The state from which these analyses are drawn, Ohio, enacted a
comprehensive tort reform statute at the end of the twelve-year period we
studied.8 Thus, the data allow us to paint a complete picture of product liability
and medical malpractice verdicts just prior to reform.9 Equally important, the
data enable us to ask whether trends in these verdicts justified the reform
measures adopted by the legislature. Answering these questions is essential, not
only to advise legislators considering tort reform in Congress and the other
states, but to inform courts weighing the constitutionality of these reforms. Two
7 Previous studies have provided essential information about the tort system, but they fail
either to examine all jury verdicts within a jurisdiction or to include sufficient control variables
to support complex analyses. Two of the most recent studies draw their information from
commercial jury verdict reporters. Although the authors of those studies restricted their
analyses to the more reliable commercial reporters, they acknowledge that the reporters do not
include all jury verdicts and that the selection may be biased. See DANIELS & MARTIN, supra
note 2, at 66-68; ERIKMOLLER, TRENDS IN CIVILJURY VERDICTS SINCE 1985, at 59-61 (1996).
Our own comparison of the comprehensive data that we gathered in Franklin County with data
reported for the same county in several verdict reporters suggests that the latter sources
substantially under-report verdicts and introduce significant biases into the database. See infra
notes 41-47 and accompanying text.
A few other studies contain more comprehensive coverage of verdicts--usually drawn
from official reports of courthouse filings or independent searches of courthouse records. These
reports, however, include only a limited number of variables and offer little statistical analysis
of outcomes. See, e.g., CAROL J. DEFRANCES Er AL., BUREAU OF JUsTICE STATISTICS, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, CIVIL JUSTICE SURVEY OF STATE COURTS, 1992: CIVIL JURY CASES
AND VERDICTS IN LARGE COUNTIES (1995); BRIAN J. OSTROM & NEAL B. KAUDER,
EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS, 1993: A NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE FROM THE COURT
STATISTICS PROJECT (1995); ANDREW H. PRESS ET AL., FEDERAL TORT TRIALS AND VERDICTS,
1994-1995 (1997); SMrrH Er AL., supra note 1. We built upon these and many other excellent
studies of the tort system. This Article, however, attempts to move beyond the limitations of
these earlier studies.
8 See 1996 Ohio Laws 2046 (Act effective Jan. 27, 1997). For summaries of the Act's
provisions, see Special Issue- HB 350: The Death ofRights, OHIO TRIAL, Nov. 1996; James F.
Lang, Tort Reform Could Benefit Municipalities, BABBrr's OHIO MUNICIPAL SERV., JanIFeb.
1997, at 1; Douglas Hill Schwartz, The Tortured Path of Ohio's Collateral Source Rule, 65 U.
CIN. L. Rev. 643 (1997); Stephen J. Werber, An Overview of Ohio Product Liability Law, 43
CLEv. ST. L. REV. 379 (1995).
9 A subsequent article will compare post-reform verdicts in these fields with pre-reform
data. The analyses presented here, therefore, provide an important baseline for assessing the
effects of tort reform, in addition to presenting an unprecedented perspective on the tort system.
We have also gathered data on motor vehicle verdicts in the same metropolitan area and plan to
report on both pre- and post-reform trends in those verdicts as well.
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courts recently struck down tort reform statutes under their state constitutions; 10
in at least one of those cases, the challengers introduced empirical evidence to
show that the legislature lacked a rational basis for its reforms.1I Expanding our
empirical knowledge of the tort system, therefore, may guide both courts and
legislatures confronting arguments about tort reform.
The first section of this Article explains the study's method, including our
choice of Franklin County, Ohio, as a representative urban county. The next two
sections report our findings on both product liability and medical malpractice
claims. A final section then summarizes this evidence, compares it to results
gathered by other researchers, and discusses the implications of the evidence for
the tort reform debate. Our findings suggest, even more dramatically than those
reported by other authors, that there is no crisis in either product liability or
medical malpractice verdicts. On the contrary, the number of verdicts in each of
these areas is small and plaintiff win rates are quite low. Both recovery rates and
verdict size, moreover, have been declining over the last decade. In this context,
the reforms adopted by some legislatures and proposed in many others are
unnecessary at best and harmful at worst.
I. BACKGROUND
The first part of this section describes our choice of Franklin County, Ohio,
as a representative urban county in which to collect data. The second part
outlines other aspects of our method, including the manner of identifying cases,
type of variables coded, and nature of the analyses we performed.
A. Franklin County, Ohio
Franklin County, Ohio, consists of the city of Columbus and many of its
surrounding suburbs. In 1996, the county included 1,011,019 residents, while the
city counted 675,045 residents. The greater metropolitan area, which
encompasses five other counties, reported 1,437,512 inhabitants. 12 These figures
rank Columbus as the sixteenth largest city in the United States; its metropolitan
10 Williams v. Wilson, 1998 Ky. LEXIS, at *63 (Ky. Apr. 16, 1998) (overturning limit on
punitive damages); Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057 (1l. 1997) (striking cap on
noneconomic damages, abolition ofjoint and several liability, and other reforms).
11 See Best, 689 N.E.2d at 1067-68.
12 See GREATER COLUMBUS CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, ECONOMIC PROFILE 3 (Mar.
1997). We offer information on both Franklin County and its surrounding metropolitan area
because the Franklin County courts may draw cases from the entire metropolitan region. Cf.
Eaton & Talarico, supra note 6, at 645 (noting that a suburban county in another state reported
an unusually lov per capita filing rate and speculating that suburban residents may file their
claims in a central urban county).
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area is the eighth fastest growing in the country.13
Franklin County's population includes a representative mix of African
American and White citizens, although it has fewer Asian and Hispanic residents
than some states. About four-fiftfis, or 81.5%, of the Franklin County population
is White, 15.9% is African American, 2.0% is Asian, and 0.9% is Hispanic.14
The metropolitan area includes somewhat more adults between the ages of
eighteen and forty-four than the national average,15 but closely approximates
national averages in other age categories. 16
The Franklin County economy includes a mix of all types of urban
employers. About one-quarter of employees work in trade (26.8%), while
another fifth (21.4%) are employed in a variety of service industries, and more
than a tenth (11.4%) toil in manufacturing. 17 The city's cost of living is just
above the national average.' 8
These factors have made Franklin County a favorite test market site.19
Pollsters and politicians have also focused on Columbus and other Ohio cities as
13 See ECONOMIC PROFILE, supra note 12, at 1.
14 See id. at 3. In 1996, United States residents divided into these four racial groups:
82.8% White, 12.6% African American, 3.7% Asian American, and 0.9% Native American.
See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1998, at 18 (1998). If residents of Hispanic origin are first
identified as a group and all remaining individuals are then separated into the four racial groups
listed above, the percentages are 10.6% Hispanic (of any race), 73.1% non-Hispanic White,
12.0% non-Hispanic African American, 3.4% non-Hispanic Asian American, and 0.7% non-
Hispanic Native American. See id. at 19.
15 Almost half (48.8%) of residents in the Columbus metropolitan area are between the
ages of eighteen and forty-four, 43.2% of residents nationwide fall within that category. See
ECONOMIC PROFILE, supra note 12, at 3. The age bulge most likely represents the presence of
several large universities in Columbus. See id. at 2. Age figures for Franklin County alone are
not available, so we report here the figures for the full metropolitan area.
16Adults between the ages of forty-five and sixty-four make up 17.8% of the
metropolitan area's population, compared to 18.7% of the population nationwide. See id.
Adults aged sixty-five or older comprise 10.0% of the metropolitan area's population and
12.5% of the population nationwide. See id. These figures leave 23.4% of the Columbus
metropolitan population under the age of eighteen, and 25.6% of the nation's population in that
youth range.
17 See id. at 4. Other categories include govemment (16.8%); finance, insurance, and real
estate (8.4%); health (6.8%); infrastructure (4.4%); and construction (4.0%). See id.
18 See id. at 2.
19 See Kent Gibbons, Qube Alumni Return and Reminisce, Multichannel News, Mar. 23,
1998, available in LEXIS, News Library, Multmaw File (Columbus has "terrific cross-section
demographics" and is "one of corporate America's favorite product test markets"); GREATER
COLUMBUS CHAMBEROF COMMERCE, COLUMBUS ON THEMOVE! 1 (Mar. 1997).
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representing a cross section of American opinion.20 For similar reasons, we
believed that Franklin County would allow a representative perspective on
product liability and medical malpractice verdicts in the United States.
Comparative information about the legal system confirms this view. Ohio
ranks twelfth out of twenty-nine reporting states in the number of tort claims
filed per capita.21 Similarly, Franklin County ranks twenty-first out of forty-five
of the largest U.S. counties in per capita filing rates for tort claims.22 The
percentage of Franklin County tort complaints devoted to medical malpractice
claims (4.8%) almost exactly matches the national average in large counties2 3
and exceeds that average for product liability cases.24 Frankdin County's overall
tort docket, as well as claims filed in the categories of medical malpractice or
product liability, fall above the national average even for large counties.25
Plaintiff win rates and verdicts in Franklin County are similarly aggressive.
Plaintiffs win 54.6% of civil jury verdicts in Franklin County, an average that
somewhat exceeds the national average of 51.8% in large counties.26 The county
ranks nineteenth among forty-five of the largest counties in the percentage of
verdicts awarding one million dollars or more.27 Franklin County thus represents
20 Commentators have long considered Ohio a bellwether state for forecasting
Presidential elections. See, e.g., Keith Bradsher et al., The 1996 Elections: The States, Midwest,
N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 7, 1996, at BI 0; Michael Winerip, Ohio County Reluctantly Tilts Toward
Clinton, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 28, 1996, at A14 (thirty-third article in a series chronicling voters'
reactions in Canton, Ohio, the county selected by the New York Times as a representative site to
track during the 1996 elections). Most recently, the Clinton administration chose Columbus as
the site of a public forum on Iraq; nearby Akron hosted a forum on race relations. See, e.g.,
James Bennett, Clinton, at Meeting on Race, Struggles to Sharpen Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
4, 1997, at Al; Robyn Meredith, 6,000 Ohioans Prove to Be a Tougher Audience Than
Congress, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 1998, at A8; Good Morning America, Selling the U.S. Military
Strategy (ABC television broadcast Feb. 18, 1998), available in LEXIS News Library, Script
File (White House chose Columbus for Iraq forum because the city is "used as the test market
of America, from fast food to automated teller machines, to cable tv and fake fat").
21 See OSTROM & KAUDER, supra note 7, at 22.
2 2 See SMrrH ET AL., supra note 1, at 7.
23 See id. The national average is 4.9%. See id. at 2.
24 Product liability claims constitute 11.9% of the tort cases filed in Franklin County, but
just 3.4% of tort cases filed in large counties nationwide. See id. at 2, 7.
25 There is a thriving legal community in Columbus. The postal zip code area for
downtown Columbus contains the sixteenth highest number of lawyers in the nation. See Joe
Blundo, If You're Downtown, You Probably Just Passed a Lawyer, COLUMBUs DIsPATCH,
Nov. 6, 1997, atGl.
26 See DEFRANCES, supra note 7, at 4, 13.
27 See id. at 13. The county ranks below national averages for large counties in both
median and mean jury awards. See id. Much of the concern over medical malpractice and
product liability verdicts, however, concerns high verdicts rather than low ones. The figures
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a legal system that does not stand at either extreme of the nation's courthouses,
but includes above average rates of claims filed, plaintiff wins, and high verdicts.
If a tort crisis exists, evidence of that crisis should appear in Franklin County's
jury verdicts.
B. Method
1. Population
Our study includes all jury verdicts rendered from 1985 through 1996 in
product liability or medical malpractice cases filed in the Franklin County Court
of Common Pleas, the trial court of general jurisdiction in Ohio. Although
Franklin County plaintiffs may also file tort claims in the municipal court, few
product liability or medical malpractice claims appear on that docket; the
municipal court's low jurisdictional limit discourages such high-ticket claims.28
Our database, therefore, includes almost all state verdicts rendered during the
years we studied.29
We were unable to include any federal court verdicts in our study. Federal
claims, however, account for only about 4% of tort cases nationwide. 30 As in the
state system, only a fraction of those filings yield a jury verdict.31 The number of
reported here, moreover, include all civil jury cases. Thus, they would include low-ticket
recoveries such as those in motor vehicle suits. It is possible that Franklin County has more of
those recoveries than does the typical large urban county. More specific comparisons on
product liability and medical malpractice verdicts, unfortunately, are not available.
28 Until 1996, the municipal court had ajurisdictional limit ofjust $10,000 for civil cases;
in 1996 that ceiling rose to $15,000. See OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1901.17 (Anderson 1998).
Plaintiffs cannot recover more than the jurisdictional ceiling in the municipal court, even if the
evidence justifies a higher award; this strongly deters claimants from filing product liability or
medical malpractice claims in municipal courts.
29 A few plaintiffs may have also filed complaints in the Ohio Court of Claims; that court
has exclusive jurisdiction over any claims against the state. See OHIo REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2743.03(A)(1) (Anderson 1998). The total number of lawsuits filed in the Court of Claims,
however, is quite small. In 1996, plaintiffs throughout the entire state filed only 492 judicial
claims in the Court of Claims. See THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO, THE OIO COURTS
SUMMARY: 1996, at DI (1996). The number ofjury verdicts involving medical malpractice or
product liability complaints from Franklin County must be minuscule.
Almost all empirical research on the tort system focuses on trial courts of general
jurisdiction. See Eaton & Talarico, supra note 6, at 638 n.26. Our study fits that pattem.
30 See SMrTH ET AL., supra note 1, at 1; see also TRENDs IN TORT LITIGATION-THE
STORY BEHIND THE STATIsTIcs 6 (Deborah R. Hensler et al. eds., 1987) (tort plaintiffs file 95%
of their claims in state court); cf. Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the
Behavior of the Tort Litigation System-And Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1147, 1205 n.187
(1992) (federal filings constitute less than 2% of the civil justice system nationwide).
31 About 4.1% of federal tort cases terminate in trial, with only three quarters of those
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federal jury verdicts in medical malpractice or product liability lawsuits,
therefore, is quite small. 32 We supplement our conclusions in Part IV with some
discussion of federal data gathered by other researchers. 33 The bulk of tort cases,
however, occur in state courts and we maintain our focus on those courts.
We identified Franklin County jury verdicts from two different sources. Our
primary source was a series of verdict summaries prepared by Stephen E.
Chappelear, a Franklin County attorney, on behalf of the Columbus Bar
Association. Since 1985, Chappelear has attempted to identify and summarize
every civil jury verdict delivered in the Franklin County Court of Common
Pleas. Chappelear visits the courthouse personally and identifies jury verdicts by
examining records in both the assignment commissioner's office and the clerk of
courts' office.34 He then gathers information about each case from the case file,
attorneys, bailiff, and trial judge.35 Chappelear publishes monthly summaries of
these verdicts in Bar Briefs, a magazine sponsored by the Columbus Bar
cases decided by ajury. See PR.SS, supra note 7, at 1, 3. Overall, about 3% of federal tort cases
produce ajury verdict.
3 2 In 1994 and 1995, for example, juries rendered just 185 medical malpractice verdicts
and 522 product liability verdicts in all federal districts combined. See PRESS, supra note 7, at 3
(combining product liability verdicts in both personal injury and property damage cases). With
ninety federal districts, this works out to about one medical malpractice and three product
liability verdicts in each district per year. See also Eaton & Talarico, supra note 6, at 656
(United States Dislrict Court in Fulton County, Georgia, a county comparable to Franklin
County, rendered only one product liability verdict in 1992).
Despite the small number ofjury verdicts in federal court, one set of researchers estimates
that federal trials account for about 40.7% ofjury verdicts in asbestos-related cases and 25.4%
of verdicts in other product liability cases. See Theodore Eisenberg et al., Litigation Outcomes
in State and Federal Courts: A Statistical Portrait, 19 SEATrLE U. L. REV. 433, 441 (1996).
Even under this estimate, our analysis of state verdicts includes a clear majority of product
liability claims. Still, further research should focus on federal verdicts in this area.
33 See infra notes 228-93 and accompanying text.
3 4 See STEPHEN E. CHAPPELEAR, SO WHAT'S YOUR CASE REALLY WORTH? A DECADE
OF JURY TIAL VERDIcrs 4 (1995). Chappelear's task has been eased in recent years by
computerization of the court's docket. For most of the years covered by our study, however, he
had to examine daily docket lists for each judge to identify all jury verdicts. The tediousness of
this task underscores how difficult it can be to compile a census of all jury verdicts-and how
commercial services that rely upon attomey reports may seriously underestimate the number of
jury trials. See also infra notes 41-47 and accompanying text (discussing the inadequacy of
several commercial services attempting to report Franklin County verdicts).
35 See CHAPPELEAR, supra note 34, at 4. In addition to these primary sources, Chappelear
checks the Ohio Trial Reporter, a commercial reporting service, for additional details on jury
verdicts. He also tracks both media coverage and appellate decisions related to the verdicts he
identifies. We examined some of Chappelear's voluminous files on Franklin County jury
verdicts and were impressed with his exhaustive background information on the cases.
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Association. He has also published one ten-year collection of the verdicts36 and
several supplements to that collection.37 We read all of Chappelear's summaries
for verdicts delivered from 1985 to 1996 and incorporated all product liability
and medical malpractice verdicts into our database.38
Our second source was a LEXIS database of jury verdicts. At the time we
used the database, it included verdicts from at least three different commercial
verdict reporters: Jury Verdict Research, The Ohio Trial Reporter, and Jury
Verdict Review Publications.39 The LEXIS database did not include any Franklin
County verdicts before 1987, so we used it only to find verdicts for the last ten
years we studied. As with Chappelear's data, we followed the same method to
identify medical malpractice and product liability verdicts. First, we printed from
the LEXIS database descriptions of all civil jury verdicts rendered in Franklin
County between 1987 and 1996. Next, we identified all verdicts involving a
medical malpractice or product liability claim.
Comparing the verdicts yielded by these two sources suggests that
Chappelear was quite comprehensive in identifying verdicts, while the
commercial services were woefully incomplete. Out of 135 verdicts reported by
any source for the years 1987-1996, Chappelear omitted only four (3.0%). Even
these four may have been due to differences in definition; at least two, for
example, involved bifurcated trials.4 ° The three commercial services combined
in the LEXIS database, on the other hand, omitted 56.4% of the medical
malpractice verdicts and 58.8% of the product liability verdicts.41 The
36 See id.
37 See STEPHEN E. CHAPPELEAR, 1997 JURY VERDIcTs (Supp. 1997); STEPHEN E.
CHAPPELEAR, FRANKLIN CouNTY COMMON PLEAS COURT 1995 AND 1996 Crm JURY TRIALS
(Supp. 1995-1996).
38 Chappelear divides his verdicts into eighteen different categories, including "medical
malpractice" and "product liability." We agreed with his classification of all cases within those
categories. We combed the other categories as well, however, and recategorized a few cases
from those categories as either medical malpractice or product liability claims. As we explain
further below, we adopted a liberal definition of both categories so that we would not miss any
evidence of a crisis in either category. See infra notes 57 and 70.
39 We performed most of our searches in the fall of 1997. LEXIS no longer includes the
database for Jury Verdict Research. In the fall of 1997, however, complete Jury Verdict
Research data for Ohio was available for the period 1987-1996.
40 As with our definition of product liability and medical malpractice claims, we
attempted to be as generous as possible in identifying jury verdicts. Chappelear may have
rejected these cases because of a somewhat more narrow definition of "jury verdict."
41 This poor showing was not due to different definitions of a "medical malpractice" or a
"product liability" case. As explained in the text, we initially printed information on every
Franklin County jury verdict reported by these services during the relevant years. We then read
the case descriptions to categorize them as medical malpractice, product liability, motor
vehicle, other tort, or other civil claim. We adopted a similar approach with Chappelear's
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commercial services, in other words, reported less than half the medical
malpractice and product liability verdicts from these ten years-even when we
pooled the resources of all three services. 42
Moreover, some biases emerged in the type of verdicts reported by the
commercial services. Those services were significantly more likely to include a
verdict when: (1) one of the defendants was female; (2) the plaintiff's age fell
between eighteen and sixty-five; or (3) a plaintiff pressed a malpractice claim
against a health care worker who did not hold a medical degree.43 The services
also appeared more likely to include a verdict when the trial lasted a greater
number of days or occurred earlier in the period we studied, although these two
correlations merely approached significance at the conventional level.44 The
latter result is particularly disturbing because it suggests that reliability of the
commercial reporting services is not improving with time; on the contrary, it
may be declining.
summaries. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. Thus, for both groups of reported
verdicts, we read the entire collection and exercised our independent discretion about how to
categorize verdicts.
42 Some researchers have identified the Ohio Trial Reporter as one of the more reliable
local reporters. See DANIELS & MARnTN, supra note 2, at 91. Even with this reporter in the
LEXIS database, we failed to identify more than half of the product liability and medical
malpractice verdicts.
43' Throughout this Article, we use the word "significantly" to denote statistical
significance. We employ the conventional .05 threshold to mark that significance. See R.
MARK SIRKIN, STATISTCS FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 195 (1995). Under this standard, a result
is statistically significant if there is no more than a 5% chance that the correlation, difference, or
other result might have occurred through random errors in sampling or reporting. For further
discussion of the concept of statistical significance, see DAVID S. MOORE, THE BASIC PRACrICE
OF STATISTICS 349-405 (1995); SIRKIN, supra, at 175-205. In most cases, we report exact
significance levels, using the form "p=-.xxx." The probability that the three relationships
reported in the text might have occurred by chance are, respectively, .039, .047, and .03 8.
For most of our results, we analyzed the entire population of jury verdicts in Franklin
County. One could argue, therefore, that tests of statistical significance are unnecessary; any
differences that emerge in our analyses reflect real differences in the population. Social
scientists, however, still use tests of significance under these circumstances as a way of
measuring the probability that the observed differences derived from errors in coding,
processing, or handling data.
44 In some instances, we report results that "approach" significance at the conventional
level. Although social scientists commonly adopt .05 as the cutoff level for statistically
significant results, see supra note 43, results that are only somewhat more likely to have
occurred by chance can also be suggestive. See SIKIN, supra note 43, at 195-96. This is
particularly true if the results form a consistent pattern with other results that approach or
achieve significance. We consider results that have a probability of occurring by chance greater
than 5% but no more than 10% as "approaching significance" and designate them in that
manner. We also report the particular p-value for these relationships.
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Most troubling of all, the commercial services appeared more likely to report
verdicts that favored plaintiffs and, among successful plaintiffs, to include higher
recoveries. Plaintiffs won almost one-third (29.3%) of the verdicts reported by
the commercial services, but only one-fifth (19.5%) of verdicts omitted by those
services.45 Similarly, the mean verdict for successful plaintiffs included in the
commercial services was $1,483,619. For plaintiffs who prevailed in trials
omitted by those services, the mean verdict was less than one-sixth that amount:
just $236,972. Neither of these differences achieved or approached statistical
significance,4 6 but they are troubling nonetheless. They suggest that studies of
the tort system based on verdicts drawn from commercial verdict reporters may
overstate the extent to which the system favors plaintiffs.47 We avoided these
biases by using the commercial services merely to double-check and supplement
Chappelear's data.
2. Dependent Variables
We used two measures of trial outcome. The first one is a dichotomous
variable indicating whether the plaintiff prevailed. A second dependent variable
reflects the size of the plaintiff's verdict. For many of our analyses, we confined
examination of the second variable to plaintiffs who prevailed at trial. Thus, we
asked whether mean verdicts were higher for successful female plaintiffs or for
successful male ones.48 As explained further below, our multivariate analysis of
the size of medical malpractice verdicts was somewhat more complex in taking
into account some information from defense victories. 49
In analyzing both outcome and recovery amount, we focused principally on
the jury verdict. As discussed below, trial judges and appellate courts reduced or
overturned some verdicts, especially in medical malpractice cases.50 Although
45 We limit these comparisons to the years 1987-1996 because we lacked any
information on 1985-1986 verdicts from the commercial reporters.
46 For the difference in recovery rates, p=.130; for the difference in verdict amounts for
successful plaintiffs, p=. I 10.
47 Numerous other authors have questioned the reliability of commercial verdict reporters.
See, e.g., VIDMAR, supra note 2, at 14; Eisenberg et al., supra note 32, at 439-40; Marc
Galanter, Reading the Landscape ofDisputes: What We Know and Don 't Know (and Think We
Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REv. 4 (1983);
Michael Rustad, In Defense ofPunitive Damages in Products Liability: Testing Tort Anecdotes
with Empirical Data, 78 IowA L. REv. 1, 31 (1992); Saks, supra note 30, at 1245-46.
48 See infra notes 118-28 and accompanying text (exploring gender differences among
product liability plaintiffs); infra notes 200-23 and accompanying text (gender differences
among medical malpractice plaintiffs).
49 See infra note 66 and accompanying text.
50 See infra notes 136-37 and accompanying text.
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we did not perform separate courthouse searches for post-verdict activity in each
case, we noted that information whenever it was available from any of our data
sources. We provide some information on those reductions and reversals in our
discussion below. Unless otherwise noted, however, we continued to base our
dependent variables on the jury's verdict. Most discussion of a tort "crisis"
focuses on jury behavior, so we limited most of our analyses to that behavior. To
the extent that judges already police jury verdicts, our findings thus overstate the
size of any crisis.
We used actual dollar values in most reports of verdict amounts, plaintiff
demands, and defendant offers. Only in bivariate and multivariate analyses
incorporating time as an independent variable did we translate actual dollars to
constant 1984 dollars.51 The latter analyses allowed us to separate global
inflation effects from specific trends within the tort system. By adhering to actual
dollars in other analyses, we weighted the scales in favor of finding any tort
crisis: actual dollars are higher than constant 1984 dollars, because they include
the effects of inflation.
We recorded both of our outcome variables by case, as well as by plaintiff.
In other words, for lawsuits with multiple plaintiffs, we analyzed outcomes both
by total controversy and by individual plaintiff. As explained further below,
some analyses lent themselves to case analysis, while others were better suited to
analysis by individual plaintiff.
3. Independent Variables
We coded more than two dozen independent variables for each jury verdict.
Information for these variables came from Chappelear's summaries, the LEXIS
database, and independent searches of courthouse files. In a few instances, we
also obtained information from appellate opinions reversing or affirming a jury
verdict.
We noted whether each plaintiff was an individual, government agency, or
institution.52 If the plaintiff was an insurance company maintaining a
subrogation claim, we both coded that fact and gathered information on the
injured party.53 For individual plaintiffs, we coded both gender and age. We later
51 For our multivariate analysis of verdict size in medical malpractice cases (see infra note
66 and accompanying text), we both translated dollars into constant 1984 dollars and divided
those amounts by 10,000. This adjustment was necessary to produce a dependent variable with
a distribution fitting the constraints of tobit analysis.
5 2 
"Institutions" included corporations as well as other private organizations that did not
use the corporate form.
53 Similarly, in wrongfiu death cases, we considered the deceased person as the "plaintiff"
and used that person's gender and other characteristics in our analyses. We did not count
consortium plaintiffs as separate individuals. Instead, we included any consortium award in the
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grouped individuals into three age categories: minors (those under the age of
nineteen), senior citizens (those over the age of sixty-four), and other adults
(individuals between the ages of eighteen and sixty-five).54
Similarly, we designated defendants as individuals, government agencies, or
institutions. We noted the gender of individual defendants and developed a
variable signaling whether any defendant was female. 55 For medical malpractice
cases, we further divided claims into three categories: those in which only
institutional defendants appeared at trial, those in which at least one medical
doctor (M.D.) appeared as a defendant and those in which health care workers
without M.D. degrees (such as nurses, optometrists, or dentists) were the only
individual defendants. 56
We had no objective measure of a defendant's liability or plaintiffs fault.
We did, however, create a variable distinguishing the few cases in which a
defendant admitted fault and contested only damages or causation. We also
coded jury findings of plaintiff fault.
In medical malpractice cases, we distinguished four types of fault
allegations: negligent failure to diagnose the plaintiffs condition, failure to
obtain the plaintiff s informed consent, nonmedical error, and negligent medical
treatment. We used the first three categories only when those were the only
allegation of fault; we assigned any case that included a claim of negligent
medical treatment to the last category. We also used a conservative definition of
"nonmedical" error, including in that category only cases in which the fault
lacked any medical component. 57
verdict for the directly injured party.
54 We attempted to gather information on marital status, occupation, and race but were
unable to obtain sufficient information on these categories. Information about race was
particularly difficult to ascertain.
55 Multiple defendants were much more common than multiple plaintiffs, so we
developed this dummy variable indicating whether any defendant was female. We were unable
to obtain sufficient information about defendants' ages to include a variable representing that
information.
56 The last category included cases in which an institutional defendant appeared along
with health care workers who lacked an M.D. degree. The distinguishing feature of this last
category was the absence of any licensed M.D.
57 For example, we coded cases in which the plaintiff claimed that the defendant had
forgotten to remove a surgical clamp or sponge after an operation as "medical" because the
supervision of surgery involves a variety of medical decisions. A case in which hospital
orderlies dropped a patient while transferring her from a gumey to an operating table, on the
other hand, qualified as a "nonmedical error."
Some might question whether the latter cases are medical malpractice cases at all. We
included them in our count of malpractice cases because some observers characterize all
negligence actions against health care establishments in that manner. We also wanted to be as
generous as possible in estimating the extent of crisis in malpractice cases. To the extent these
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For product liability cases, we recognized five different contexts in which
most injuries arise: workplace, home, recreational activities, medical treatment,
and motor vehicles. We assigned injuries to the "home" context only if the
activity involved some sort of chore or other home-based work. We included all
recreational activities, whether they occurred at home or elsewhere, in the
"recreation" category.58 We also created a sixth category for product-related
business disputes that involved only property damage. Finally, we assigned a few
cases to a category of "other" contexts. 59 These contextual categories do not
directly reflect the defendant's degree of fault, but we theorized that context
might affect a jury's determination in product liability cases. 60
To measure the severity of each plaintiff's injury, we developed a twelve-
point rating scale. As Table 1-1 reflects, this scale ranged from claims of pure
property damage through various degrees of personal injury to death. 61 We used
cases should not appear in the malpractice category, we have overestimated the number of
cases in that field. Including these cases also increased apparent win rates and average verdicts
in medical malpractice cases. As we note below, plaintiffs who alleged nonmedical negligence
were more likely to recover, and recovered higher verdicts, than did other malpractice
plaintiffs. These differences were not significant in our multivariate analyses, but the
nonmedical negligence cases still inflated win rates and recoveries to some extent. See infra
notes 156-58 and accompanying text.
5 8 Stephen Daniels and Joanne Martin used a similar scheme to characterize the settings
in which product claims arise. See DANIELS & MARTIN, supra note 2, at 168-72. They,
however, appear to have assigned recreational injuries occurring at home to the "home"
category. We attempted to distinguish work-like activities occurring in the home from
recreational conduct occurring in that setting.
59 These included a few injuries that occurred in public buildings and were difficult to
characterize from available information as recreation or work related.
60 On this score we built upon the work of Daniels and Martin, who found different
patterns of recovery in varying product liability settings. See DANIELS & MARTIN, supra note 2,
at 168-83.
61 Once again, we built this scale on the work of Daniels and Martin. See id. at 150-51.
We, however, expanded their scale to include separate categories for property damage and soft
tissue injuries. We also renamed some ofthe categories.
We realize that our ordinal scale incorporates existing biases in damage awards,
particularly those treating emotional injuries as less significant than physical ones. See, e.g.,
Martha Chamallas, The Architecture of Bias: Deep Structure in Tort Law, 146 U. PA. L. REV.
463 (1998) (critiquing both the attempt to distinguish these two categories of injuries and the
assumption that emotional injuries are less serious than physical ones). Some of the categories,
moreover, are so difficult to compare that the ranking cannot truly be ordinal. Severe property
damage, for example, might well constitute a more serious injury than minor physical bruises.
The placement of soft tissue injuries, moreover, is problematic. A permanent soft tissue injury
may not be as severe as a temporary injury involving broken bones, bums, or surgery. Juries, at
least, may feel that way.
We dealt with these issues by using the ordinal scale but also creating dummy variables
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this full ordinal scale in some analyses. In addition, we created dummy variables
to distinguish both wrongful death cases and those involving only property
damage.62
Table I-1: Twelve-Category Injury Scale
Value Description Sample Injuries
0 Property Damage Only Fire damage, damaged stock
Emotional Distress Only
Temporary Soft Tissue Injury
Temporary Minor Injury
Temporary Significant Injury
Temporary Major Injury
Permanent Soft Tissue Injury
Permanent Minor Injury
Permanent Significant Injury
Permanent Major Injury
Permanent Grave Injury
Death
Mental anguish
Bruises, muscle pain
Lacerations, contusions
Broken ankle, infection, minor
bums
Major bums, several broken
bones, temporary injury requiring
surgery
Chronic muscle pain, lost strength
Loss of finger, loss of toe
Loss of arm or leg, blindness in
one eye, deafness, minor brain
damage
Paraplegia, blindness in both eyes,
serious brain damage, permanent
damage to reproductive system
Quadriplegia, severe brain
damage, vegetative state
Death
for property damage and death cases. These dummies allowed us to test whether juries
responded to those injuries in a way that was out of line with their ordinal rankings. We also
considered constructing dummy variables for emotional distress and soft tissue damages, but
too few of those cases existed in our database to justify those dummies.
62 As explained in the previous note, these dummies helped us explore the fit of our
ordinal scale. See id. We suspected that juries might react to property damage and death cases
in a manner that did not completely fit their ordinal ranking. Some of our results confirmed this
suspicion. See, e.g., infra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
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Another cluster of independent variables attempted to measure resources
devoted to resolving each claim. One of these variables reflects the number of
months between the filing date of the complaint and the jury verdict. Another
gives the number of days consumed by trial. A third variable counts the number
of defense lawyers, while a fourth reflects the number of lawyers on the
plaintiff's team. We also counted the number of expert witnesses used by
plaintiffs and defendants, but this information was reliable only for cases decided
after 1991. A final variable in this category indicates whether a verdict occurred
in a retrial of a case in which a previous verdict had been overturned through a
post-verdict motion or on appeal.
We had some settlement information (either plaintiffs last demand or
defendant's best offer) in forty percent of the cases in our database. For most of
these cases, information about both plaintiffs and defendant's offers was
available. Because of the number of cases with missing values for this variable,
we were unable to use the variable in multivariate analyses. We nonetheless
include some descriptive information and bivariate analyses of settlement offers
in our discussion.
We were able to obtain information on several variables related to gender.
As noted above, we coded the gender for all individual plaintiffs, as well as
whether any woman appeared among the defendants. We also coded whether the
plaintiff's trial team included a woman lawyer and whether the defendant's team
included any women. Finally, we noted whether the judge presiding over the trial
was female.
Our final independent variable allowed us to track changes over time. We
coded the month of each verdict on a continuous scale, with "1" representing
January of 1985 and "144" representing December of 1996. This scale provided
a more sensitive measure of time than simply using the year of verdict.
4. Statistical Techniques
In the discussions that follow, we provide descriptive information about
most of the variables in our database. We then use a variety of bivariate
techniques to explore the relationship between each independent variable and the
two dependent variables.63 The number of product liability cases in our database
was too small to support multivariate analysis of outcomes in those cases. For
medical malpractice verdicts, however, we conducted two types of multivariate
63 Bivariate analyses compare two variables without taking other factors into account. For
discussion of common bivariate analyses, see MOORE, supra note 43, at 111-75 (correlations
and relations in categorical data); id. at 435-62 (comparing means); id. at 522-53 (cross
tabulations); id. at 556-87 (one-way analysis of variance). We performed all of our descriptive
and bivariate calculations with SPSS version 8.0.
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analysis. First, we constructed a logistic regression equation for plaintiff
victories. 64 This analysis allowed us to assess the relationship between each
independent variable and the likelihood that a plaintiff would recover, while
simultaneously controlling for other variables in the equation.65 We then
conducted a tobit analysis on the verdict amount for successful plaintiffs, while
censoring cases in which the defendant prevailed.66 This analysis allowed us to
assess the relationship between each independent variable and verdict size, while
controlling for other factors in the equation. With multivariate analyses, we thus
determined the unique effect each independent variable had on our two
dependent variables: the likelihood that plaintiffs would recover and the size of
their verdicts.
II. PRODUCT LABILiTY VERDICTS
Product liability verdicts comprise only a small percentage of the civil
justice system.67 Despite the relative paucity of these verdicts, critics of the tort
6 4 Logistic regression is the proper regression technique for a dichotomous outcome-
such as whether a malpractice plaintiff won or lost the claim. For discussions of logistic
regression, see J. SCOTT LONG, REGRESSION MODELS FOR CATEGORICAL AND LIMrrED
DEPENDENT VARIABLES (1997); MARIJA J. NORUSIS, SPSS ADVANCED STATISTICS USER'S
GUIDE 45-69 (1990). We used the LIMDEP program for these analyses.
6 5 We omitted a few variables with a high number of missing values from our
multivariate equations. For both multivariate techniques described here, we substituted the
mean for missing values and created a dummy variable marking cases with those missing
values. If the coefficient for the dummy lacked significance, we dropped the dummy and
retained the missing-value substitute in the variable of interest. If the dummy proved
significant, we dropped both that dummy and the original variable from the equation. See
JACOB COHEN & PATRiCiA COHEN, APPLiED MuLTiPLE REGREssION/CORRELATION ANALYSIS
FOR THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 292-96 (2d ed. 1983) (recommending this treatment for
missing values). We needed to drop variables with missing values in only a few instances.
6 6 For a discussion of the tobit model and its uses, see LONG, supra note 64, at 187-216.
Tobit "censors" the dependent value (zero) of defense victories while still incorporating
information about the independent variables from those cases. Including the full value of
defense victories in an ordinary least squares regression would produce misleading results
because for the purpose of estimating damages, these cases were not worth "nothing."
Completely excluding the defense victories, on the other hand, would obscure some
relationships. Tobit analysis solves this problem by incorporating independent variable
information about the defense victories but defining the dependent value as unknown for those
cases. Once again, we used LIMDEP software for this analysis.
67 In Franklin County, product liability claims accounted for only 3.8% of civil jury
verdicts rendered between 1985 and 1994. See CHAPPELEAR, supra note 34, at 4. Nationwide,
product liability cases constitute between 3.0% and 5.4% of civil jury verdicts rendered by
state courts sitting in the nation's largest counties. See DEFRANCES, supra note 7, at 2. The
latter percentage includes all "toxic substance" cases, many of which include product liability
[Vol. 60:315
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE & TORTREFORM
system frequently invoke product liability trials as examples of the justice system
gone awry. Similarly, substantial tort reform efforts focus on product-related
claims.68 Because of the centrality of product liability cases in the tort reform
debate, we focused the first part of our research on those cases.
A. Filings, Trials, and Verdicts
Before examining product liability verdicts, we look briefly at the number of
product liability claims filed each year in Franklin County. The state of Ohio,
unfortunately, did not maintain separate data on product liability cases until
1990. Annual reports from that year through 1996, however, suggest that product
liability filings are both low and declining in Franklin County. As Table II-1
shows, plaintiffs filed or reactivated only 174 product liability claims in 1990.69
By the end of the seven-year period preceding reform, that number had
diminished by almost two-thirds, to only sixty-one new or reactivated claims
each year.
Table 11-1: Product Liability Filings by Year in Franklin County, Ohio
Year Claims Filed, Year Claims Filed,
Reactivated, or Reactivated, or
Transferred Transferred
1990 174 1994 61
1991 118 1995 66
1992 90 1996 61
1993 83
claims. See id. at n.b; see also DANIELS & MARTIN, supra note 2, at 81-82 (estimating that
product liability verdicts accounted for 4.2% ofjury verdicts in state courts); infra notes 228-
50 and accompanying text (reporting further data on the number of product liability claims and
verdicts).
6 8 See, e.g., DANIELS & MARTIN, supra note 2, at 5. See generally supra notes 1, 6.
69 Data for this table are drawn from The Ohio Courts Summary published each year by
the Supreme Court of the State of Ohio. Table 1 reflects data from the table of "Courts of
Common Pleas-General Division, Product Liability Overall Caseloads" for each year (1990-
1996). The court system may not define "product liability" claims in precisely the same manner
we used. The number of product liability jury verdicts reported by the annual Ohio Courts
Summary for Franklin County, however, is very close to our own figures. This suggests a
consistent definition.
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The number of complaints producing jury verdicts was even smaller.
Franklin County juries rendered just forty-four verdicts in product liability cases
between 1985 and 1996-an average of only 3.7 verdicts each year.70 Plaintiffs,
moreover, were surprisingly unsuccessful on their product liability claims. As
Table 1-2 shows, only nine product liability claimants won jury verdicts over the
entire twelve-year period we studied.71 Just one out of every five trials (20.4%)
produced a verdict for the plaintiff.
Table H-2: Product Liability Verdicts by Year in Franklin County, Ohio
Year Plaintiff Wins Defendant Wins Total Verdicts
1985 1 3 4
1986 3 3 6
1987 1 3 4
1988 0 4 4
1989' 1 2 3
1990 1 4 5
1991 1 5 6
1992 0 3 3
1993 0 2 2
1994 0 1 1
1995 1 3 4
1996 0 2 2
Total 9 35 44
Even when plaintiffs prevailed at trial, product liability verdicts were usually
modest. As Table 11-3 shows, one third of the winning verdicts fell under
$100,000. Indeed, all three of these verdicts were less than $50,000; two
plaintiffs recovered only $5,000 apiece, while one obtained $49,322. The median
(middle) product liability award was $207,560, while more than three-quarters of
the awards fell under $400,000.
70 Categorizing lawsuits as "product liability" claims can be difficult. Product liability
suits may overlap with premises liability, negligent operation of motor vehicles, and even
contract cases. We used a relatively generous definition of product liability cases, including
any case in which the plaintiff claimed in whole or in part that a defective product contributed
to personal injury or property damage. Even with this generous definition, product cases
remained scarce.
Two of the verdicts we studied occurred in the same case, after the court of appeals
ordered a new trial in the wake of the first verdict. We counted these verdicts separately
because each trial consumed separate resources and provided a distinct opportunity for
recovery. The defendant, however, prevailed in both of these trials.
71 In a tenth case, the plaintiff lost at trial, but obtained a reversal on appeal. The parties
then settled the case for an undisclosed amount.
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Table 11-3: Verdicts for Successful Plaintiffs, Product Liability Trials in
Franklin County, Ohio, 1985-1996
Verdict Range Number Percentage Cumulative
of Cases Percentage
$0-99,999 3 33.3 33.3
$100,000-199,999 1 11.1 44.4
$200,000-299,999 2 22.2 66.6
$300,000-399,999 1 11.1 77.7
$400,000 or more 2 22.2 99.9
The nine verdicts, however, did include two relatively high awards. One
plaintiff recovered $783,000, while another obtained $4,350,000. These two
verdicts pulled the mean (average) award up to $681,522. The high verdicts
seemed to reflect severe damages, admitted liability, or both. The defendant
conceded liability in the only product liability lawsuit to generate a verdict over
one million dollars; the plaintiff in that case was a seventeen-year-old boy
rendered quadriplegic. Even the high awards, moreover, reflected purely
compensatory damages. No plaintiff persuaded a jury to award punitive damages
on a product liability claim in Franklin County during the entire twelve-year
period we studied.
The few plaintiffs who prevailed in product liability claims appeared to
defend those verdicts successfully against post-judgment attack. According to
our information, trial judges did not reduce any of the nine awards for
plaintiffs.72 Defendants appealed at least two of these awards, but the appellate
court likewise affirmed both verdicts without reduction.73
Defendants, on the other hand, were somewhat less successful in defending
their trial victories. Plaintiffs appealed at least eleven of the cases they lost from
72 As noted above, see supra note 50 and accompanying text, we did not perform a
complete search of post-trial activity for the jury verdicts in our database. We recorded
information only when it was available in the verdict summaries we coded. In medical
malpractice cases, however, we noted quite a few cases in which the trial or appellate court
reduced a verdict. See infra notes 136-37 and accompanying text. It is noteworthy, therefore,
that no such instances appeared in our data for product liability cases.
73 During an earlier period, defendants may have been more successful in reducing
plaintiff awards. A study of product liability cases decided in five states between 1983 and
1985 found that judges reduced awards in half those cases. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, PuB. No. GAO/MRD-89-99, PRODUCT LiABILrrv: VERDicTs AND CASE REsOLUrON
IN FIVE STATES 45 tbl.3.5 (1989). Since the mid-1980s, juries may have become more
conservative in product liability cases, leading to fewer reversals or verdict reductions. Indeed,
we speculate below that juries may have become too conservative in recent years, leading to
some reversals favoring plaintiffs. See infra note 75 and accompanying text.
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1985 through 1996, and the appellate court remanded for a new trial in three of
those lawsuits.74 This pattern suggests that trial judges and juries may have been
too harsh toward product liability plaintiffs during the period we studied and that
appellate judges acted to curb that tendency. If trial courts and juries erred in
product cases, in other words, their errors seemed to favor defendants rather than
plaintiffs.75
B. Plaintiffs and Defendants
The plaintiffs in the forty-four product liability trials included individuals,
government agencies, and corporations. One plaintiff was a city school system,
seeking recovery against a manufacturer who had supplied ceiling plaster
containing asbestos. Three other plaintiffs were insurance companies pursuing
subrogation claims after compensating an insured for a product-related loss. In
two of the subrogation cases, the injured party was an individual; in the third it
was a research institute claiming property damage from an inadequate fire
retardant.76
Individuals appeared as plaintiffs in the other forty product liability trials.
One case stemmed from a product-related accident that killed one person and
injured two others; plaintiffs sought to recover on behalf of all three victims. The
other thirty-nine claims involved just one injured individual.77 Overall, therefore,
74 Plaintiffs obtained settlements of an undisclosed amount before two of the other
appeals were resolved; the appellate court affirmed the trial court in the remaining six cases.
Obtaining a new trial, of course, far from guaranteed victory for the plaintiff. One of the
three plaintiffs who obtained a new trial lost before the second jury as well. Further information
was unavailable about the other two cases.
75 During an earlier period, James Henderson and Theodore Eisenberg found evidence
that product liability defendants succeeded more often than plaintiffs on appeal and that
defendants' success rates increased over time. See James A. Henderson Jr. & Theodore
Eisenberg, The Quiet Revolution in Products Liability: An Empirical Study of Legal Change,
37 UCLA L. REv. 479 (1990) (analyzing cases published nationwide from 1976 to 1988). Our
database is much smaller than the one analyzed by Henderson and Eisenberg and we did not
focus on appellate outcomes-so our contrary findings are merely suggestive. It is possible,
however, that trends have again shifted in appellate courts-especially as trial verdicts have
begun to favor defendants so heavily.
76 For most of the analyses reported below, we analyze these subrogation claims as if the
injured party appeared as the plaintiff. Thus, we measure the severity of each injured party's
physical damages. When we take subrogation into account, we specifically note that fact.
77 As noted above, our tally of injured plaintiffs excludes any consortium plaintiffs. We
included any damages for loss of consortium with the award for the plaintiff suffering direct
physical injury. See supra note 53.
In one case, husband-and-wife farmers sued for injury to their livestock from allegedly
defective feed. Although both appeared as plaintiffs, they alleged injury to their common
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these forty-four trials involved the claims of one government agency, one private
institution, and forty-four individuals.78 For the remaining analyses in this
section, we present data by claimant rather than trial.
We knew the gender of forty-one out of the forty-four individual plaintiffs.
Nine of those plaintiffs (22.0%) were female, while thirty-two (78.0%) were
male. Men were even more heavily represented among successful plaintiffs.
Seven out of the eight successful individual plaintiffs were men; men won about
one-fifth (21.9%) of their product liability claims, while women prevailed in
only one-tenth (11.1%) of their lawsuits. The total number of cases is too small
to draw statistically significant conclusions from this gender gap. The figures,
however, suggest that men are more likely than women to assert product liability
claims-at least at trial-and that men are particularly likely to succeed on those
claims.79
We knew the plaintiff's age for about half (45.7%) of the individual
plaintiffs. Among those twenty-one plaintiffs, about one-quarter (23.8%) were
minors. None were over sixty-four. We noticed no difference in recovery rates
between minor and adult plaintiffs although the number of plaintiffs included in
this analysis was quite small.80 We did observe that the mean age for all product
liability plaintiffs in our database was only 37.2 years, suggesting that product
liability claims proceeding to trial are the province of relatively young plaintiffs.
The defendants in all forty-four of the product liability trials were
economic interest. Thus, we treated this lawsuit as involving one individual plaintiff.
78 As explained above (see supra note 76), this tally substitutes the directly injured party
for any insurance company pursuing a subrogation claim.
79 Because our data are limited to jury verdicts, it is difficult to determine the origin of
these gender differences. It is possible that men suffer more injuries giving rise to product
liability claims-perhaps because they work more often with dangerous machines or toxic
chemicals. It is also possible, however, that men are more likely to sue over these injuries than
women are. Finally, men may be less likely than women to settle their product liability
claims-or defendants may be less likely to offer men favorable settlements on these claims.
All of these scenarios (and perhaps others) could explain the gender differences we observed.
Our data on gender differences in product liability verdicts are similar to findings by
Thomas Koenig and Michael Rustad. Those researchers found that men outnumbered women
four to one as punitive damage recipients in product liability cases. See Thomas Koenig &
Michael Rustad, His and Her Tort Reform: Gender Injustice in Disguise, 70 WAsH. L. REv. 1,
34 (1995). Because Koenig and Rustad examined a database composed exclusively of cases in
which punitive damages had been awarded, they could not differentiate between gender
differences in the award of punitives and gender distinctions in underlying win rates. See id.
Our data suggest that men simply outnumber women as both product liability plaintiffs injury
trials and as successful plaintiffs at those trials. It is not surprising, under those circumstances,
that they also outnumber women among plaintiffs receiving punitive damage awards.
80 Among individual plaintiffs for whom we had age information, one out of five minors
(20.0%) recovered, while three out of sixteen adults (18.8%) prevailed at trial.
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organizations rather than individuals, so we could not examine any potential
differences in the treatment of individual and organizational defendants. The
defendant in one of our cases was a school district. In the other forty-three trials,
the defendant was a private company such as the manufacturer or retailer of a
product.
C. Fault, Context, and Injury
One product liability defendant conceded fault before trial. This defendant
both lost the trial on causation/damages and suffered the largest jury award.
Juries similarly penalized careless plaintiffs. Juries attributed fault to three of the
product liability plaintiffs in our database, and all three of those plaintiffs lost at
trial.8 1
The product liability claims arose in a variety of contexts-including the
workplace, home, and highway. The largest category of claims proceeding to
trial (28.3%) involved nonrecreational injuries that occurred at home,82 while the
next largest group (23.9%) involved workplace injuries. Another tenth of the
claims (8.7%) were business disputes in which a business claimed economic loss
from a defective product. Almost two-thirds (60.9%) of the claimants proceeding
to trial, therefore, had suffered injury while laboring at home or in the workplace.
The dominance of work-related claims contrasts with popular notions that
product liability lawsuits center on recreational injuries. 83
Only one-fiftfi of the plaintiffs (19.6%) suffered an injury in a purely
recreational context, while another 4.3% were injured in a restaurant or other
commercial setting that might be considered recreational. The remaining injuries
occurred either in connection with a motor vehicle accident (10.9%) or medical
treatment (4.3%).
Recovery rates varied somewhat according to the context of the injury.
Plaintiffs injured in recreational contexts or through medical treatment appeared
81 Ohio is a comparative negligence jurisdiction, allowing plaintiffs to recover as long as
their negligence was "no greater than the combined negligence" of all defendants and potential
defendants. See OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.19(A)(2) (Anderson 1998). The Ohio Supreme
Court has ruled that comparative negligence does not diminish the recovery of plaintiffs
pursuing product liability claims based on strict liability. See Bowling v. Heil Co., 511 N.E.2d
373 (Ohio 1987). Product-related claims based on negligence, however, are subject to
comparative fault rules.
82 Nonrecreational injuries in the home included accidents with ladders, lawn mowers,
and other appliances. We counted injuries arising from hobbies, swimming pools, and other
recreational uses as "recreational" claims whether they occurred at home or elsewhere. See
supra note 58 and accompanying text.
83 See DANIELS & MARTIN, supra note 2, at 175-98 (commenting on a similar finding).
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even less likely than other product liability claimants to recover.84 Plaintiffs
injured in motor vehicle accidents, conversely, appeared somewhat more likely
than other plaintiffs to recover.85 Partly because of the small number of total
claims, however, none of these differences achieved statistical significance.
Injuries in litigated product liability claims varied from minor bodily injury
to death.86 One-tenth of the claims (11.4%) involved purely property damage,
and one plaintiff asserted only emotional distress. Almost half the claims
(47.8%) alleged temporary bodily injury although some of those temporary
injuries involved multiple fractures or other serious harms. One-fifth of the
litigated claims (20.5%) were for permanent bodily injury, while another fifth
(18.2%) were for wrongful death.
Once again, we noticed some variation in recovery rate depending on the
severity of the plaintiffs injury. Plaintiffs who asserted only property damage
appeared somewhat more likely than other plaintiffs to prevail at trial; two of
these five plaintiffs (40.0%) won their cases before juries, while only 17.9% of
other product liability plaintiffs prevailed. Similarly, four out of the thirteen
plaintiffs (30.8%) with temporary significant or temporary major injuries (e.g.,
broken bones, bums, or injuries requiring surgery) prevailed before juries.
Conversely, only one of the nine plaintiffs (11.1%) who suffered permanent
injuries recovered at trial. Plaintiffswho died from their product-related injuries
had an average recovery rate (25.0%) at trial.
The total number of claims is too small to draw firm conclusions from this
pattern; although the differences are suggestive, none achieved statistical
significance. These preliminary findings, however, suggest that juries do not
necessarily find for the most severely injured plaintiffs. On the contrary, there is
some tendency to return verdicts in favor of plaintiffs who suffer either property
damage or temporary, although debilitating, personal injuries. Plaintiffs with
more serious, permanent injuries-including those who suffer death--may fare
less well at trial. Some researchers have suggested that this kind of pattern
derives from jurors' psychological defenses-jurors blame the victims of
84 Only one out of nine plaintiffs injured in recreational accidents (11.1%) prevailed at
trial, while neither of the two plaintiffs injured during the course of medical treatment obtained
jury verdicts in their favor. In contrast, 18.2% of the plaintiffs injured at work, 23.1% of
plaintiffs injured in nonrecreational accidents at home, and 25.0% of plaintiffs with business
disputes prevailed at trial.
85 Two out of five plaintiffs who asserted product liability claims stemming from motor
vehicle accidents (40.0%) won favorable jury verdicts. This percentage, notably, falls between
the overall win rate for plaintiffs in product liability suits (19.6%) and the much higher win rate
for plaintiffs injured in all motor vehicle accidents. The latter percentage was 71.6% in our
Franklin County data.
86 For two plaintiffs, we lacked sufficient information to categorize their injury. The
percentages reported here exclude those two claimants.
1999]
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
accidental harm when injuries are severe because they do not want to believe that
such devastating injuries could happen to them.87 On the other hand, this type of
recovery pattern might also derive from settlement behavior; it is possible that
defendants more readily settle meritorious claims brought by severely injured
plaintiffs than less injured ones or that severely injured plaintiffs are more
willing to proceed to trial even when their claims are weak. Whatever the
explanation for the trend we identified, the pattern refutes any notion that juries
resolve product liability claims on the basis of sympathy for the most injured
claimants.
Among plaintiffs who suffered bodily injury and prevailed at trial, the
degree of injury correlated positively with verdict size (r=.397).88 Jury awards,
therefore, appeared to follow the severity of the plaintiff's injury. The
correlation, however, was not statistically significant (p=.378); the small number
of successful claims involving bodily injury precludes drawing statistically
reliable conclusions from that correlation.
D. Conduct ofLitigation
The average product liability claim took almost three years to come to
trial.89 On average, 33.6 months elapsed between the filing of a product liability
complaint and trial on that complaint.90 Even when we excluded three trials that
were retrials of earlier dispositions, so that we examined only time to first jury
trial, the average product liability claim took 32.1 months to ripen for trial.
Product liability claims that arose in recreational or motor vehicle settings
appeared to take longer than other product claims to reach trial, but the
differences were not large enough to be statistically significant.91 Death cases did
not take significantly longer than nondeath cases to come to trial; nor did we find
8 7 See, e.g., Neil Feigenson et al., Effect of Blameworthiness and Outcome Severity on
Attributions ofResponsibility and Damage Awards in Comparative Negligence Cases, 21 LAW
& HUM. BEHAV. 597 (1997).
88 The letter 'Y' conventionally represents the correlation coefficient between two
variables. For sources discussing correlation, see supra note 63.
8 9 In this section, we analyze outcomes by verdict rather than by plaintiff. In other words,
we treat the trial involving three plaintiffs as a single case.
90 A nationwide survey of civil suits in the seventy-five largest counties yielded a similar
figure; product liability claims averaged 32.0 months from complaint to jury verdict with a
median of 28.9 months, See DEFRANCES, supra note 7, at 10.
91 Claims that arose in a recreational setting took, on average, 41.4 months to reach trial,
while nonrecreational claims took 31.4 months (p--.16). Similarly, product claims associated
with motor vehicle accidents took 46.7 months to reach trial, while nonvehicular claims took
32.6 months (p=.22). Only three product claims arose out of motor vehicle accidents-
counseling particular caution in interpreting the last figure.
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any significant correlation between the severity of injury and the time to trial.
Once in the courtroom, the average product liability claim consumed 5.7
trial days. The range, however, was substantial-from less than one day to
sixteen full days. More than a quarter of product trials concluded in three days or
less, while more than half finished by the end of the fifth day. The context of an
injury (e.g., recreational, work-related, vehicular) was unrelated to the length of
trial. Death cases, however, appeared to take longer to try than other product
claims. 92
Almost two-thirds of product claimants (63.6%) staffed their trials with a
single lawyer. The remaining plaintiffs employed only two lawyers, for a mean
of 1.4 plaintiff's lawyers in product cases. Two-thirds of all defendants (65.9%),
on the other hand, used at least two lawyers at trial, while 11.4% employed four
or five lawyers. The average number of defense lawyers in product trials was 2.0.
Notably, product liability defendants used significantly more lawyers than did
medical malpractice defendants.93
Although product liability plaintiffs used relatively few lawyers at trial, they
employed more expert witnesses than product defendants did.94 Only one out of
twelve plaintiffs (8.3%) proceeded to trial without any expert witnesses. Three
quarters of product liability trials used two or more expert witnesses for the
plaintiff with four marking the highest number of those witnesses. One-third of
product liability defendants, on the other hand, used no experts at trial, and
almost half (41.7%) employed only one expert. The mean number of experts for
product liability plaintiffs was 2.0, while for defendants it was 1.0.
Defendants devoted significantly more lawyers to wrongful death trials than
to those in which the plaintiff survived.95 Defendants also employed
significantly more expert witnesses in death cases than in nondeath ones.96 In
addition, after excluding both death cases and claims involving only property
damage from our analysis, we observed a high positive correlation between the
92 On average, death cases took 7.4 days to try, while other product claims took only 5.3
days. The difference was not statistically significant (p=.14 ), but may be suggestive. Overall,
the severity of injury did not correlate significantly with trial length.
93 Defendants in medical malpractice trials, on average, employed only 1.6 lawyers
(p=.015). See also infra note 171 and accompanying text (discussing defense lawyers in
malpractice cases).
94 As discussed above, we have reliable data on expert witnesses only for cases decided
after 1991. See supra text following note 62. The comparisons in this paragraph, therefore,
analyze only the twelve product liability cases decided from 1992 through 1996.
95 Defendants employed 2.6 lawyers, on average, when the plaintiff had died and just 1.8
lawyers when the plaintiff's injury was less than death (p=.041).
96 In death cases, defendants averaged 2.2 experts, while in nondeath cases they averaged
just .82 experts (p=.03 1).
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number of defense experts and the severity of the plaintiff's injury.97 Defendants,
therefore, appear to have devoted more resources (both lawyers and expert
witnesses) to trials involving claims of death or serious personal injury. The
strategy seems rational, because defendants would expect the highest verdicts in
those cases.
Plaintiffs, like defendants, seemed to devote more expert witnesses to claims
involving serious injury or death.98 Again, the relationship could signal the
possibility of higher verdicts in those cases, justifying a greater investment of
resources. Alternatively, claims of serious injury or death may require more
expert witnesses because the question of setting damages is more complex.
Curiously, especially given their willingness to devote more expert witnesses
to these cases, plaintiffs employed significantlyfewer lawyers in product liability
trials involving serious physical injuries than in those claiming less serious
harm.99 Even in death cases, plaintiffs appeared to use fewer lawyers than they
did for other product liability claims.100 It is hard to explain this paradox.
Perhaps plaintiffs view serious injury claims as simpler to win or as more
susceptible to jury sympathy, thereby reducing the need for a large legal team.101
Alternatively, lawyers from smaller offices (with fewer attorneys to devote to
trial) may be more likely to push disputed claims involving severe injuries to trial
than are their colleagues from larger firms; this difference could explain the trend
towards fewer plaintiffs' attorneys in product liability trials centered on more
serious injuries.
We noted one further relationship between legal staff and expert witnesses
that is interesting. The correlation between the number of plaintiff's experts and
number of defendant's lawyers was quite high (.619, p=.001). This correlation
may suggest a tendency for plaintiffs to fight difficult cases on the facts (by using
97 The correlation was .886 (p=.003). Caution should be exercised in interpreting this
correlation, however, because it is based on only eight observations.
98 Plaintiffs introduced, on average, 2.5 experts in death cases, but only 1.4 experts in
other product cases. The overall correlation between severity of injury and number of expert
witnesses (once we excluded claims involving only property damage) was .742. Neither of
these differences achieved statistical significance (p=.1 19 for the first comparison and p=.113
for the second), and both are based on a small number of cases, so they are merely suggestive.
Plaintiffs also employed significantly more expert witnesses (3.3) when the injured person
was a child than when the injured party was an adult (1.4, p=.026). This difference may have
reflected the need for expert testimony to show a child's future earnings and claimed loss.
99 The correlation coefficient for these two variables was -.33 (p=.02 9).
100 On average, plaintiffs employed 1.1 lawyers in death cases, but 1.4 lawyers in
nondeath cases. This difference, however, did not achieve statistical significance (p=.127 ).
101 If such a perception exists, it appears to be incorrect. As explained above, plaintiffs
with more severe injuries were less likely to recover in product liability trials than were
plaintiffs with more modest injuries. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
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additional expert witnesses), while defendants combat them on the law (by
employing additional attorneys). On the other hand, the relationship may derive
simply from the plaintiffs burden of proof in a civil suit combined with the
product liability defendant's incentive (and financial ability) to invest heavily in
legal counsel. As the proponent in court, plaintiffs often find expert witnesses
essential to establish both liability and damages; adding expert witnesses may be
unavoidable for plaintiffs in complex cases. Product liability defendants, on the
other hand, have an incentive to invest especially heavily in trial defense because
any courtroom loss raises the possibility of multiple claims from other users of
the same product. The corporate defendants who predominate in product liability
trials, moreover, often have the resources to respond to that incentive.102 Taken
together, these circumstances might prompt plaintiffs to add expert witnesses to
satisfy their burden of proof in difficult cases, while defendants add attorneys in
those cases.
Whatever the explanation for the intriguing correlation between the number
of plaintiffs expert witnesses and that of defendant's trial counsel, the more
important fact is that both of those numbers are surprisingly low. Although
product liability claims offer some of the highest stakes in civil litigation-for
both plaintiffs and defendants-parties staff those cases sparsely. Neither armies
of experts nor cadres of lawyers marked the typical product liability trial in
Franklin County.
None of these trial-related variables, moreover, seemed to affect the
plaintiffs likelihood of recovery. Neither trial length nor elapsed time between
complaint and trial correlated significantly with plaintiff success. Nor did the
number of lawyers or expert witnesses (for either side) vary significantly
between successful and unsuccessful plaintiffs. 103 Our failure to find any
significant relationship among these variables does not mean that plaintiffs and
defendants made poor resource allocation decisions. On the contrary, if both
102 Product liability plaintiffs also have an incentive to invest heavily in their trials.
Although they are unlikely to be repeat players, the trial represents the plaintiffs only
opportunity to recover damages for an often devastating injury. The individual plaintiffs who
predominate in product claims, however, often lack the means to invest that heavily in their
trials. Indeed, most of these plaintiffs rely upon contingency contracts to retain their trial
counsel, and contingent fee lawyers have an incentive to minimize the number of counsel
participating in a case so that they maximize the value of the contingency agreement. This is
especially true in fields like product liability in which plaintiff win rates are so low.
103 Likewise, none of these trial-related variables correlated significantly with the amount
that successful plaintiffs recovered. The number of cases for these analyses, however, was too
small to be meaningful; only nine product liability plaintiffs recovered a jury verdict during the
years we studied, and we lacked information on some trial-related variables for some of these
cases.
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sides made equally effective decisions, their efforts would have canceled one
another out.
E. Settlements
Table 11-4 summarizes the settlement information available on product-
liability claims that proceeded to trial.104 We have some information on
seventeen (37.0%) of the claims, and information on both parties' final
settlement offers in fourteen (30.4%) of the cases.
Plaintiffs' settlement demands correlated strongly with the severity of their
injuries; plaintiffs who had suffered more severe bodily injuries demanded, on
average, higher settlements than did other plaintiffs.10 5 Defendants' offers, on
the other hand, showed no correlation with injury severity.10 6 Nor did the size of
defendants' offers correlate with that of plaintiffs' demands; indeed, this
correlation coefficient was negative. 10 7 These facts suggest that plaintiffs and
defendants differed, not only in their assessment of fault, but in their valuation of
the plaintiffs injury.108 Alternatively, the defendants' somewhat surprising
pattern of offers might be due to their perception that the most seriously injured
plaintiffs were also least likely to recover; thus, they discounted those potential
awards more heavily than possible awards to less seriously injured plaintiffs.10 9
Our analyses provide some support for the latter perception; as noted above,
the most seriously injured plaintiffs were somewhat less likely to prevail in
product liability trials.I10 Overall, however, defendants' settlement offers did not
accurately predict a plaintiffs likelihood of winning at trial. Instead, there was
104 We analyze settlement information by plaintiff rather than by verdict. No settlement
information, however, was available for the one product liability case with multiple plaintiffs.
105 We excluded cases involving only property damage from this analysis because of the
difficulty of comparing property damage to bodily injury. After excluding the former cases, the
correlation between severity of the plaintiff's injury and size of the settlement demand was .782
(p=.003).
106 This correlation coefficient was -.026 (p=.925).
107 r = -.224; p=.484.
108 lfplaintiffs and defendants differed only on their assessment of fault, we would expect
defendant's offers to fall below plaintiff's demands but still to correlate positively with them.
Defendants, in other words, would make higher offers to seriously injured plaintiffs because
their financial exposure in those cases was higher.
109 In medical malpractice cases, in contrast, the size of both plaintiffs' demands and
defendants' offers showed a significant positive correlation with injury severity once we
excluded wrongful death cases. See infra note 188 and accompanying text. The size of
plaintiffs' demands also seemed to correlate positively with that of defendants' offers. See infra
note 191 and accompanying text.
1 10 See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
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very little correlation between these two variables.11 1 Nor did the size of a
plaintiff's demand accurately predict the plaintiffs likelihood of recovering.
Indeed, the relationship between the latter two variables was negative, although
nonsignificant. 112
Table 11-4: Final Settlement Offers and Demands, Product Liability Claims
in Franklin County, Ohio, 1985-1996
Defendant's Last Plaintiff's Last Verdict Defendant's Plaintiff s Gain
Offer Demand Gain
0 240,000 0 240,000 0
0 n/a 0 n/a 0
0 1,000,000 0 1,000,000 0
1500 15,000 0 15,000 -1500
2500 300,000 0 300,000 -2500
3000 30,000 49,322 -19,322 46,322
3250 4100 0 4100 -3250
3500 n/a 228,819 n/a 225,319
5000 87,000 5000 82,000 0
7500 300,000 0 300,000 -7500
12,000 n/a 0 n/a -12,000
15,000 750,000 0 750,000 -15,000
15,000 350,000 0 350,000 -15,000
20,000 175,000 0 175,000 -20,000
25,000 50,000 180,000 -130,000 155,000
25,000 475,000 0 475,000 -25,000
50,000 100,000 0 100,000 -50,000
Plaintiffs made a "mistake" by rejecting settlement offers and going to trial
more often than defendants did; in four cases, plaintiffs gained no additional
recovery (beyond the defendant's last offer) by going to trial, while in ten cases
the plaintiff recovered less at trial than the defendant had offered in settlement.
All ten of the latter cases were cases in which the defendant offered a small
I I I r = -.085 (p=.7 47 ).
112 r = -A07 (p=.148). It is plausible that plaintiff's demands would correlate negatively
with trial success because plaintiffs typically lower their demands during active settlement
negotiations. In weak cases, defendants might refuse to offer any settlement to the plaintiff or
might make a token offer that is too low to elicit counter bargaining from the plaintiff. In these
cases, then, the plaintiff's "last demand" would be the very high demand with which the
plaintiff attempted to initiate settlement discussions. In more meritorious cases, the parties
might have narrowed the gap between their offers before breaking off negotiations-thus
leading to lower "last offers" for those more meritorious claims.
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settlement (never more than $50,000 and usually less than $20,000) and the
plaintiff lost at trial. 13
Defendants, on the other hand, "mistakenly" rejected settlement demands
and went to trial in only two cases. In the twelve other cases for which we know
the plaintiffs final demand, the defendants saved substantial money by going to
trial rather than satisfying that last demand. In nine of those twelve cases, the
savings amounted to $100,000 or more. Indeed, in one controversy the defendant
refused to offer any settlement in response to a $1,000,000 demand and prevailed
at trial.
Despite these differences between plaintiffs and defendants, both plaintiffs
and defendants made rational decisions to proceed to trial if we consider cases in
the aggregate. Although plaintiffs lost four-fifths of the cases they tried,
substantial verdicts in the nine cases they won more than offset their "losses" in
declining small settlement offers on cases they lost. Overall, plaintiffs netted
$274,891 by rejecting defendants' settlement offers and proceeding to trial. On
average, this was a gain of $16,170 per case. Defendants gained even more in the
aggregate. By refusing to satisfy plaintiff demands, defendants saved more than
three-and-one-half-million dollars ($3,641,778) in the aggregate or an average of
$260,127 per case.
The savings on both sides, of course, are not nearly as large if we consider
the costs of going to trial. Especially in the case of plaintiffs, trial costs may have
eliminated apparent savings. 114 It is also difficult to estimate the impact of these
trials on other cases in the pipeline. Defendants may have saved even more than
the numbers in Table 11-4 suggest by establishing precedents against particular
types of recovery. Likewise, plaintiffs (and their lawyers) may have gained more
than the table reveals by demonstrating to settlement-wary defendants that they
were willing to go to court. The "gains" recorded in Table 11-4, therefore, offer
only a rough estimate of the gains each side realized by going to trial.
Aggregating the gains and losses in Table 11-4 is artificial in another sense;
different parties and lawyers participated in the different cases. No one individual
113 Defendants offered no settlement in three (17.6%) of the cases for which we have
information on defendants' offers. This percentage is quite similar to the percentage of "zero
offers" in product liability cases reported in a study by Samuel Gross and Kent Syverud. See
Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Getting to No: A Study of Settlement Negotiations and
the Selection of Cases for Trial, 90 MIcH. L. REV. 319, 360 (1991) (product liability
defendants made zero offers in 21.6% of cases for which offer information was available).
114 Samuel Gross and Kent Syverud estimate that a trial costs at least $10,000 in
economic costs; consequently, in their analysis of litigation outcomes, they counted plaintiffs
as successful only when they recovered at least $10,000 more than they would have received
through settlement. See id. at 336-37. If we use the same $10,000 figure to assess plaintiffs'
trial costs, plaintiffs realized only about $6,170 per case by pushing claims to trial.
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or company realized a net gain from these diverse lawsuits.115 Nonetheless, the
aggregate figures illustrate a dynamic that may inform individual settlement
negotiations. Defendants in product liability suits have a strong win record in
Franklin County; they are likely to prevail if they go to trial. Overall, therefore,
defendants will recognize substantial savings by declining plaintiffs' demands
and pushing the case to trial-although they occasionally will pay more in
response to a jury verdict than they would have by satisfying the plaintiffs
demand.
Plaintiffs have an incentive to proceed to trial for a different reason. They are
more likely than defendants to lose at trial, but because defendants' settlement
offers are low, they will recover enough in their occasional wins to make trial
tempting. No one plaintiff will recognize an overall gain; indeed, four out of five
plaintiffs will lose. The payoff on the one-in-five gamble, however, is about
$681,522 (the mean verdict for plaintiffs who prevailed on product liability
claims) compared to an average settlement offer (in these litigated cases) of only
$11,074 offered by the defendant.
Under these circumstances, it is surprising that the number of product
liability trials remains so low. The low number of trials, contrasted with the
above incentives to proceed to trial, suggests that other factors constrain most
claims to settle or to evaporate without payment.11 6 To trace those factors, we
need information about the vast majority of product liability claims that fail to
reach court.1 17 Based on the limited information in this database, however, it
appears that neither plaintiffs nor defendants resolve too many claims at trial or
bring a poor assortment of controversies to court; both sides recognized
economic gains by bringing this set of disputes to the courtroom. It is possible, of
course, that either plaintiffs or defendants push too few cases to trial-or that
they could choose a better array of cases for the jury. To evaluate the latter
decisions, we must obtain information on the full set of claims that are settled or
withdrawn.
115 In the case of defendants, an aggregate gain is somewhat more plausible. Certain
companies or industries undoubtedly are repeat players in product liability lawsuits. Insurance
companies who provide liability insurance are even more likely to be repeat players.
116 Commentators often speak of complaints that fail to reach trial as "settling." In many
of these cases, however, the plaintiff settles for no payment at all. One study estimates the
percentage of medical malpractice claims dismissed without payment as 40%. See VIDMAR,
supra note 2, at 24. Obtaining further information about these claims, as well as about claims
that never generate a legal complaint, is one of the most pressing tasks in studying the tort
system.
117 We are in the process of gathering information about settled and abandoned claims
from plaintiffs' lawyers in Franklin County. Although the data gathering process is time-
consuming, especially because of the need to protect client confidentiality, those data should
offer the first detailed perspective on tort claims that fail to reach trial.
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F. Gender Differences
As noted above, men greatly outnumbered women among the plaintiffs who
tried product liability claims in Franklin County.1 8 Men were also more likely
than women to win their product liability suits although these differences were
not statistically significant.
Male plaintiffs most heavily outnumbered female ones in nonrecreational
home-based injuries where men accounted for twelve of the thirteen disputes
(92.3%) resolved by juries. Women, on the other hand, were most prevalent in
product claims arising out of motor vehicle accidents (33.3% female) and
medical care (50.0% female). The overall numbers are too small to draw firm
conclusions, but the pattern is interesting. It is possible that men suffer more
product-related injuries than women while working around the home, but women
suffer disproportionately from those injuries while receiving medical
treatment. 19 It is also possible, however, that the discrepancies arise from
differences in claiming or settlement rates.120 Without fuirther information on
claims settled or dropped before trial, it is impossible to distinguish those effects
in our data.
Women were also scarce among the lawyers who tried product liability
claims. No women represented product liability plaintiffs, while only four
defendants (8.7%) employed at least one woman at trial. Those few female
defense lawyers tended to work on teams with a higher number of lawyers. 121
They also were more likely to appear in more recent trials. 122 These two
relationships suggest that women's participation in product liability trials may be
on the rise.123 Still, given the large number of women who have graduated from
law school during the last twenty years, 124 the number of female lawyers
118 See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
119 Men, for example, may be more likely to work with ladders, lawn mowers, power
tools, and other products that cause serious injury while performing home-based chores.
12 0 See supra note 79.
121 Defense teams with a female lawyer averaged 2.5 lawyers overall, while all-male
defense teams averaged 2.0 lawyers. In part because of the small number of teams with any
female lawyers, this difference was not statistically significant (p-.3 9 8).
12 2 The correlation between trial year and presence of a female defense lawyer was .280
(p--.059).
123 Large defense teams may be more likely than small ones to include junior lawyers.
The appearance of women on the former teams, therefore, may signal that they are beginning
to move up through the ranks of trial lawyers. Similarly, the appearance of more women at
recent trials suggests that the number of female trial counsel is growing.
124 By the 1977-1978 academic year, women constituted almost one-third of all enrolled
law students. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, APPROVED LAW SCHOOLS: STATISTICAL
INFORMATION ON AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION APPROVED LAW SCHOOLS 451 (1998 ed.
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participating in product liability trials is surprisingly low.
Two other noteworthy gender correlations appeared in our analyses. Cases
staffed with at least one female lawyer took longer to come to trial,125 and these
cases generated significantly higher settlement offers (on average) than did cases
staffed with no women.126 The total number of product liability claims was too
small to support multivariate analysis, so we cannot be sure these relationships
would persist after controlling for other factors. Women lawyers, for example,
never appeared solo at trial; they always worked on teams. It is possible that the
cases on which these women worked were, on average, more complex than cases
staffed by men alone. If so, the length of pre-trial delay and size of settlement
offer might derive from the complexity of the case rather than the presence of a
female attorney.127 The bivariate correlation, however, suggests the utility of
exploring further the relationship between gender and trial strategies.
Female judges presided over five of the product liability claims (10.9%) in
our database. Women were significantly more likely to preside over recent
verdicts than older ones.128 Somewhat more surprisingly, we detected a possible
negative relationship between the presence of a female judge and the number of
lawyers for the plaintiff. Only one lawyer represented the plaintiff in each of the
five cases tried before a female judge. An average of 1.4 lawyers, on the other
hand, represented plaintiffs before male judges. This difference merely
approached significance at the conventional level (p=.059), but it signals a
possible relationship. Once again, the finding suggests the fruitfialness of
exploring a variety of gender relationships in the courtroom.
1997) (during the 1977-1978 academic year, 113,080 students were enrolled in J.D. programs,
and 31,650 of them were women). By 1987-1988, women comprised more than 41% of all
law students, and by 1996-1997, the percentage of women students exceeded 44%. See id.
125 The correlation between length of time before trial and presence of a female defense
lawyerwas .311 (p-.040).
126 The correlation between size of the defendant's last offer and presence of at least one
woman on the defense team was .569 (p=.017). This positive correlation did not stem simply
from women working on more recent cases with inflation-affected offers. Even after
substituting constant 1984 dollars for actual settlement offers, the correlation between size of
the defendant's last offer and presence of a female attomey was .550 (p=.022).
127 The relationships, however, do not seem to derive simply from the fact that women
worked on larger defense teams. The correlation between number of defense lawyers and
length of pre-trial delay was negative (r--.076) and nonsignificant (p=.63 2). The correlation
between size of settlement offer and number of defense attorneys was positive (r=.A01), but it
did not reach significance (p=.1 11) and was not as large as the correlation between settlement
offer and presence of a female attorney.
128 The correlation between verdict year and presence of a female judge was .296
(p=.046).
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G. Trends
A "crisis" may emerge from trends in filings, trial rates, or verdicts, rather
than from average figures over more than a decade. In this section, we briefly
examine changes in product liability cases during the twelve years we studied.
As noted above, there is no evidence that product liability filings increased
in Franklin County during these twelve years. On the contrary, as Table II-1
shows, filings decreased by almost two-thirds between 1990 (the first year such
data were available) and 1996. In 1996, plaintiffs filed or reactivated only 61
product liability cases in Franklin County compared with a high of 174 in 1990.
Nor did the number of product liability verdicts increase during the last
twelve years. As Table 11-2 demonstrates, the number of product liability
verdicts never exceeded six during each of those years; the table shows no
marked growth in verdicts. On the contrary, the number of product liability trials
may have declined slightly during the most recent five years we studied. From
1992 to 1996, only twelve product liability claims proceeded to trial-an average
of only 2.4 trials each year. During the preceding seven years, thirty-two claims
(or about 4.6 claims each year) produced jury verdicts. Thus, the number of
product liability trials in Franklin County has been low for more than a decade-
and was particularly low during the five years immediately preceding reform.
Nor did we find any evidence that either a plaintiffs likelihood of recovery
or the size of plaintiffs' verdicts increased over the twelve-year period before
reform. Again, Table 11-2 suggests that just the opposite may be true. Plaintiffs
won eight product liability lawsuits during the seven years stretching from 1985
through 1991. During the five years following 1991, plaintiffs won just a single
additional award. The median award for successful plaintiffs before 1992,
moreover, was $218,190, while the mean award was $766,088. The single post-
1991 award was for just $5,000. In part because of the small number of product
liability trials, these trends did not attain statistical significance.' 2 9 They suggest,
however, that plaintiffs' recoveries may have been diminishing during the years
preceding reform-certainly those recoveries were not increasing.
We found only two significant trends over time. As reported above, defense
129 When we correlated verdict size (measured both in actual dollars and constant 1984
dollars) with trial year, the correlations were negative but not significant for the twelve-year
period. For a more sensitive measure of time, we also correlated verdict size with sequentially
numbered months. Once again, the correlations were negative but nonsignificant. Pro-plaintiff
verdicts likewise showed a negative, but nonsignificant, correlation with both measures of
time.
We also compared the five-year period immediately preceding reform with the seven
years preceding that. Plaintiffs were less likely to recover during the more recent period, and
recovered smaller verdicts when they did prevail, but again the differences failed to achieve
statistical significance.
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teams were more likely to include female lawyers during the more recent years
we studied.130 Similarly, recent trials were more likely to occur before female
judges. Other variables-such as the length of time before trial, the length of the
trial, and the number of lawyers for the plaintiff or defense-showed no
significant change over time.131
flH. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE VERDICTS
Defendants in medical malpractice cases, like those in product liability suits,
fear high verdicts and jury prejudice. The data from Franklin County, however,
suggest that neither fear is well founded. As with product liability suits, the
number of medical malpractice claims proceeding to trial is small, and
defendants win most cases before the jury. High verdicts in this field correspond
with serious injuries, admitted liability, or both.
A. Filings, Trials, and Verdicts
Ohio does not maintain separate statistics on medical malpractice filings.
Since 1990, however, the state has tracked the number of "professional tort"
claims filed in the courts of common pleas. These claims include all medical
malpractice suits, as well as complaints filed against other professionals (such as
attorneys or accountants). As Table 11-1 shows, the number of professional tort
claims filed in Franklin County between 1990 and 1996 was modest.132 The total
number of annual claims rested at just under 300 per year until 1995 when filings
grew moderately. In 1996, the last year before Ohio's tort reform, plaintiffs filed
331 professional tort claims. It is impossible to tell from these figures whether
this modest growth occurred in medical malpractice claims, other professional
claims, or both categories combined. The annual number of medical malpractice
complaints in Franklin County, however, did not exceed 331 when the legislature
adopted tort reform.
130 See supra note 122 and accompanying text. None of the plaintiffs employed a female
lawyer at trial during the entire twelve-year period.
131 We were unable to examine possible changes in the number of expert witnesses for
either side because we possessed reliable information on that variable only for the last five
years. During those five years, however, there was no significant change in the number of
expert witnesses introduced by either side.
13 2 Data for this table are drawn from The Ohio Courts Summary, published each year by
the Supreme Court of the State of Ohio.
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Table 1-1: Professional Tort Filings by Year in Franklin County, Ohio
Year Claims Filed, Reactivated, Year Claims Filed, Reactivated,
or Transferred or Transferred
1990 287 1994 297
1991 290 1995 352
1992 288 1996 331
1993 245
Only a handful of these claims matured into jury verdicts. Juries decided just
114 medical malpractice cases in Franklin County from January 1985 through
December 1996.133 As Table Ih-2 shows, the number of verdicts in any one year
never exceeded sixteen, with a mean of only 9.5 jury decisions each year.134
Plaintiffs, moreover, lost most of these medical malpractice trials. As Table
111-2 reports, plaintiffs lost almost seven tenths (69.3%) of the medical
malpractice cases they took to court.135 In all, only thirty-five medical
malpractice plaintiffs won jury verdicts in Franldin County during the twelve
years before reform. On average, less than three (2.9) malpractice plaintiffs
succeeded before ajury each year.
When plaintiffs did prevail, their verdicts covered a wide range of dollar
values. Jury verdicts for the thirty-five successful plaintiffs in our population
ranged from $2,703 to $12,000,000. Although a few high verdicts dominated the
group, many verdicts clustered at the lower end of the scale. Table 111-3 displays
this distribution. Almost one-third of the awards (31.4%) were for $50,000 or
less, while more than half (51.4%) were for less than $200,000. At the other end
of the scale, five verdicts (14.3%) were for more than a million dollars, while ten
(28.6%) were for $500,000 or more. Medical malpractice claimants, however,
133 Three lawsuits generated two jury verdicts apiece during this time. In other words,
juries resolved only 111 controversies during this twelve-year period although three of the
controversies produced two verdicts apiece. We counted each verdict separately for this study
because each verdict imposes trial costs on the legal system and provides an opportunity for
high verdicts. All six of the verdicts in two-verdict cases, however, favored the defense.
134 The plaintiff in each of these trials was a single injured individual. Analyses by
individual and by case, therefore, do not differ for the verdicts discussed in this section. As
noted above, we counted the decedent as the injured individual for wrongful death cases and
did not count consortium or subrogation claimants as separately injured individuals (although
their recoveries appear as part of the total verdict). See supra note 53.
135 In a few of these cases, plaintiffs recovered some damages by settling with another
potential defendant, We identified four such cases in our database. Other settlements may have
existed but escaped notation in the court files or case summaries from which we worked.
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Table 111-2: Medical Malpractice Verdicts by Year in
Franklin County, Ohio
Year Plaintiff Wins Defendant Wins Total Verdicts
1985 3 2 5
1986 5 3 8
1987 0 5 5
1988 4 5 9
1989 4 8 12
1990 3 6 9
1991 3 9 12
1992 4 12 16
1993 2 7 9
1994 3 10 13
1995 3 3 6
1996 1 9 10
Total 35 79 114
recovered no punitive damages during the entire twelve years we studied.
The mean jury verdict for successful malpractice plaintiffs ($828,630) was
higher than the mean award for successful product liability claimants ($681,522).
Somewhat surprisingly, however, the median (middle) award for successful
malpractice plaintiffs ($198,000) was lower than the median award for product
liability plaintiffs who prevailed ($207,560). Again, this reflects the skewed
Table 111-3: Verdicts for Successful Medical Malpractice Plaintiffs in
Franklin County, Ohio, 1985-1996
Verdict Range
$0-99,999
$100,000-199,999
$200,000-299,999
$300,000-399,999
$400,000-499,999
$500,000-599,999
$600,000-699,999
$700,000-799,999
$800,000-899,999
$900,000-999,999
$1,000,000 or more
Number of
Verdicts
11
7
4
2
1
1
0
1
2
1
5
Percentage of
Verdicts
31.4
20.0
11.5
5.7
2.9
2.9
0.0
2.9
5.8
2.9
14.3
Cumulative
Percent
31.4
51.4
62.9
68.6
71A
74.3
74.3
77.1
82.9
85.7
100.0
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nature of malpractice awards with half of all awards concentrated under
$200,000, but a few very high awards distorting the mean.
Medical malpractice plaintiffs were less likely than product liability
claimants to retain their high jury awards. Trial and appellate judges reduced or
overturned six of the jury verdicts for malpractice plaintiffs, including four of the
five highest awards. 136 In four other cases, the parties settled the dispute
(presumably for less than the jury verdict) pending the defendant's appeal.
Therefore, more than one quarter of the successful plaintiffs recovered less than
the jury's original award. Table 111-4 lists the awards that were reduced or
overturned, as well as the amount ultimately collected by the plaintiff when that
amount is known.
Table 111-4: Post-Verdict Changes in Awards to Medical Malpractice
Plaintiffs in Franklin County, Ohio, 1985-1996
Jury Verdict Post-Verdict Action Final Award
$12,000,000 Reduced by trial judge $8,150,000
$3,000,000 Reduced on appeal $1,500,000
$2,400,000 Settled after reversal $50,000
$1,200,000 Settled before appeal $1,025,000
$725,000 Settled before appeal unknown
$250,000 New trial ordered on appeal unknown
$200,000 Settled before appeal unknown
$133,000 Reduced by trial judge $130,000
$100,000 Settled before appeal unknown
$43,350 New trial ordered on appeal unknown
Plaintiffs, too, sometimes succeeded in obtaining a new trial or settlement
when they had lost before the jury. Four plaintiffs won new trials on post-verdict
motions or appeals. Four others secured a settlement from the defendant after a
defense verdict. Only one of those settlement amounts-for $2,000-was
available to us.
Overall, however, post-verdict activity benefited defendants rather than
plaintiffs. The average amount recovered by successful plaintiffs dropped by
almost one-quarter, from $828,630 to $638,959, after accounting for post-verdict
changes. 137 Similarly, the median recovery dropped from $198,000 at the time of
136 Other researchers have observed a similar pattern in medical malpractice cases. See
e.g., Thomas B. Metzloff, Researching Litigation: The Medical Malpractice Example, 51 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1988, at 199,237.
137 In calculating the mean and median post-verdict recoveries for successful plaintiffs,
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verdict to $150,000 after post-verdict motions and appeals. This drop, again,
represents almost a one-quarter reduction in awards to plaintiffs. Thus, we
obtained substantial evidence that medical malpractice plaintiffs collect
considerably smaller awards than those originally awarded by juries.
Despite this discrepancy, we continue to focus on jury verdicts throughout
most of this Article. Tort reformers usually focus on those verdicts as presenting
unfair threats to doctors, hospitals, and other defendants. The reductions
discussed above suggest that trial and appellate judges already possess
considerable power to reduce any unfair awards. By focusing on jury verdicts
themselves, however, we examine the strongest evidence of any tort crisis.
B. Plaintiffs and Defendants
All of the medical malpractice plaintiffs who proceeded to trial were
individuals or estates representing deceased individuals. 138 As with product
liability suits, we noticed some gender differences among these injured parties.
Women predominated among plaintiffs at trial (60.2%) and represented an even
higher percentage of winning plaintiffs (67.4%).139 The latter difference,
however, was too small to be statistically significant. Similarly, when we
controlled for other factors through regression analysis (see Table 1m-5),
plaintiff's gender was not significantly associated with the likelihood of
recovering at trial.140
Female plaintiffs who prevailed at trial appeared to recover larger verdicts
than did male plaintiffs. The mean award for successful female plaintiffs was
$1,071,052, while the mean award for men was just $449,744. In bivariate
analysis, this difference was not statistically significant. When we controlled
other factors in a tobit analysis, however, the difference achieved significance. 141
As Table 111-6 suggests, successful female plaintiffs recovered significantly
higher verdicts than did successful male plaintiffs-even after controlling for
injury severity, type of malpractice, and a number of other factors.142
we eliminated cases in which the plaintiff's eventual recovery was unknown.
138 In one suit, the State of Ohio Department of Human Services joined the plaintiff in a
subrogration claim for medical services. We, however, coded information about the individual
as the primary plaintiff in this lawsuit.
139 We lacked information about the gender of one plaintiff; that plaintiff is omitted from
these comparisons.
140For an explanation of this multivariate analysis, see supra notes 64-65 and
accompanying text.
141 For a discussion of this technique, see supra note 66 and accompanying text.
142 Our analysis was unable to control for some factors that might affect verdict size; in
that sense, our findings are tentative. At least one other study, however, has identified a similar
relationship between gender and verdict size. See David W. Leebron, Final Moments:
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Medical malpractice plaintiffs were as likely as product liability plaintiffs to
be minors. About one-fifth of the malpractice plaintiffs (22.1%) were minors,
compared to 23.8% of product liability plaintiffs. 143 Malpractice plaintiffs,
however, were more likely than product liability plaintiffs to be older than sixty-
four. About one out of every seven malpractice plaintiffs (14.7%) fell into the
sixty-four and older category, while none of the product liability plaintiffs did.144
Despite this difference, the mean age of medical malpractice plaintiffs was
virtually identical to that of product liability plaintiffs-37.5 years.145
We found tentative indications that minors, and perhaps seniors, were more
likely to win their malpractice claims than were adults aged between those two
groups. In bivariate analyses, both minors and seniors showed substantially
higher win rates than did plaintiffs falling between those two groups. About half
of both minors (46.7%) and seniors (50.0%) won a jury verdict, while only one-
quarter (27.9%) of plaintiffs aged between those two groups were successful. In
part because of our small sample size, these differences were not statistically
significant. After controlling for other factors through regression analysis, the
relationship between senior status and recovery remained weak- the coefficient
was positive but did not even approach significance (see Table 111-5). The
relationship between minor plaintiffs and a successful claim, on the other hand,
was both positive and approached significance at the conventional level
(p=.05 9). It is possible, therefore, that minor plaintiffs enjoy more success than
adult ones after controlling for other factors. 146
Damages for Pain and Suffering Prior to Death, 64 N.Y.U. L. REv. 256,306 n.202 (1990).
Some other studies of damage awards have concluded that men obtain higher awards than
women do. See, e.g., Chamallas, supra note 61, at 465 (summarizing studies). Some of those
studies used data from jury verdict reporters rather than complete verdict sets; further, most
were unable to control for many variables. On the other hand, most of those studies examined
the tort system as a whole, rather than the subset of medical malpractice cases. Our findings,
therefore, might be consistent with those other studies-if malpractice cases differ from other
tort claims in this respect. The possibility of gender differences in tort awards--together with
differences based on race, ethnicity, age, social class, and other factors-merits further study.
143 We knew the plaintiff's age for close to two-thirds (59.6%) of the malpractice
claimants. The age-based comparisons in this section draw upon just those cases.
144 This difference approached significance at the conventional level (p'.057).
145 The average age of product liability plaintiffs was 37.2 years. See supra text
accompanying note 80.
146 This does not mean, of course, that juries discriminate in favor of minor plaintiffs. It is
also possible that defendants disproportionately resist settlement with minors, leaving the
stronger claims by minors to reach the jury. If that were true, then juries would respond
rationally to the stronger claims by resolving more lawsuits in favor of minors.
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Table 1H-5: Logistic Regression for Plaintiff Victory in Medical Malpractice
Jury Trials in Franklin County, Ohio, 1985-1996
Variable Logistic Regression Significance
Coefficient
Admission of Liability 16.499** .003
Child Plaintiff 1.560* .059
Death of Plaintiff 1.909* .096
Diagnosis Allegation 0.804 .265
Female Defendant -0.935 .373
Female Judge -0.709 A68
Female Lawyer for Defendant -2.645** .041
Female Lawyer for Plaintiff 1.836* .085
Female Plaintiff 0.551 .405
Informed Consent Allegation -10.383 .976
Injury Severity -0.316* .094
Institutional Defendant Only 0.418 .698
Month of Verdict -0.246** .013
Non-M.D. Defendant 1.660** .050
Nonmedical Error Allegation 12.229 .971
Number of Lawyers for Defendant 0.417 .388
Number of Lawyers for Plaintiff -0.694 .990
Plaintiff Fault 2.039 .196
Pre-Trial Period -0.282 .128
Prior Trial -12.484** .034
Senior (Over 64) Plaintiff 1.061 .306
Trial Length 0.322** .024
Y-Intercept -1.288 A64
Nagelkerke R2  .557** .000
N 114
** Significant at .05 or less
* Approaches significance at .10 or less
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Table m-6: Tobit Analysis on Verdict Size in Medical Malpractice
Jury Trials in Franklin County, Ohio, 1985-1996
Variable Tobit Coefficient Significance
Admission of Liability 218.73** .041
Child Plaintiff 39.050 .524
Death of Plaintiff 22.191 .789
Diagnosis Allegation 58.525 .319
Female Defendant 25.226 .741
Female Judge 8.5301 .910
Female Lawyer for Defendant -199.87** .016
Female Lawyer for Plaintiff 11.755 .894
Female Plaintiff 101.16** .042
Informed Consent Allegation -484.27 .970
Injury Severity 2.7550 .830
Institutional Defendant Only 128.42 .135
Month of Verdict -1.9890** .008
Non-M.D. Defendant 63.648 .332
Nonmedical Error Allegation -93.466 .357
Number of Lawyers for Defendant -12.985 .708
Number of Lawyers for Plaintiff 47.024 .215
Plaintiff Fault 11.692 .919
Pre-Trial Period -4.4l06** .006
Prior Trial -666.94 .938
Senior (Over 64) Plaintiff 40.737 .614
Y-Intercept 157.08** .000
N 114
** Significant at .05 or less
* Approaches significance at .10 or less
We also noticed interesting differences in verdict amounts based on age.
Successful plaintiffs between the ages of eighteen and sixty-five recovered, on
average, $1,722,003. Plaintiffs sixty-five and older recovered considerably less
on average ($306,000), while minors obtained the lowest average awards
($145,965). Given the small number of recoveries, these differences did not
achieve statistical significance. They fit, however, with the legal rules governing
damages. Adult plaintiffs under the age of sixty-five usually are gainfully
employed and have long life expectancies. Damages for this group predictably
are higher than for older plaintiffs, who often have retired and enjoy shorter life
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expectancies. Damages for all adults might also exceed those for minors because
minor's damages are notoriously difficult to estimate.
When we subjected verdict amounts for successful plaintiffs to multivariate
analysis, none of the age categories achieved statistical significance. Thus, after
controlling for severity of the injury and other factors, we found no evidence that
the size of jury awards varied by age category. It is possible that significant
relationships, consistent with the bivariate ones identified above, would emerge
from analysis of a larger database. It is also possible that juries actually
undercompensate adults under sixty-five after controlling for factors like injury
severity.
Turning our attention to malpractice defendants-these parties included
institutions, doctors, and health care workers without M.D. degrees-twenty-one
of the trials (18.4%) included only an institution (such as a hospital or health care
plan) as a defendant.147 Fourteen other trials (12.3%) involved individual
defendants, but no defendant with an M.D. degree. Defendants in the latter cases
included nurses, dentists, osteopaths, and other health care professionals. The
bulk of the cases (69.3%) included at least one M.D. as a defendant.
In initial bivariate analyses, plaintiffs who tried claims against purely
institutional defendants appeared significantly more likely to win those claims
than were plaintiffs who pursued a claim against at least one M.D.148 Plaintiffs in
the first group won 57.1% of their trials. When an M.D. appeared at the defense
table, the recovery rate plummeted to 21.5% (p=.003). When we controlled for a
variety of other factors through logistic regression, however, this relationship
disappeared (see Table I-5). The apparent bias against institutional defendants
was due to other factors. In particular, two of the three defendants who admitted
liability were institutional defendants. This happenstance strongly influenced the
bivariate relationship.
Multivariate analyses, on the other hand, suggested that plaintiffs who sued
health care workers without M.D. degrees were more likely to recover, on
average, than were plaintiffs who sued at least one M.D. This difference did not
achieve statistical significance in our bivariate analysis, 149 but it achieved
significance after controlling for other factors. As Table 111-5 reveals, plaintiffs
who sued health care workers other than medical doctors were significantly more
147 In some of these cases, the plaintiff originally sued an individual defendant as well,
but the individual settled prior to trial.
148 A one-way analysis of variance established significant differences in recovery rates
among the three categories of defendants. F(2, 11 1)=5.93, p=.004. Post-hoc analyses
established that the difference between institutional defendants and M.D.s was significant,
while the other differences were not.
149 Plaintiffs won 42.9% of their claims against health care workers other than M.D.s,
compared to 21.5% of claims against M.D.s (p=.102).
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likely to win jury verdicts---even after controlling for the severity of the injury
and other factors. Contrary to the fears of some doctors, therefore, medical
doctors appear less vulnerable to jury verdicts than are other health care
professionals accused of similar types of malpractice.
When we examined verdict size for successful plaintiffs, we found no
significant relationship between that size and the defendant's status. Verdicts
against M.D.s were similar to those against other health care workers. 150 The
small difference was not significant either in bivariate or multivariate analyses.
Verdicts against institutional defendants were larger, on average, than those
against either individual doctors or other health care workers. Once again,
however, this difference was not significant either in bivariate or multivariate
analyses. 151 Thus, we found no evidence that juries allowed the defendant's
status, rather than the plaintiffs injuries, to dictate the size of awards.
Finally, we examined whether the presence of a female defendant affected
either plaintiff recovery rates or verdict size. After excluding trials against purely
institutional defendants, 14.0% of the defense groups included at least one
woman. Groups that included a female defendant appeared slightly more likely
to lose at trial than were groups composed exclusively of male defendants. Just
under one-third (30.8%) of defendants that included at least one woman lost at
trial, while less than one-quarter (23.8%) of all-male defendants lost at trial. This
difference, however, was not statistically significant and was due in part to other
factors (such as the overrepresentation of female defendants among health care
workers other than medical doctors). When we controlled for those factors
through regression analysis, we found no significant relationship between the
likelihood of a plaintiffs recovery and the presence of a female defendant (see
Table 111-5).
Similarly, although the average verdict against defendant groups that
included at least one woman was higher than the average verdict against all-male
defendant groups, the difference was not significant. Nor did we detect any
significant relationship between the defendant's gender and verdict size when we
controlled for other factors through multivariate analysis (see Table 1I-6). The
plaintiffs gender, therefore, appears to have some association with verdict size
but the defendant's gender shows no significant relationship to either recovery
rates or verdict amounts.
150 The average verdict for plaintiffs who recovered against at least one M.D. was
$470,045, while the mean verdict against other health care workers was $434,058. Both
averages exclude cases in which the defendant prevailed.
151 The average verdict for plaintiffs who successfully sued institutional defendants was
$1,533,913. A one-way analysis of variance for the three categories of defendants was not
significant, F(2, 32)=1.02, p=.3 72 ; nor was a comparison of the mean verdict for institutions to
a mean verdict for individuals (p-.1 5 6). As Table 111-6 shows, the coefficients for institutional
defendants and non-M.D. defendants were not significant in multivariate analysis.
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C. Fault and Injury
Defendants admitted liability in three of the cases they tried, losing all three
of those cases. As a result, the defendant had conceded liability in almost one-
tenth (8.6%) of the malpractice cases plaintiffs won. These cases included the
lawsuit with the second highest jury verdict. In a fourth case, which also
produced a substantial verdict, a chief of surgery and obstetrician agreed that
some malpractice had occurred but pointed the finger at one another.
Conversely, juries found plaintiffs at fault in at least three of the cases we
studied.152 One of these plaintiffs lost as a result of the fault, while the other two
recovered reduced verdicts. The verdicts in the latter cases were quite small,
including both the smallest verdict among malpractice recoveries ($2,703) and
another small award ($43,350).
A defendant's admission of fault was a significant factor in predicting both
plaintiff recovery and the amount of the verdict. As Table I-5 shows,
defendants who admitted liability were significantly more likely to lose at trial
even after controlling for other factors.1 53 Interestingly, these defendants also
suffered significantly higher verdicts (see Table m-6)154 The latter relationship
occurred even after controlling for the severity of the plaintiffs injury. It is
possible, therefore, that juries penalize defendants for their fault admissions by
assessing especially high verdicts. On the other hand, it is possible that plaintiffs
pressed these cases to trial, despite the defendant's admission of liability,
precisely because potential damages were so high. Selection of cases for trial, in
other words, might cause some of the detected effect.
Plaintiff fault did not play a significant role in recovery rates once we
controlled for other factors. The absence of a significant relationship between
these variables may be partly due to the large number of cases that plaintiffs lost
even without any finding of fault on their part. Ironically, the lack of any
apparent relationship may also stem from the fact that plaintiff fault was noted
most often in the case summaries when plaintiffs won a discounted recovery
despite that fault; when plaintiff fault contributed to a defense verdict, the loss
alone may have been noted. It is also quite likely that plaintiff fault plays a
smaller role in medical malpractice cases-in which the professional controls
152 It is possible that juries found plaintiffs at fault in additional cases in which they
returned either a defense verdict or a low recovery for the plaintiff. The trial summaries we
consulted, however, included only three explicit references to plaintiff fault.
153 Bivariate analyses produced the same result. All (100.0%) of the defendants who
admitted fault lost at trial, while only 28.8% of other defendants suffered an adverse jury
verdict (p=.027).
154 Bivariate analysis similarly revealed a higher verdict for defendants who conceded
fault ($1,218,733) than for other defendants ($792,058), but the difference was not statistically
significant (p=.743).
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most of the decisionmaking-than in other types of tort suits.
In addition to noting these admissions of defendant liability and findings of
plaintiff fault, we divided the plaintiffs' allegations of error into four categories.
In three cases (2.6%), plaintiffs exclusively alleged a violation of their informed
consent. In five other cases (4.4%), plaintiffs claimed a nonmedical error such as
dropping the patient while transferring her from a gurney to the operating table.
In another quarter of the cases (23.7/o), the plaintiff alleged that the defendant
failed to diagnose the plaintiffs ailment correctly. In the remaining two-thirds of
the cases (69.3%), the plaintiff alleged a medical error such as prescnbing the
wrong course of treatment or performing surgery incorrectly. 155
The type of alleged negligence had little impact on the likelihood of a
plaintiffs recovery. In bivariate analysis, plaintiffs who alleged nonmedical
negligence (such as allowing a plaintiff to fall off a gurney) appeared
significantly more likely than other plaintiffs to recover.156 This relationship,
however, disappeared after we controlled for other factors in our multivariate
analysis (see Table 1T-5). Plaintiffs, for example, admitted liability in response to
one-fifth (20.0%) of the claims of nonmedical error but to only 1.8% of other
malpractice allegations. Other categories of alleged fault showed no significant
relationship with plaintiff recovery rates either in bivariate or multivariate
analysis. 157
Nor was the type of alleged negligence associated with verdict amounts for
successful plaintiffs. Plaintiffs who proved errors in diagnosis may have
recovered somewhat lower verdicts, on average ($648,445), than did plaintiffs
proving either errors in medical treatment ($875,554) or nonmedical negligence
($910,503). However, these differences were not significant.158 Nor were any of
155 For further discussion of these categories, see supra note 57 and accompanying text.
Whenever a plaintiff alleged both medical error and one of the other types of carelessness, we
categorized the allegation as one of medical error. The other three categories, in other words,
represent cases in which the plaintiff claimed only a violation of informed consent, nonmedical
error, or negligent failure to diagnose.
156 A one-way analysis of variance first indicated that the likelihood of recovery varied
significantly among the four categories of claims, F(3, 1 10)=4.69, p=.004. Subsequent analysis
revealed that recovery rates among plaintiffs alleging medical or diagnostic error were quite
similar. About one quarter (27.8%) of the former plaintiffs recovered, while a similar
percentage (29.6%) of the latter claimants succeeded at trial. In contrast, all five of the plaintiffs
(100%) who alleged a nonmedical error prevailed at trial, and none of the three plaintiffs (0%)
who exclusively alleged consent violations succeeded. The difference between the former
percentage and all other plaintiffs was significant (P=.002) although the latter was not (p=. 329).
157 It is noteworthy that all three of the plaintiffs who exclusively alleged a violation of
their informed consent lost at trial. It would be useful to examine this possible relationship in a
larger database.
158 A one-way analysis of variance, using the four categories of alleged negligence as the
independent variable, showed no significant difference in verdict amounts. F(2, 32)='.036,
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the negligence categories significant in our multivariate analysis of recovery
amount (see Table 11-6).
Injuries in medical malpractice cases, like those in product liability suits,
spanned a wide spectrum. Almost one-third (28.6%) of the malpractice plaintiffs
died from their injuries. 159 Another quarter (27.7%) suffered a temporary, but
major, injury (e.g., one requiring surgery). The next largest cluster (14.3%)
suffered a permanent significant loss (e.g., the loss of one limb or permanent
deafness). More than half the medical malpractice plaintiffs (51.8%) suffered
this type of permanent significant loss or worse.160 Only one plaintiff (0.9%)
claimed no physical injury from the alleged malpractice, 161 while just one other
(0.9%) alleged a temporary soft tissue injury as the only damage.
Overall, personal injuries in medical malpractice cases were more severe
than those in product liability cases. The mean injury for a medical malpractice
plaintiff was 7.5 (halfway between a permanent significant and permanent major
injury), while the median injury was 8.0 (a permanent major injury). The mean
injury for product liability plaintiffs was 5.5, ranking between permanent soft
tissue and permanent minor injury. The median for product liability plaintiffs
was just 5.0, the equivalent of a permanent soft tissue injury. 162
The severity of the plaintiff s injury showed a complicated relationship with
the plaintiff's likelihood of recovering. On one hand, when we included all types
of bodily injury in a single scale with death as the most severe injury, we found
no significant difference in mean injury level between plaintiffs who won their
malpractice claims and those who lost their claims. Plaintiffs in the first group
had an average injury level of 7.6, while those in the latter group had a similar
average of 7.5 (p-=.7 4 4 ). Similarly, we found no significant difference in
recovery rates between plaintiffs who died and those who survived; only one-
third (33.3%) of the former group prevailed, but 29.8% of the latter group
prevailed as well (p=.8 18 ).
When we applied multivariate analysis, however, we found that both death
p=.965.
159 Percentages for injury categories exclude two cases for which we lacked sufficient
information to rate the injury.
160 In addition to the 14.3% who suffered a permanent significant loss, and the 28.6%
who died from their injuries, 6.3% of the medical malpractice plaintiffs suffered a permanent
major loss (such as paraplegia or blindness), while 2.7% suffered a permanent grave injury
(such as quadriplegia, severe brain damage, vegetative state).
161 This plaintiff claimed that his wife had been artificially inseminated without his
consent and with sperm from another donor. The couple later divorced and the plaintiff
claimed emotional distress, child support, and insurance expenses as his damages.
162 Product liability plaintiffs, however, were more likely to suffer substantial property
damage, especially business-related damage. It is difficult to rank the latter type of injury as
compared to bodily harm.
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and the degree of injury (short of death) showed a possible relationship with the
plaintiffs likelihood of recovering. As Table 111-5 reveals, plaintiffs who died
from their injuries may have been more likely than other plaintiffs to prevail in
their malpractice suits-although this relationship merely approached
significance at the conventional level (p=.096). On the other hand, once we
excluded death cases, plaintiffs with more serious injuries may have been less
likely to recover.163 The coefficient for degree of injury is negative in Table 111-5
although it too merely approaches significance at the conventional level
(p-.0 9 4).
This pattern suggests that juries respond most favorably to both wrongful
death plaintiffs and plaintiffs who suffer serious but temporary injuries. Further,
jurors seem least likely to compensate malpractice plaintiffs who have suffered
devastating permanent injuries such as blindness or paraplegia. The pattern is
particularly striking because it is similar to the one we observed in product
liability cases. 164 In both of these trial categories, plaintiffs with catastrophic
injuries short of death seemed least likely to recover. As discussed above, this
effect might derive from a psychological defense that discourages jurors from
identifying with plaintiffs who have been very badly injured.165 Alternatively,
the pattern could derive from settlement behavior. Defendants may be most
likely to settle meritorious claims involving devastating permanent injuries-
precisely because the damages in those cases are so high. That tendency would
leave only relatively weak claims in this category for resolution at trial. Plaintiffs
may be correspondingly likely to press these weak claims to trial because the
pay-off, if they do succeed, will be so high.
When we limited our analysis to successful plaintiffs, injury severity showed
a strong bivariate correlation with verdict size. This was especially true when we
excluded wrongful death cases from the analysis. When we included death as the
highest rung on our severity scale, the injury rating correlated positively with the
amount of a successful plaintiffs recovery (r=.305), but the result merely
approached significance at the conventional level (p=.080). When we eliminated
death cases from our analysis, the correlation between injury severity and award
size for successful plaintiffs jumped to .551 and became highly significant
(p=.005).
These results suggest that, while verdict size relates closely to severity of the
163 By including both a continuous variable ranking degree of injury and a dichotomous
variable denoting death in our multivariate analysis, we were able to measure the relationship
between recovery rates and degree of injury after controlling for (or eliminating from that
variable) death cases. We employed the same approach in analyzing verdict size through
multivariate techniques.
164 See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
165 See supra note 87.
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injury, juries tend to compensate wrongful death claimants somewhat less than
they compensate the most seriously injured plaintiffs who survive. We
confirmed the latter by comparing average verdicts for wrongful death plaintiffs
with those for plaintiffs who survived. Claimants who died from medical
malpractice but prevailed before a jury recovered, on average, $790,003.
Successful plaintiffs who suffered serious permanent injuries (but not death), on
the other hand, recovered a mean award of $2,276,698-almost three times
higher.166 This difference was not statistically significant (p=.281), but does
suggest that death claimants obtain low verdicts compared to other seriously
injured malpractice victims. 167
Once again, this difference may derive from the nature of cases brought to
trial. Wrongful death plaintiffs who come to trial may, for some reason, have
lower economic damages than death plaintiffs who are able to settle.
Alternatively, the difference may reflect undercompensation of wrongful death
claimants in malpractice cases, or it may reflect the unfortunate reality that
ongoing treatment of a seriously injured patient (such as a quadriplegic or
comatose victim) is extraordinarily expensive-even more expensive than the
highest value juries are willing to set on a lost life.
Curiously, when we subjected verdict size for successful plaintiffs to
multivariate analysis, neither the severity of the plaintiff's injury nor the fact of
death correlated significantly with verdict size. Coefficients for both of these
independent variables were positive, but far from significant (see Table fIl-6). It
is impossible to know whether analyses of a larger population would uncover
significant relationships or whether these factors lack significance once other
variables have been controlled.
Notably, however, we found that the bivariate correlation between severity
of the plaintiffs injury and verdict size was even higher when we analyzed
awards that had been adjusted by trial or appellate judges rather than raw jury
verdicts. When we excluded death cases, the former correlation reached .648 and
was highly significant (p=.001). This suggests that trial judges and appellate
courts reduced jury awards in part to conform them more closely to the severity
of the plaintiffs injury.
166 Indeed, -wrongfiul death plaintiffs recovered less, on average, than the mean award for
all other plaintiffs, including those who suffered only temporary injuries. The average award
for plaintiffs who survived medical malpractice and recovered some jury award was $844,081.
Like the difference reported in the text, the difference between this average and that for
wrongful death plaintiffs was not statistically significant.
167 See also Randall R. Bovbjerg et al., Juries and Justice: Are Malpractice and Other
Personal Injuries Created Equal?, 54 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBs. 5, 19 (1991) (demonstrating
that awards for wrongful death plaintiffs in medical malpractice cases were higher than for
plaintiffs who suffered minor injuries but lower than for plaintiffs who suffered the most
serious non-death injuries).
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D. Conduct ofLitigation
On average, medical malpractice claims came to trial after 32.2 months. The
median time to trial was four months lower, or 28.5 months. Both of these
figures were slightly lower than in product liability cases, but the difference in
means was not statistically significant.168
The average pre-trial periods for malpractice suits, like those for product
liability claims, included a few cases in which a claim was retried after a
successful appeal or post-verdict motion. Eight (7.0%) of the malpractice claims
in our population fit that description. When we excluded those eight cases, the
average time to trial in malpractice cases fell to 30.3 months, while the median
declined to 28.0 months.
Retried cases were significantly less likely than other malpractice claims to
succeed before the jury. Plaintiffs failed in all eight of these retried cases-a
significantly higher failure rate than for first-time malpractice trials (p=.047).
Even after we controlled for other variables (see Table 111-5), plaintiffs who
pursued a second malpractice trial were significantly less likely to prevail than
other malpractice plaintiffs.
At trial, malpractice claims consumed about the same number of days as did
product liability claims. Medical malpractice trials ranged from one to sixteen
days in length, with a mean of 5.6 and a median (middle value) of 5.0.169
Interestingly, claims that generated longer trials were significantly more likely to
succeed than other claims. The mean trial length for a successful claim was 6.2
days, while that for an unsuccessful claim was 5.3 days. Although this difference
merely approached significance (p=.097) in a bivariate comparison, it achieved
significance once we controlled for other factors through logistic regression. As
Table r1-5 reveals, trial length was one of the factors that corresponded
significantly with a judgment for the plaintiff in medical malpractice cases.
This positive relationship could stem from the plaintiffs behavior, the
defendant's behavior, or a combination of both. Perhaps the simplest explanation
is that plaintiffs who devote more time to establishing liability at trial are more
likely to succeed. Alternatively, plaintiffs may correctly estimate their likelihood
of success and, if they perceive a strong chance of winning, may devote more
time than other plaintiffs to detailing damages. On the other hand, defendants
168 Medical malpractice cases in Franklin County came to trial somewhat faster than
malpractice trials in other large counties nationwide. In a study of state courts in the nation's
seventy-five largest counties, the Department of Justice found that medical malpractice claims
averaged 38.8 months from complaint to trial, while the median was 33.6 months. See
DEFRANCES, supra note 7, at 10.
169 Product liability trials consumed, on average, 5.7 days. The difference between this
mean and that for malpractice trials was not statistically significant.
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who perceive a strong case for the plaintiff may expend more time on their
defense, hoping to persuade the jury of a weakness in the plaintiff's case. Any of
these explanations would establish a rational relationship between trial length
and plaintiff success.1 70
The number of lawyers and expert witnesses involved in the average
malpractice trial was surprisingly low. Indeed, malpractice defendants employed
fewer lawyers on average than did product liability defendants. The mean
number of defense lawyers in a medical malpractice trial was just 1.6-and even
that figure was somewhat distorted by a single trial with seven defense
lawyers.1 71 More than half of all medical malpractice claims (54.4%) went to
trial with just one defense lawyer.
Malpractice defendants also employed relatively few expert witnesses. One-
third of defendants (33.3%) introduced no expert witnesses, while another third
(33.2%) relied upon just one.172 No defendant employed more than four experts,
with an overall mean of 1.2. This mean did not differ significantly from the mean
number of experts introduced by defendants in product liability suits (1.0,
p=.601). Nor did the number of defense experts in each malpractice trial
correlate significantly with the number of defense lawyers associated with that
trial. Defendants, therefore, were selective in whether they chose to employ
additional experts or lawyers for a particular trial.
Malpractice plaintiffs also staffed their cases in a lean manner. Plaintiffs
averaged just 1.3 lawyers in medical malpractice cases, with more than two
thirds (70.2%) of all medical malpractice plaintiffs going to trial with just one
lawyer. 173 Almost one-third of malpractice plaintiffs (27.8%) introduced no
expert witnesses,174 while another two-fifths (40.7%) relied upon just one expert.
In all, more than two-thirds of all malpractice cases (68.5%) proceeded to trial
with zero or one expert witness for the plaintiff; the mean number of experts for
170 Trial length seemed less clearly related to the size of a successful plaintiff's verdict. In
bivariate analysis, trial length did correlate positively with verdict size (r=.250), but the result
was not statistically significant. Unfortunately, we could not include trial length in our
multivariate analysis of verdict size because we were missing some values for this variable and
the missing values significantly affected the equation.
171 In contrast, product liability defendants employed an average of 2.0 lawyers at trial.
The difference between these means was statistically significant (p=.0 15).
172 As noted above, we have reliable data on expert witnesses only for trials occurring
after 1991. We limit analyses of expert witnesses to the fifty-four medical malpractice verdicts
rendered after that year.
173 This mean was quite similar to the average number of plaintiff's lawyers (1.4) in
product liability cases. The difference was not statistically significant.
174 Some of these plaintiffs may have relied upon witnesses characterized as "fact"
witnesses (such as a doctor who provided follow-up care) to offer evidence on the standard of
care.
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plaintiffs was just 1.3.175
The number of plaintiff's experts did not correlate significantly with the
number of plaintiffs lawyers. Like defendants, therefore, plaintiffs chose to
allocate additional legal resources in some trials and additional expert witnesses
in others. Interestingly, the number of experts for the defense correlated highly
with the number of experts for the plaintiff (r=.514, p=.000), while the number of
plaintiffs lawyers correlated significantly with the number of defendant's
lawyers (r=.242, p=.009). Plaintiffs and defendants, therefore, either made
similar decisions about which trials merited extra legal resources and which ones
deserved additional expert witnesses-or they responded to one another's lead
on these matters.
The type of negligence alleged by the plaintiff showed no significant
association with the number of experts employed by either the plaintiff or
defendant (for example, cases involving a failure to diagnose did not elicit
significantly more or less experts than cases alleging erroneous treatment). 176
The severity of the plaintiff's injury, on the other hand, did relate
significantly to the number of experts for both plaintiffs and defendants. 177 That
relationship, however, was not a simple linear one. Instead, both sides employed
relatively few experts for both cases involving temporary minor damages and
those producing death. Plaintiffs averaged only 0.5 experts in the first type of
case and 0.8 experts in the second. Defendants, similarly, averaged 0.2 experts in
lawsuits claiming the most minor injuries and 0.8 in those alleging death.
Both plaintiffs and defendants invested more heavily in experts for cases
claiming permanent major injuries. Plaintiffs averaged 2.4 expert witnesses in
these cases, while defendants averaged 1.9. The relatively large number of
witnesses in these cases may have stemmed from both the high damages at stake
in these lawsuits and the difficulty of calculating those on-going damages. It is
noteworthy that both plaintiffs and defendants made similar decisions in staffing
these cases. 178
175 This average was lower than the mean number of plaintiff's experts in product
liability cases (2.0), but the difference did not achieve statistical significance (p-.129).
17 6 During the five years for which we possessed reliable data on expert witnesses,
plaintiffs did not bring any claims involving nonmedical negligence to trial. Therefore, we
could not test whether these cases used significantly fewer expert witnesses.
177 A one-way analysis of variance, using five injury categories that combined several of
the ratings on our twelve-point scale, was significant for both the number of plaintiff's experts
(F(4, 48)=4.05, p=.00 7) and number of defendant's experts (F(4, 48)=3.33, p=.017). The five
injury categories used in this analysis were temporary minor injuries (1-4 on our injury rating
scale); temporary major injuries (5 on the injury rating scale); permanent minor injuries (6-7 on
the injury rating scale); major permanent injuries (8-10 on the scale); and death.
178 Cases involving temporary major injuries or permanent minor injuries fell between
the extremes discussed in the text. In both of these categories, plaintiffs and defendants each
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The number of lawyers employed by plaintiffs and defendants similarly
showed a strong relationship to the severity of the plaintiffs injury.179 On this
measure, however, the two sides deployed their forces in slightly different
patterns. For defendants, the relationship between number of lawyers and injury
severity was linear: they employed the most lawyers when the plaintiff had died
(1.9) and almost as many lawyers when the plaintiff survived but suffered a
serious, permanent injury (1.8). For other claims, those involving less
devastating injuries, defendants averaged only 1.4 lawyers. The latter mean was
significantly lower than either of the other two.
Plaintiffs, on the other hand, devoted the most lawyers to cases involving
serious, permanent injuries rather than to wrongful death cases. Plaintiffs
averaged 1.5 lawyers in the former cases and 1.4 lawyers in the latter. For claims
involving less serious injuries, they employed only 1.2 lawyers on average-
significantly less than for claims involving serious, permanent injuries but not
significantly different than the average for wrongful death cases.
The tendency for plaintiffs to devote the most lawyers to cases involving
serious, permanent injuries, rather than wrongful death, may reflect simple
economics. The former cases produce the highest verdicts, 180 and plaintiffs pay
their lawyers on a contingency basis. Claims of serious, permanent injury,
therefore, may be able to support more lawyers at trial than claims for wrongful
death. It is also possible that the former group of cases is more difficult to litigate
because they involve more complicated issues of damages or causation. If the
latter were true, however, we might expect to see defendants deploying their
lawyers in the same manner. Instead, defendants employed even more lawyers
for wrongful death cases than for ones involving serious permanent injuries.
In addition to the differential allocation of lawyers and witnesses by injury
severity, it is noteworthy that plaintiffs employed more expert witnesses than
defendants in every category, while defendants used more lawyers than plaintiffs
in each category. The pattem is analogous to one we observed in product liability
cases and, once again, might suggest that plaintiffs attempt to win their cases on
the facts, while defendants try to prevail on the law.181 As noted above, however,
the difference is more likely to stem from the economic and legal position of the
parties. Plaintiffs must introduce expert witnesses in medical malpractice cases
supplied an average of one expert witness.
179 For the plaintiffs, the correlation was .201 (p=.034 ). For the defendants, it was .299
(p=.001). Conversely, neither the type of alleged negligence nor the status of the defendant
showed a significant relationship with the number of lawyers employed by either the plaintiffs
or the defendants. One-way analyses of variance were not significant for any of these
relationships.
180 See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
181 In product liability cases, we noted that the number of plaintiffs' expert witnesses
correlated with the number of defendant's lawyers. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
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because the law requires them to do so in order to establish lack of care.182
Defendants are not compelled to introduce expert witnesses, although they may
choose to do so. At the same time, plaintiffs may lack sufficient resources to
employ as many lawyers as defendants do. This is particularly true given the
contingent fees charged by most plaintiffs' lawyers and the relatively low rate of
recovery in malpractice trials.
When we examined the relationship among witnesses, lawyers, and pre-trial
delay, we found evidence that the defendant's preparations, rather than the
plaintiffs, determined the length of time between filing a complaint and trial.
Neither the number of plaintiff's lawyers nor the number of expert witnesses for
the plaintiff correlated significantly with the number of months between
complaint and trial. 183 On the other hand, both the number of defense lawyers
and the number of defense witnesses showed a positive correlation with length of
time to trial. 184 The extent of the defendant's preparations, rather than the
plaintiff s pre-trial work, thus appears to determine the trial date. 185
Lengthy pre-trial preparations appear to pay off for defendants. Our
multivariate analysis revealed that longer pre-trial periods were associated with
significantly lower verdicts for plaintiffs (see Table 111-6). Thus, defendants' pre-
trial preparations may both determine the time of trial and, when those
preparations are extensive, may reduce the verdicts assessed against the defense.
On the other hand, neither the number of lawyers nor number of expert
witnesses for each side affected case outcomes after controlling for other
variables. In bivariate analyses, a higher number of plaintiffs lawyers was
associated with a significantly higher verdict for successful plaintiffs. 186 This
relationship, however, disappeared once we controlled for other variables (see
Table 111-6). The number of defense lawyers was not significantly related to case
outcomes in either bivariate or multivariate analyses (see Tables 111-5 and mI-6).
Nor did the number of experts for either side appear to affect either the plaintiff s
182 See Bruni v. Tatsumi, 346 N.E.2d 673, 676-77 (Ohio 1976); Morris v. Children's
Hosp. Med. Ctr., 597 N.E.2d 1110, 1114 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991). See generally W. PAGE
KEETONErAL., PROSSERANDKEErONONTHELAWOFTORTS 188-89 (5th ed. 1984).
183 For the number of plaintiff's lawyers, r = -.026 (p=.79 1); for the number of plaintiff's
experts, r = -.004 (p=.971).
184 The first of these relationships approached significance, r = .164 (p=.086), while the
second achieved significance, r = .257 (p=.025).
185 This does not necessarily mean that defendants spend longer than plaintiffs do on their
pre-trial preparations. It is possible that defendants do not begin trial preparation until after a
complaint is filed, while plaintiffs complete at least some of their pre-trial work before filing a
complaint. Many malpractice defendants, however, do know of potential claims before a
formal complaint is filed. Indeed, institutional review boards and other forms of peer review
may alert defendants to potential claims even before plaintiffs consider initiating a lawsuit.
186 r =.372 (p=.028).
[Vol. 60:315
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE & TORTREFORM
likelihood of recovery or the size of that recovery.187
E. Settlements
Table 111-7 reports available settlement information for both plaintiffs and
defendants in medical malpractice cases. We possessed that information for
plaintiffs in forty-one (36.0%) of our cases and for defendants in forty-three
(37.7%) of those lawsuits.
Both plaintiffs and defendants increased the size of their settlement proffers
as the severity of the plaintiffs injury increased. These positive correlations,
however, achieved significance only when we excluded death cases from our
analysis. 188 In death cases, both plaintiffs and defendants appeared to name
smaller settlement amounts than in other cases although these relationships were
not significant. 189 In settlement negotiations as well as jury verdicts, therefore,
death cases fared less well than claims of serious injury. 190
Although the contrast between death and nondeath cases is interesting, the
apparent agreement of plaintiffs and defendants in assessing these claims is even
more noteworthy. Both plaintiffs and defendants followed the pattern described
above. In addition, the correlation between offers and demands was positive and
approached significance. 19' This agreement contrasts with product liability
cases, in which plaintiffs and defendants appeared to differ substantially when
valuing claims for settlement.
Malpractice plaintiffs were also more astute than product liability claimants
in matching their demands to the eventual verdict. Among successful plaintiffs,
the verdict amount correlated highly with the size of the previous settlement
demand.192 Defendants' offers showed no similar relationship. On the other
hand, defendants offered higher settlements when plaintiffs employed more
187 We did not include the number of plaintiff's or defendant's expert witnesses in our
multivariate analyses because too many values were missing for those variables. See supra note
65. In bivariate analyses limited to post-1991 cases, however, none of these relationships even
approached significance.
188 Before excluding death cases, the correlation between the size of the plaintiff's
demand and injury severity was .241 (p-.134), while the correlation between size of the
defendant's offer and injury severity was .211 (p=.181). After excluding death cases, these
correlations increased to .510 (p=.005) and A89 (p=.004).
189 The average plaintiff's demand was $398,636 in death cases and $546,000 in
nondeath cases. Similarly, the mean defendant's offer was $12,018 in death cases and
$112,910 in nondeath ones. For plaintiffs, p=.620. For defendants, p=.307.
190 See supra notes 163-65 and accompanying text.
191 r = .303 (p=.068).
192 r = .683 (p=.002 ). The amount of a plaintiffs demand, however, did not accurately
predict whether the plaintiff would recover (r = -.049, p=.761).
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lawyers and when more time had elapsed before trial.193 The former relationship
could reflect a tendency for plaintiffs to employ more lawyers for high-stake
claims; defendants then would respond to the possibility of a high verdict rather
than to the number of plaintiffs lawyers. The positive relationship between
defendant's offer and pre-trial delay suggests that defendant's offers rise as the
negotiating period progresses.
Medical malpractice defendants seemed considerably more resistant to
settlement than were product liability defendants. In twenty-three of the forty-
three cases for which we had information about the defendant's best offer
(53.5%), the settlement offer was zero. In other words, the defendant was not
willing to discuss settlement on any terms in half the cases for which we have
offer information. 194 Even among cases that plaintiffs won, defendants offered
no settlement in about half (47.4%) of the cases for which we knew defendant's
final offer. This percentage of "zero offers" far exceeds the percentage of such
offers in product liability cases. 195
The resistance of medical malpractice defendants to settlement meant that
they often lost money by going to trial. To offer a conservative assessment of
those losses, Table 111-7 compares settlement offers and demands to the
plaintiffs "adjusted verdict," that is, to the jury award as modified during any
post-trial proceedings or appeals. We have information about the plaintiffs
demand in seventeen of the thirty-five lawsuits that plaintiffs both won before
the jury and for which post-verdict information was available. In seven of those
cases (41.2%) the plaintiff offered to settle for a lower amount-often a
considerably lower amount-than the plaintiff ultimately recovered. 196 In the
$12,000,000 verdict noted above, for example, the plaintiff initially demanded
$3,750,000 and reduced that demand to $2,000,000 on the morning of trial.
Although the trial judge reduced the jury's verdict to $8,150,000, the defendant
lost $6,150,000 by pushing the case to trial rather than accepting the plaintiffs
best offer. In other cases, defendants lost as much as $575,000 or $1,050,000 by
193 The correlation coefficient for size of the defendant's offer and number of plaintiffs
lawyers was .329 (p=.031). The coefficient for length of pre-trial period and size of defendant's
offer was .442 (p=.003). We also detected a possible relationship between trial length and size
of the defendant's offer. For this relationship, r = .299 (p=.064 ).
194 Even this percentage may underestimate the percentage of cases in which defendants
were unwilling to settle with plaintiffs. The seventy-one cases for which we lack information
on the defendant's best offer (almost two-thirds of the population) may well be cases in which
the defendant offered no damages in settlement.
195 In product liability cases, defendants refused to make any offer in only 17.6% of the
cases for which we have settlement information, and none of those zero offers occurred in
cases that plaintiffs ultimately won.
196 In one other case, the plaintiff offered to settle for exactly the amount that the jury
awarded, $300,000.
[Vol. 60:315
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE & TORTREFORM
going to trial.
As in product liability cases, however, both malpractice plaintiffs and
defendants made rational decisions to try cases if we consider those cases in the
aggregate. Juries imposed a few large verdicts on defendants, but defendants
won the majority of malpractice cases, including cases in which plaintiffs had
demanded large settlements. As a result, defendants netted $6,611,185 by going
to trial, an average of almost $174,000 per case.197
Plaintiffs fared even better by going to trial. Although they rejected low and
modest settlements in cases that they lost before the jury, they more than made
up for those losses by winning several large verdicts from defendants. Overall,
plaintiffs netted $12,704,815 by going to trial, almost $326,000 per case.198
It is noteworthy that the position of plaintiffs and defendants in malpractice
cases reverses the position of those parties in product liability cases. In
malpractice cases, plaintiffs gained more than defendants from rejecting
settlement offers and proceeding to trial. In product liability cases, defendants
gained more than plaintiffs from eschewing settlement and defending claims in
court. The differences derive both from the somewhat higher plaintiff win rate in
malpractice cases and from the large percentage of zero offers by defendants in
these cases.
It is difficult to assess further the efficiency of settlement decisions without
information about cases that do settle. That information might reveal systematic
undercompensation of plaintiffs, unfair pressure on defendants to settle nuisance
suits, or a variety of other patterns in the cases that do not reach a jury verdict.199
The information outlined above, however, suggests that both plaintiffs and
defendants currently make rational decisions about the cases that do come to
trial; overall, both sides benefited from electing trials in the cases for which we
have information. On the other hand, it appears that malpractice defendants-
rather than plaintiffs-may be somewhat too inclined to resist settlement and
push cases to trial.
197 If we exclude the largest and somewhat unrepresentative jury verdict from the pool,
defendants realized a net gain of $12,761,185 by going to trial (almost $345,000 per case).
Excluding this outlying verdict, however, distorts the results because it is exactly this type of
large verdict that defendants fear in calculating the advantages of settlement.
198 If we exclude the one very large verdict, plaintiffs fared somewhat less well. Under
these circumstances, plaintiffs netted $4,654,815 by going to trial, a more modest $122,495 per
case. It seems most fair to include the large verdict in these calculations, however, because the
titanic recovery is exactly what plaintiffs (and their attorneys) hope for in making these
calculations.
199 We are in the process of gathering systematic information from law firms about
settled and abandoned claims. That information, to be analyzed in a later article, may shed
substantially more light on the efficacy of the settlement process.
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Table 111-7: Final Settlement Offers and Demands, Medical Malpractice
Claims in Franklin County, Ohio, 1985-1996
Defendant's
Last Offer
n/a
na
n/a
n/a
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2000
2000
5000
5000
10,000
15,000
25,000
25,000
30,000
30,000
Plaintiff's GainPlaintiff's Last
Demand
25,000
150,000
500,000
500,000
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
3500
6000
20,000
35,000
40,000
75,000
87,000
100,000
100,000
300,000
325,000
400,000
450,000
450,000
550,000
1,000,000
1,000,000
1,500,000
4,700,000
3500
90,000
15,000
90,000
500,000
135,000
275,000
475,000
100,000
450,000
Adjusted
Verdict
100,000
0
0
0
0
0
300,000
800,000
0
0
0
115,000
0
0
40,000
0
new trial
300,000
settled
0
0
1,500,000
151,062
0
454,500
0
0
4000
0
0
150,000
50,000
17,253
130,000
0
2000
0
Defendant's
Gain
-75,000
150,000
500,000
500,000
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
3500
6000
20,000
-80,000
40,000
75,000
47,000
100,000
unknown
0
unknown
400,000
450,000
-1,050,000
398,938
1,000,000
545,500
1,500,000
4,700,000
-500
90,000
15,000
-60,000
450,000
117,747
145,000
475,000
98,000
450,000
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
0
0
300,000
800,000
0
0
0
115,000
0
0
40,000
0
unknown
300,000
unknown
0
0
1,500,000
151,062
0
454,500
0
0
2000
-2000
-5000
145,000
40,000
2253
105,000
-25,000
-28,000
-30,000
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Table M1-7 Continued
Defendant's Plaintiff's Last Adjusted Defendant's Plaintiff's Gain
Last Offer Demand Verdict Gain
40,000 490,000 settled unknown unknown
50,000 150,000 200,000 -50,000 150,000
60,000 275,000 850,000 -575,000 790,000
75,000 n/a settled unknown unknown
75,000 100,000 0 100,000 -75,000
75,000 450,000 0 450,000 -75,000
75,000 850,000 0 850,000 -75,000
100,000 2,000,000 8,150,000 -6,150,000 8,050,000
450,000 n/a 0 n/a -450,000
500,000 2,000,000 1,025,000 975,000 525,000
F. Gender Differences
We detected a surprising number of gender differences in medical
malpractice cases. As noted above, successful female plaintiffs obtained
significantly higher verdicts than successful male ones once we controlled for a
variety of factors.200 We also noted a number of interesting bivariate correlations
with the plaintiff's gender. Female plaintiffs were somewhat less likely than
male ones to bring a claim of erroneous medical diagnosis to trial.20 1 Women
were also significantly less likely to pursue a trial against a purely institutional
defendant.202 On the other hand, female plaintiffs were significantly more likely
to litigate malpractice claims against health care workers who lacked a medical
degree.20 3 Trials involving female plaintiffs also lasted significantly longer than
those concerning male plaintiffs.204 These cases also appeared to take longer to
200 See supra notes 141-42 and accompanying text. Curiously, verdict size showed no
significant bivariate correlation with plaintiff's gender. Only after controlling for other
variables did this gender effect emerge.
201 Almost one-third (3 1.1%) of the claims litigated by male plaintiffs were erroneous
diagnosis claims, while only 17.6% of the claims tried by women fell into that category. This
difference approached significance at the conventional level (p=.076).
202 Once again, almost one-third of male claims (3 1.1%) were against purely institutional
defendants, while only one in ten of the women's claims (10.3%) involved those defendants
alone. This difference was statistically significant (p=.006).
203 Less than five percent of male plaintiffs (4.4%) tried malpractice claims against health
care workers who lacked a medical degree. The proportion of female plaintiffs trying claims
against these health care workers (16.2%) was almost four times higher. The difference was
statistically significant (p=.049).
204 Trials for female plaintiffs lasted, on average, 6.2 days, while trials for male plaintiffs
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come to trial although the difference between male and female plaintiffs merely
approached significance on this measure.205
These differences, of course, do not necessarily reflect differences in the
entire pool of malpractice plaintiffs. They may instead reflect differences in
settlement patterns of male and female plaintiffs and thus in the claims that
proceed to trial. It is possible, for example, that institutional defendants more
readily settle claims pursued by female plaintiffs than by male ones; this
behavior would produce the significant imbalance we observed in the gender of
plaintiffs pursuing claims against institutional defendants at trial. Without more
information about settled and withdrawn claims, we can only begin to suggest
explanations for some of the differences we observed. The differences
themselves, however, suggest that the treatment of malpractice claims involves a
large number of gender differences.
Women were less well represented among malpractice defendants than
among plaintiffs. As noted above, a woman appeared among the defendants in
only 14.0% of the trials in which at least one individual defendant appeared.20 6
The presence of a female defendant did not affect the plaintiffs likelihood of
recovery or the size of a successful plaintiffs verdict--either in bivariate
analyses or after controlling for other factors. Trials against at least one female
defendant, however, appeared to consume more time than trials against all male
or institutional defendants.207 This difference merely approached significance at
the conventional level (p=.080), but is interesting in light of the parallel finding
with respect to female plaintiffs. It is not clear why the presence of a female
plaintiff or defendant should prolong trial time-or whether this distinction
emerges because of some gender difference in settlement behavior.
We also noticed two intriguing relationships that suggest gender-conscious
decisions in planning trial strategies. Female defendants were significantly more
likely to appear in trials presided over by female judges,2 08 and plaintiffs were
significantly more likely to employ at least one female lawyer when a woman
appeared among the defendants. 209 The first relationship may suggest that the
averaged 4.6 days (p=.003).
205 On average, claims pursued by female plaintiffs took 33.9 months to come to trial,
while those pursued by men took only 28.3 months (Pl=.0 83).
206 See supra text following note 151. Overall, including trials against purely institutional
defendants, the defendants included a woman 11.4% of the time.
207 Trials involving a female defendant consumed, on average, 7.7 days, while trials
involving male defendants or exclusively institutional defendants lasted an average of only 5.3
days.
208 One-third of the trials involving a female defendant (33.3%) occurred before a female
judge, while only 10.1% of trials involving all male or institutional defendants occurred before
female judges. This difference was statistically significant (p=.0 44 ).
209 In more than a third of the cases involving a female defendant (38.5%), plaintiffs
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presence of a female judge encourages female defendants to resist settlement and
proceed to trial. Perhaps these defendants believe their chances are better with a
woman presiding over the courtroom.210 The second relationship suggests that
plaintiffs may consciously staff their claims with female lawyers when they face
a female defendant. Alternatively, these cases may be less likely than others to
settle for some reason.
The presence of a female judge, like that of a female plaintiff or defendant
corresponded with a significantly longer trial length. Trials before female judges
lasted an average of 7.0 days, while those before male judges ended, on average,
after 5.3 days (p=.03 1). To disentangle the effects of female defendants and
female judges (variables that themselves correlated), we estimated an ordinary
least squares regression equation to predict trial length in medical malpractice
cases.211 The gender of both plaintiffs and defendants remained significant after
controlling for other factors. In other words, trials involving either a female
plaintiff or a female defendant on average, were longer than other malpractice
trials. The coefficient marking the presence of a female judge was also positive
and narrowly missed significance at the conventional level (p=.051). Thus, all
three gender differences may bear some relationship to trial length.212
Female judges, as one might expect were more likely to preside over recent
trials than earlier ones.213 The prevalence of female lawyers working for
chose to employ at least one female lawyer. In cases involving male or institutional defendants,
only 7.9% of plaintiffs used a female lawyer. This difference was statistically significant
(p=.007).
210 Our data, however, did not support any such belief. We found no significant
difference between male and female judges either in overall recovery rates or in recovery rates
against female defendants.
211 The full equation is available from the authors.
212 'Me most important predictor of trial length, however, was severity of the plaintiff's
injury. As one might expect, after controlling for other factors, more serious injuries generated
longer trials. The number of plaintiff's lawyers also corresponded significantly with trial
length, with more lawyers associated with longer trials. Apart from these two variables,
however, the only variables whose coefficients reached or approached significance were the
three gender variables described in text.
Once again, the relationship between female judges and trial length (or between female
parties and trial length) is not necessarily a direct causal one. It is possible that parties are less
likely to settle complex cases assigned to female judges than to male ones. If so, this could
result from the judge's behavior, male judges, on average, might act more aggressively to
encourage settlement of complex cases. The relationship, however, could also stem from the
perception of parties or lawyers, who may overestimate their own success before a female
judge.
213 The average "Year" for verdicts rendered before female judges was 1993.1, while the
average year for verdicts occurring before male judges was 1990.8 (p=.007).
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plaintiffs also increased over time.214 Curiously, however, this was not true for
defense lawyers. Women were slightly more likely to appear at the defense table
in later years, but the difference was not statistically significant.2 15 Women
lawyers were also more likely to represent malpractice defendants than any of
the other parties we studied: Almost one-fifth of malpractice defense teams
(18.4%) included at least one woman lawyer, while only 11.4% of plaintiffs in
malpractice trials retained at least one woman. 216 These comparisons suggest
that women have a longer and more secure history as defense counsel in
malpractice cases, while they are just beginning to represent malpractice
plaintiffs and product liability defendants-and have not yet achieved any
representation as counsel for product liability plaintiffs.
Even malpractice defendants, on the other hand, were unlikely to employ
women as solo counsel. Only five women appeared as solo trial counsel for the
defendant, while fifty-seven men did so. For both plaintiffs' and defendants'
counsel, the presence of a female lawyer correlated significantly with a larger
legal team. The average size of a plaintiff's team including at least one woman
lawyer was 1.7, while the average size of all-male teams was 1.3.217 For
defendants the discrepancy was even larger; teams that included at least one
woman averaged 2.3 lawyers, while all-male defense teams averaged just 1.4
lawyers.218 We noted the same relationship in product liability cases.219 Parties
and law firms thus appear more likely to employ women as the size of a trial
team grows.
Gender differences also emerged in the type of claims women lawyers
defended. Women defended only 3.8% of the cases in which plaintiffs suffered a
serious permanent injury, while they helped defend 22.7% of other malpractice
claims (p=.021). Conversely, women appeared more likely to defend wrongful
death claims than other types of malpractice cases; they appeared at the defense
table in 30.0% of wrongful death cases but only 14.3% of the cases in which the
plaintiff survived. This difference barely missed significance at the conventional
2 14 The average year for verdicts rendered in cases involving at least one female
plaintiff's lawyer was 1993.9, while the average year for verdicts secured by all-male plaintiff's
teams was 1990.6 (p=.000).
2 15 The average year of verdict for cases in which at least one woman appeared as defense
counsel was 1991.8, while the average year for other cases was 1990.8 (p=.178).
216 As noted above, women were even more scarce in product liability trials. Women
represented no plaintiffs in those trials and participated in defending only 8.7% of defendants.
See supra notes 121-24 and accompanying text.
217 This difference was statistically significant (p--.0 16).
218 This difference was also statistically significant (p=.000).
2 19 See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
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level (p=.055).220
Perhaps our most noteworthy gender-related findings, however, emerged
from multivariate analyses of both the plaintiffs likelihood of recovery and
verdict size for successful plaintiffs. After controlling for other factors,
representation by a female lawyer was associated with better outcomes for both
plaintiffs and defendants. When the defendant retained at least one woman
lawyer, the plaintiff was significantly less likely to recover (see Table 1m1-5), and
the verdict for any successful plaintiff was significantly lower (see Table 111-6).
Conversely, when the plaintiffs legal team included at least one woman, the
plaintiff appeared more likely to recover-although this difference merely
approached significance at the conventional level.221
These surprising, and consistent, gender effects might derive from
particularly strong trial skills among female lawyers. Especially if women have
had difficulty obtaining courtroom work,222 the women who enter that arena
may be particularly qualified. Alternatively, the apparent success of female
attorneys could derive from clients' and law firms' cautiousness in employing
women. It is possible that clients hire women-or firms assign them to cases-
only when they believe the case will be easy to win.223 Whatever the explanation
for the pattern, however, the consistency of the results and their emergence after
controlling for other variables suggests that gender has important effects in
medical malpractice cases. These results wanant further study in both
malpractice and other litigation fields.
G. Trends
The number of medical malpractice verdicts increased significantly between
220 Once again, these distinctions might derive from differences in settlement rates rather
than in initial employment of women lawyers. It is possible, for example, that men and women
are equally likely to defend malpractice claims involving serious permanent injuries but that
women settle those cases more readily than men do.
221 We found no significant relationship between verdict size and presence of a woman
on the plaintiff's legal team although the coefficient for the latter variable was positive. See
supra Table IH-6.
222 Some analyses of female attorneys suggest that they have particular difficulty entering
the litigation field. See, e.g., CYNT-HA FUCHS EPSTEIN, WOMEN IN LAW 103-04 (2d ed.
University of fI1. Press 1993); MONA HARRINGTON, WOMEN LAWYERS: REWRITING THE RULES
129 (1994); Lynn S. Glasser, Survey of Female Litigators: Discrimination by Clients Limits
Opportunities, in THE WOMAN ADVOCATE: EXCELLING IN THE 90's, at 59 (Jean Maclean
Snyder & Andra Barmash Greene eds., 1995).
223 Our multivariate equations controlled for the size of both plaintiff's and defendant's
trial teams, so we cannot attribute the gender effects revealed in Tables 1]i-5 and 111-6 simply to
women's presence on larger trial teams. It is true that those teams might, on average, be more
successful than small teams, but the regression equations take that possible effect into account.
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1985 and 1992, from five in the former year to sixteen in the latter year.224 After
1992, however, verdicts again declined, averaging only 9.5 verdicts annually
during the succeeding four years.225 Even during the peak year of 1992, the total
number of verdicts (sixteen) appears small for a county encompassing more than
one million residents. The period preceding reform at the end of 1996, therefore,
does not seem to have witnessed a dramatic increase in medical malpractice
verdicts. Instead, verdicts appear to have been on the decline after a moderate
peak earlier in the decade.
Equally important, both plaintiff win rates and verdict size declined
significantly during the twelve years preceding reform in Ohio. Table 111-2
chronicles the dramatic decline in plaintiff wins-and concurrent rise in
defendant victories-during the twelve years we studied. During 1985, the first
year we analyzed, defendants won 40.0% of the malpractice claims they
litigated. In the following year, they prevailed in a comparable 37.5% of the
cases. By 1991, the middle of the period we studied, the percentage of defendant
wins had risen to 75.0%. Defendants maintained the same win rate during the
following year, and raised it further in 1993 to 77.8%. By 1996, the last year we
analyzed, defendants won fully 90.0% of the malpractice claims they litigated.
Our multivariate analysis, moreover, confirms that this trend was not due to
changes in the nature of plaintiffs' claims, injuries, or other variables. Even after
controlling for those factors, the coefficient for verdict month (a measure of
passing time) showed a significant negative association with the likelihood that a
plaintiff would prevail. Thus, a medical malpractice plaintiff in 1996 was
significantly less likely to win a jury verdict than was a plaintiff in 1985-even if
the plaintiffs alleged similar types of malpractice and suffered similar injuries.
Similarly, verdict amounts for successful plaintiffs declined over time. The
four highest verdicts in our database occurred before 1992, with just one verdict
exceeding the million-dollar mark after that time. The mean verdict from 1986
through 1991 was $1,117,116, while after 1991 the mean fell to $340,424.26
These figures are particularly dramatic because they do not control for inflation.
Thus verdicts fell in face dollar amounts, even as the real value of those dollars
also declined.
Table 111-6 shows this trend even more clearly. After controlling for the
severity of the plaintiff s injury, the nature of the alleged malpractice, and other
224 A bivariate correlation between the year and the annual number of verdicts for these
eight years (1986-1992) was both positive (r=.873) and significant (p=.005).
225 During the first four years of the period we studied, 1985-1988, malpractice verdicts
averaged 6.75 each year. During the next four years, 1989-1992, verdicts averaged 12.25 each
year. During the final four-year period, as reported in the text, verdicts averaged 9.5 each year.
226 This difference in means is not statistically significant but is suggestive of the trend
confirmed by our multivariate analysis.
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variables, the coefficient for verdict month showed a significant negative
association with verdict amount. Thus, successful malpractice plaintiffs who won
verdicts later in the period we studied recovered significantly lower damages
than did plaintiffs who secured verdicts earlier in the period.227 This remained
true even for injuries of comparable severity.
Thus, trends in both recovery rates and verdict size dramatically favored
defendants during the years immediately preceding reform. Rather than signaling
a crisis in the tort system, these trends suggested a rapid decline in plaintiffs
recoveries in medical malpractice cases.
IV. DIscussIoN: WAS THERE A CRISIS?
The evidence detailed above strongly suggests that Franklin County's tort
system suffered no crisis during the twelve years preceding 1997. Nor was
Franklin County unusual in this respect. In this section, we summarize the
absence of crisis in Franklin County and draw parallels between our findings and
those of other researchers in different parts of the country. We then briefly
address reforms of the tort system under consideration around the country,
demonstrating that they are ill-suited to the state of the current tort system.
A. The Missing Crisis
Close empirical examination of product liability and medical malpractice
verdicts in Franklin County, a representative urban county, refutes claims of a
tort crisis. Available data from other jurisdictions point in the same direction. We
identified eight different indications that, far from being in crisis, the tort system
both operates smoothly and tends to favor defendants in product liability and
medical malpractice lawsuits.
1. Low Filing and Verdict Rates
The annual number of product liability and medical malpractice claims filed
in Franklin County is surprisingly low. A county of more than one million
residents generated about sixty product liability claims and three hundred
medical malpractice complaints each year. In contrast, county residents filed or
reactivated about 2,900 other tort claims each year.228 The majority of those
227 As explained in the methods section, see supra note 51 and accompanying text, we
used constant 1984 dollars as the dependent variable in multivariate analyses. Thus, the
negative coefficient for time in Table IM-6 suggests that malpractice verdicts declined in
constant dollars over the period we studied. The bivariate comparisons reported in the previous
paragraph, however, suggest that verdicts declined in actual amounts as well.
228 See, e.g., TmE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO, THE OO CouRTs SuMMARY 1996, at 12E
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complaints were small-stakes automobile negligence claims, not the type of
cases tort reformers feature.
Even after combining all tort claims, those complaints constitute only a
fraction of the civil justice system. During the most recent year we studied,
Franklin County residents filed or reactivated 2,330 mortgage foreclosures,229
4,494 claims based on contract or other nontort principles,230 and 8,941 domestic
relations cases.231 Disputes over mortgages, contracts, domestic relations, and
other civil matters were five times more likely to produce courthouse filings than
were complaints of any type of personal injury.
Nationwide data tell the same story. A Department of Justice study of civil
cases in the nation's seventy-five largest counties concluded that medical
malpractice claims constitute about 4.9% of all tort filings, while product liability
complaints comprise only 3.4% of those filings.232 Tort cases themselves,
moreover, make up only about ten percent of civil claims filed in state courts of
general jurisdiction.233 Product liability and medical malpractice claims thus
each account for less than half of one percent of civil cases filed in state
courts.234 In contrast, domestic relations lawsuits constitute more than forty
percent of state civil filings.235
(reporting 2,937 "other tort" cases filed or reactivated in Franklin County during 1996).
2 29 See id. at 20E.
2 30 See id. at 32E.
231 See id. at2F.
232 See SMrrH ET AL., supra note 1, at 2. The study was based on cases closed from July
1, 1991, to June 30, 1992, in state courts of general jurisdiction in those seventy-five counties.
For some analyses, the researchers drew a representative sample of cases from forty-five of the
counties. See id. at 1; see also Eaton & Talarico, supra note 6, at 650 (product liability claims
constituted only 1.3% of tort claims filed in four Georgia counties between 1990 and 1993;
medical malpractice complaints constituted another 3.6% of tort claims).
233 See SMITH ETAL., supra note 1, at 2. The percentage may be even lower outside these
large urban counties. See, e.g., Eaton & Talarico, supra note 6, at 641 (tort claims constituted
only 4.9% of civil filings in four Georgia counties). See generally Saks, supra note 30, at 1208
(tort claims comprise less than ten percent of the civil justice system in most states where data
have been compiled).
234 This figure probably overestimates the prevalence of product liability and medical
malpractice claims. Most states maintain courts of limited jurisdiction as well as general
jurisdiction; product liability and medical malpractice claims are very unlikely to appear in the
former courts. See supra note 28 and accompanying text (discussing Ohio's courts of limited
jurisdiction). Including claims filed in courts of limited jurisdiction, therefore, would further
depress the percentage of medical malpractice and product liability claims.
2 35 See SMITH Er AL., supra note 1, at 2; see also Eaton & Talarico, supra note 6, at 642
(domestic relations cases composed about half the civil litigation docket in two Georgia
counties and more than 70% of that docket in two other counties); Galanter, supra note 3, at
1105 n.34 (domestic relations filings in state courts of general jurisdiction increased by 37%
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Federal claims alter this picture only slightly. The federal courts, like their
state counterparts, docket relatively few tort complaints compared to other civil
claims. Less than one-fifth of federal civil filings are tort cases.2 36 Federal courts,
moreover, do not play any special role in processing medical malpractice claims;
some plaintiffs file those claims in federal court, but malpractice claims do not
constitute an unusually large percentage of federal tort filings.
Product liability complaints do constitute a larger percentage of the federal
civil docket. Because of the special role federal courts play in mass tort litigation,
about one-third of the tort claims filed in federal court are product liability
suits.237 Overall, however, federal claims constitute only about four percent of
tort cases nationwide.238 Even after accounting for lawsuits filed in federal court,
therefore, product liability claims constitute only about 4.4% of tort claims
nationwide. 239
The number of complaints filed in any court, of course, greatly exceeds the
number of jury verdicts rendered in that court. Over the twelve-year period we
studied, Franklin County juries delivered an average of less than four product
liability verdicts and fewer than ten medical malpractice verdicts each year. Jury
trials in automobile negligence or business and contract disputes were much
more common. Franklin County juries resolved about thirty-five of the former
cases and twenty-two of the latter disputes each year.240 Product liability and
between 1988 and 1993).
236 See PREss, supra note 7, at I (during 1994-1995, tort cases constituted about 18% of
civil claims terminated by U.S. district courts).
237 See SMrrH Er AL., supra note 1, at 1 n.1. This figure may overstate the number of
product liability claims filed in federal court; one researcher has suggested that when cases are
transferred from one district to another (a common occurrence in product liability cases) the
federal system double counts the filings. See Galanter, supra note 3, at 1108.
238 See SMrH ET AL., supra note 1, at 1.
239 If federal claims constitute four percent of all tort filings, and one third of those federal
claims allege product defects, then 1.3% of all tort filings are product liability complaints filed
in federal courts. Meanwhile, 96% of all tort filings occur in state courts and 3.4% of the latter
filings are product liability claims. Therefore, 3.3% of all tort filings must be product liability
claims filed in state court, and 4.4% of all tort claims contain product liability allegations. This
figure probably overstates the percentage of product liability lawsuits because it is based in part
on filings in large counties. Small counties most likely receive a smaller percentage of product
liability filings than larger counties do.
240 These averages are drawn from CHAPPELEAR, supra note 34, at 6. To calculate the
average number of verdicts in motor vehicle cases, we combined Chappelear's categories of
"motor vehicle crashes" and "motor vehicle-pedestrian crashes." For business and contract
disputes, we combined the categories of "business disputes," "sale of goods and services,"
"fraud," "insurance," "construction," "employment," and "real estate." A brief perusal of cases
falling into these categories indicated that all of them involved alleged breaches of contract or
related matters. In all, Franklin County juries produced an average of 84.8 civil verdicts a year
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medical malpractice trials occupy only a small comer of the legal system.
Once again, the small number of jury verdicts in Franklin County
corresponds with the experience of courts nationwide. Between July 1, 1991, and
June 30, 1992, juries in the nation's seventy-five largest counties rendered 647
product liability verdicts and 1,370 medical malpractice decisions.241 On
average, therefore, each county witnessed only 8.6 product liability verdicts and
18.3 medical malpractice verdicts that year. During the same year, juries in each
county decided an average of 52.2 automobile negligence cases, 29.6 contract
disputes, and 3.7 real estate controversies. 242 These averages, based on data
collected for a single year, may be artificially high; our Franklin County figures
suggest that 1992 experienced an exceptionally high number of jury verdicts.243
Even data gathered during a peak year demonstrate that the number of jury
verdicts in product liability and medical malpractice cases is low both in absolute
numbers and as a percentage of all civil jury verdicts.244
Federal jury verdicts are equally scarce although the percentage of product
liability verdicts is higher in federal courts than in state courts. In fiscal year
1991-1992, federal juries rendered 73 medical malpractice verdicts, 199
asbestos-related verdicts, and 218 other product liability verdicts.2 45 On average,
therefore, each of the ninety federal districts issued 0.81 medical malpractice
verdicts, 2.21 asbestos verdicts, and 2.42 other product liability verdicts. These
verdicts comprised about 43% of tort jury verdicts in the federal courts,
representing the somewhat greater share of product liability claims in those
from 1985 through 1994. See id.
241 See DEFRANCES, supra note 7, at 2. The number of product liability verdicts reported
above includes both the product liability and toxic substance categories from the Civil Justice
Survey. See id. at n.b.
242 See id. at 2 (juries in 75 counties decided 3,915 automobile negligence cases, 2,217
contract disputes, and 277 real estate cases).
243 Franklin County recorded 135 jury verdicts in 1992, more than in any other year we
studied. Indeed, many of the years we studied witnessed fewer than half this number of
verdicts. The county, moreover, produced 15 medical malpractice verdicts during 1992-
again, an unusually high number but one that closely matches the county average computed
from the Civil Justice Survey figures. It is possible, therefore, that 1992 represented an unusual
peak year for jury verdicts. If so, the Civil Justice Survey overstates the extent ofjury verdicts
in large counties.
244 See also OSTROM & KAUDER, supra note 7, at 25 (estimating that product liability
claims constitute 2% of all tort trials in state court, while medical malpractice claims constitute
12% of those trials).
24 5 See Eisenberg, supra note 32, at 436-37; see also PRESS, supra note 7, at 3 (in two
other recent years, federal juries decided about 185 medical malpractice cases and 473 product
liability claims; each year, therefore, juries in the ninety federal districts decided an average of
1.0 medical malpractice cases and 2.6 product liability suits).
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courts.24 6 The federal courts, however, devoted as many resources to contract
trials as to product liability or medical malpractice ones. During the same fiscal
year, the federal courts concluded 463 jury trials on contract claims, or about
5.14 trials per district.247 Even in federal court, product liability and medical
malpractice verdicts are scarce in absolute numbers and retain a minority share
of the civil trial docket.
Researchers repeatedly have shown that the majority of individuals injured
by negligent conduct-whether medical malpractice, flawed manufacturing
processes, or other actions-never file a legal complaint. The "Harvard Study"
of medical care in New York concluded that only 2% of patients who suffered
negligent treatment, as judged by physician raters, filed malpractice claims.2 48 A
recent Florida survey similarly found that among 220 women who suffered an
adverse birth outcome (usually death or serious, permanent injury to the infant)
none filed a malpractice claim.249 Although we had no measure of the incidence
of medical malpractice or product-related negligence in Franklin County, our
data are consistent with these studies. The small number of malpractice and
product complaints filed in Franklin County, as well as in other large counties
246 See Eisenberg, supra note 32, at 437 (reporting a total of 1,124 federal jury verdicts in
tort cases). Conversely, the share of motor vehicle tort cases is lower in federal courts than in
state courts.
247 See id.
248 See PAUL C. WEILER ET AL., A MEASURE OF MALPRACTCE 73 (1993). Conversely,
the study concluded that a high percentage of filed claims lacked merit as determined by the
physician raters. See id. at 71-76. On this score, some critics have pointed out that the study's
assessment of negligence depended upon medical charts rather than claim records where
evidence of negligence often is more fully developed. The legal system appears to be effective
in weeding out nonmeritorious claims. See, e.g., Randall R. Bovbjerg, Medical Malpractice:
Research and Reform, 79 VA. L. REv. 2155, 2163-66 (1993). The authors of the study
themselves agree that the docketing of nonmeritorious claims is "likely due to the fact
that... patients and their lawyers have a difficult time identifying in advance valid claims that
demonstrate that something went wrong in treatment." Paul C. Weiler, Fixing the Tail: The
Place of Malpractice in Health Care Reform, 47 RUTGERS L. REv. 1157, 1162 (1995). They
reject the claim that 'greedy' personal injury lawyers are wont to file spurious tort claims." Id.
24 9 See Frank A. Sloan & Chee Ruey Hsieh, Injury, Liability, and the Decision to File a
Medical Malpractice Claim, 29 L. & SoC'Y REV. 413, 430 (1995). This finding is particularly
noteworthy because Florida has one of the highest rates of malpractice claims in the nation and
obstetrics suffers one of the highest claim frequencies among medical specialties. See id. The
authors of this study did not disclose how many of these 220 injuries derived from negligence,
as determined by their independent physician raters, but it appears that some did. For other
studies documenting low filing rates among injured people or negligence victims, see, e.g.,
Marlynn L. May & Daniel B. Stengel, Who Sues Their Doctors? How Patients Handle
Medical Grievances, 24 L. & SoC'Y REv. 105 (1990); Don Harper Mills, Medical Insurance
Feasibility Study: A Technical Summary, 128 W.J. MED. 360 (1978). See generally Saks,
supra note 30, at 1183-84 (summarizing studies).
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nationwide, suggests that most victims of these types of negligence eschew the
legal process.2 50
2. Low Win Rates for Plaintiffs
Plaintiffs lost the overwhelming majority of product liability and medical
malpractice claims they brought to trial. Franklin County plaintiffs won only
one-fifth of their product liability trials and less than one-third of medical
malpractice lawsuits. In comparison, plaintiffs won 78.9% of business disputes,
69.1% of employment-related trials, and 73.5% of real estate controversies.251
Nationwide figures are comparable. In the country's most populous counties,
medical malpractice plaintiffs win only 30.3% of their jury trials and product
liability plaintiffs prevail just 40.5% of the time.2 52 These success rates are
among the lowest recorded for any category of civil claim. Plaintiffs in contract
actions win almost two-thirds (62.9%) of their actions, while plaintiffs who sue
professionals other than health care workers win 50.3% of jury verdicts.2 53 The
only plaintiffs who fare as poorly as medical malpractice or product liability
complainants in state courts are government agencies prosecuting eminent
domain actions.254
2 50 See also Richard L. Abel, The Real Tort Crisis-Too Few Claims, 48 OHIo ST. LJ.
443 (1987); Richard A. Posner, Explaining the Variance in the Number of Tort Suits Across
U.S. States and Between the United States and England, 26 L LEGAL STUD. 477, 487-88
(1997) (after controlling for factors like income, education, and urbanization, U.S. citizens
appear to file fewer tort claims than their English counterparts).
251 See CHAPPELEAR, supra note 34, at 152, 186, 198.
2 52 See DEFRANCES, supra note 7, at 4. In toxic substance tort cases, a category that
includes many product liability claims, plaintiffs prevailed 74.0% of the time. See id.; see also
Eaton & Talarico, supra note 6, at 663 (In Fulton County, Georgia, juries found for the plaintiff
in only one out of nine medical malpractice cases tried in 1992.); id. at 664 & n.75 (One of the
largest medical malpractice insurers in Georgia maintains that its insureds win almost 80% of
cases that go to trial.).
253 See DEFRANCES, supra note 7, at 4.
254 See id. (showing a 20.7% success rate for eminent domain plaintiffs). Plaintiffs also
won only 20.0% of mortgage foreclosure cases, but juries decided only six of those cases
during the entire year making the category too small for valid comparisons. See id.; see also
MOLLER, supra note 7, at 16 (1996) (plaintiffs win only 33% of medical malpractice cases and
44% of product liability trials-the lowest win rates among civil claims included in this
analysis); OSTROM & KAUDER, supra note 7, at 34 (plaintiffs win 30% of medical malpractice
claims and 40% of product liability claims--the lowest win rates among tort plaintiffs);
VIDMAR, supra note 2, at 39 (in North Carolina, medical malpractice plaintiffs won 20% of
trials from 1984-1987 and 16% from 1987-1990); id. at 38-39 (summarizing win rates from a
variety of medical malpractice studies; rates ranged from 13.5% to 53.0%, with a median of
about 29%).
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Win rates for product liability and medical malpractice plaintiffs in federal
courts are equally low. Medical malpractice plaintiffs won just 31.8% of federal
trials in two recent years.255 Product liability plaintiffs who suffered personal
injuries won only 26.8% of those trials.256 These were the lowest success rates
recorded for any category of federal tort plaintiffs.2 57 In both state and federal
courts, therefore, medical malpractice and product liability plaintiffs face
inhospitable recovery odds.
3. Absence ofPunitive Damages
Empirical studies repeatedly show that juries rarely award punitive damages
in product liability, medical malpractice, or other tort cases.258 Our data
Low win rates in medical malpractice and product liability cases have existed since 1959.
See AUDREY CHIN & MARK A. PEERSON, DEEP POCKETs, EMpiY POCKETS: WHO WINs IN
COOK CouNTY JURY TRIALS 51 (1985) (discussing a study of more than 9,000 civil jury trials
in Cook County, Illinois, between 1959 and 1979 that showed medical malpractice plaintiffs
won 33% of trials and product liability plaintiffs won 38% of trials; other categories of tort
plaintiffs were more likely to prevail).
255 See PRESS, supra note 7, at 4. This percentage includes both bench and jury trials.
Another pair of scholars has calculated that medical malpractice plaintiffs won just 26% of
federal jury trials in fiscal year 1991-1992. See Eisenberg, supra note 32, at 437. During a
longer period stretching from 1979 to 1993, federal malpractice plaintiffs won 27% of jury
trials. See id.
2 56 See PRESS, supra note 7, at 4. The small number of product liability plaintiffs claiming
property damage were somewhat more successful; they won 39.3% of federal trials. See id.
The discrepancy between product liability plaintiffs claiming personal injury and those
asserting property damage is similar to the difference we observed between those two groups.
See supra text following note 86.
Another set of researchers has analyzed federal product liability win rates by
distinguishing between asbestos cases and all other product claims. According to these
researchers, plaintiffs won 87% of asbestos jury trials in fiscal year 1991-1992, but only 37%
of other product trials. See Eisenberg, supra note 32, at 437. During a longer period, stretching
from 1979 to 1993, and before federal data distinguished the two categories of claims, product
liability plaintiffs won 30% of their federal jury trials. See id.
2 57 See PRESS, supra note 7, at 4. Overall, tort plaintiffs did not seem to fare as well in
federal court as in state courts. Federal plaintiffs won 42.5% of all tort trials, while state
plaintiffs won 53% of those trials. See id.; SMITH Er AL., supra note 1, at 5. But see Eisenberg,
supra note 32, at 437 (stating that federal tort plaintiffs enjoyed higher success rates than state
plaintiffs in fiscal year 1991-1992, although federal win rates for a longer period lag behind
state win rates).
258 See, e.g., MARK PETERSON ET AL., PUNITIvE DAMAGES: EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 8-31
(1987); Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, Myth and Reality in Punitive Damages, 75 MINN.
L. REV. 1 (1990); Theodore Eisenberg et al., The Predictability of Punitive Damages, 26 J.
LEGAL STuD. 623, 633-37 (1997); Thomas Koenig & Michael Rustad, The Quiet Revolution
Revisited: An Empirical Study of the Impact of State Tort Reform of Punitive Damages in
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emphatically agree with these observations. Although we tracked every jury
verdict over an entire twelve-year period in Franidin County, we did not find a
single award of punitive damages in a product liability or medical malpractice
trial. Punitive damages were much more common in business disputes; during
the ten years we studied, five out of thirty successful plaintiffs in business
controversies (16.7%) obtained a punitive award. 259
The Department of Justice produced similar findings after reviewing all jury
verdicts in the nation's seventy-five largest counties. That review identified only
three punitive damage awards in product liability trials during the year ending
June 30, 1992.260 The total amount of punitive damages awarded those three
plaintiffs, moreover, was $40,000 (about $13,000 apiece). 261 During the same
year, only thirteen medical malpractice plaintiffs in these seventy-five counties
obtained punitive damage awards; the average punitive assessment for those
plaintiffs was $245,000.262
The Department of Justice likewise found that plaintiffs in contract actions
are considerably more likely than either medical malpractice or product liability
complainants to obtain punitive awards. About one in every eight successful
contract plaintiffs (12.2%) in this nationwide study obtained punitive damages,
compared to only 3.1% of medical malpractice and 2.2% of product liability
plaintiffs.263 The average punitive damage award in contract cases, moreover, far
exceeded the average for medical malpractice or product liability cases. The
mean punitive award in contract cases topped one million dollars; awards in
those cases accounted for almost two-thirds (63.3%) of the total punitive
damages assessed that year.264
Products Liability, 16 JusT. Sys. J. 21 (1993).
2 59 See CHAPPELEAR, supra note 34, at 8, 152.
260 See DEFRANCES, supra note 7, at 8.
261 See id. Thirteen other plaintiffs in "toxic substance" cases received punitive damage
awards averaging $1,994,000. See id. Some of those lawsuits may have included product
liability allegations although many may have included intentional tort claims as well.
2 62 See id.
263 See id. Professionals other than health care workers (primarily accountants and
engineers) were also substantially more likely to suffer punitive damage awards in malpractice
actions; 15.7% of malpractice actions against nonmedical professionals resulted in punitive
damages. See id.
264 Total punitive damages assessed in the studied counties reached $267,879,000.
Punitive damages in contract cases made up $169,528,000 of that total. See id.; see also ERIK
MOLLER ET AL., PuNmvE DAMAGES IN FINANcIAL INJURY JUY VERnIcTs 20, 22 (1997)
(stating that punitive damages are awarded in about 14.2% of all financial injury jury trials;
mean awards exceed one million dollars in all categories of financial injury cases).
Recent empirical work has focused on the predictability of punitive damage awards. After
analyzing several large data sets, a team of researchers headed by Theodore Eisenberg
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4. Modest Compensatory Awards
Despite tales of rampant million dollar verdicts, we identified only six
verdicts over the million dollar mark in twelve years of product liability and
medical malpractice trials. Most plaintiffs recovered substantially less than that
amount. One-third of prevailing product liability claimants obtained under
$50,000 at trial; the median verdict for successful product liability plaintiffs was
$207,560. Similarly, one-third of successful medical malpractice plaintiffs
obtained $50,000 or less, while the median award was $198,000. Medical
malpractice verdicts, moreover, fell by almost 25% through post-verdict motions
and appeals.
The medians we calculated in Franldin County are strikingly similar to those
for product liability and medical malpractice plaintiffs nationwide. In large urban
counties, the median verdict for a successful product liability plaintiff was
$260,000 in 1992; for a winning medical malpractice plaintiff, it was
$201,000.265 Median awards for federal plaintiffs are somewhat higher,266 but
the total number of those plaintiffs remains small compared to state plaintiffs.
The average verdicts in medical malpractice and product liability cases are
high when compared to other categories of jury verdicts.267 The awards in
concluded that punitive damages are both rare (especially in product liability or medical
malpractice lawsuits) and closely tied to compensatory damages. See Eisenberg et al., supra
note 258. Cass Sunstein, Daniel Kahneman, and David Schkade, on the other hand, conducted
simulations with potential jurors suggesting that, although the jurors held common moral
judgments related to punitive damages, they might have difficulty translating those judgments
into consistent monetary awards. See Cass R. Sunstein et al., Assessing Punitive Damages
(with Notes on Cognition and Value in Law), 107 YALE L.J. 2071 (1998); see also A. Mitchell
Polinsky, Are Punitive Damages Really Insignificant, Predictable, and Rational? A Comment
on Eisenberg et al., 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 663 (1997) (commenting on the Eisenberg study).
Although further work needs to be done on predictability, the debate is more relevant to
business disputes and other claim categories in which punitive damages are more common. As
the Eisenberg study and others persuasively show, these awards are extremely rare in product
liability or medical malpractice cases.
265 See DEFRANCES, supra note 7, at 5. Median awards in some jurisdictions appear to be
considerably lower. In a North Carolina study, the median award for successful plaintiffs in
medical malpractice trials was only $36,500 between 1984 and 1990. See VIDMAR, supra note
2, at 25.
2 66 See PRESS, supra note 7, at 4 (the median award for federal product liability plaintiffs
was $284,000 and for medical malpractice plaintiffs it was $463,000). Very high awards in
aviation cases (median=$999,000) distort the median award in federal product cases. See id.;
see also Eisenberg, supra note 32, at 439 (median federal jury award between 1979 and 1993
was $267,000 in medical malpractice cases and $318,000 in product liability trials).
267 See, e.g., DEFRANCES, supra note 7, at 5 (reporting median awards for numerous civil
categories); PRESS, supra note 7, at 4 (median awards in federal tort trials). See generally
DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., COMPENSATION FOR ACCIDENTAL INJURIES IN THE UNITED
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malpractice and product cases, however, compensate serious injuries. Almost
one-third (29.3%) of Franklin County plaintiffs who prevailed on medical
malpractice or product liability claims died from the negligence they proved.268
The median recovery for those wrongful death plaintiffs was $312,500. In
contrast, the median award for federal plaintiffs who successfully prosecuted tort
claims growing out of aviation accidents was more than twice as high-
$655,000.269 Few individuals would trade their lives for either $312,500 or
$655,000; both figures undoubtedly undervalue human life. The comparison,
however, suggests that jury awards in medical malpractice and product liability
cases are modest given the extent of injuries in those cases and the value attached
to similar injuries in other litigation categories.270
5. Few Lavyers, Few Experts
Plaintiffs and defendants employed surprisingly few lawyers and expert
witnesses in the trials we studied. Plaintiffs averaged only 1.A lawyers in product
liability lawsuits and 1.3 lawyers in malpractice trials. Defendants employed
more lawyers than plaintiffs did but still staffed trials sparingly. On average, 2.0
lawyers represented product liability defendants at trial, while only 1.6 lawyers
represented malpractice defendants in the courtroom.
Expert witnesses were even more scarce. Plaintiffs called the most experts in
product liability cases where they averaged 2.0 experts per trial. Defendants
called only 1.0 experts in the average product liability case. In medical
malpractice trials, long assumed to be a battleground of experts, plaintiffs
introduced an average of 1.3 expert witnesses, while defendants relied upon an
average ofjust 1.2 experts.
Few other studies count the number of experts or lawyers appearing in civil
trials. The data from Franklin County, however, suggest that product liability and
medical malpractice trials consume relatively few of these resources. Trials on
other tort claims probably employ even fewer lawyers and experts, while
controversies that settle outside the courtroom may rely upon the smallest
STATES (1991); Bovbjerg et al., supra note 167.
268 We exclude from these calculations the few plaintiffs who claimed only property
damage in their successful product liability suits.
2 69 See PRESS, supra note 7, at 4. Almost all claims growing out of aviation accidents are
wrongful death claims, making this category an apt reference point for jurors' valuation of
death cases.
2 7 0 See also D. DEWEES Er AL., EXPLORING THE DOMAIN OF ACCIDENT LAW 422-23
(1996) (jurors tend to undercompensate the most severe injuries); Frank A. Sloan & Thomas J.
Hoerger, Uncertainty, Information and Resolution of Medical Malpractice Disputes, 4 J. RISK
& UNCERTAINTY 403 (1991) (suggesting that medical malpractice plaintiffs are
undercompensated for their economic injuries).
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number of lawyers. 271 Rather than subsidizing armies of lawyers and expert
witnesses, the tort system appears to use those resources quite efficiently.
6. Low Settlement Offers
Our current database permits only preliminary comments about settlement
patterns because we possess only information about cases that failed to settle.
The available information, however, shows no evidence that defendants suffer in
the settlement process. Defendants made low settlement offers even in cases they
ultimately lost. Malpractice defendants often refused to discuss settlement on any
terms. Win rates that overwhelmingly favored defendants backed up these
practices; although defendants suffered some high verdicts, they paid less overall
by pushing disputed cases to trial.
7. Rational Verdict Patterns
Without making an independent evaluation of the merits and damages of
each case, it is impossible to judge the correctness ofjury verdicts. Several of our
findings, however, suggest that juries reach rational decisions in product liability
and medical malpractice cases. We found no evidence that seriously injured
plaintiffs prevailed more often than less grievously injured ones. Indeed, once we
separated death and nondeath claims, survivors who suffered less serious injuries
were more likely to succeed in court on their medical malpractice claims. A
similar pattern emerged in product liability cases with plaintiffs who suffered
moderate physical injuries securing jury verdicts more often than plaintiffs who
experienced catastrophic ones. We also noticed that product liability plaintiffs
who alleged property damage were more likely to win at trial than those who
suffered any type of bodily injury.272
These distinctions may derive from varying settlement rates for the different
injury categories; juries are not necessarily biased against plaintiffs who suffer
the most debilitating physical injuries.273 The patterns, however, refute the
notion that juries premise liability on sympathy. The juries in our investigation
did not favor the most seriously injured plaintiffs.
On the other hand, we did find links between the severity of a plaintiffs
271 One recent study, examining all tort filings in four Georgia counties, concluded that
96% of tort plaintiffs and 92% of tort defendants employed only one or two attorneys. See
Eaton & Talarico, supra note 6, at 653. Indeed, three quarters of all plaintiffs employed only a
single attorney. See id.
2 72 The same trend appears in a database of verdicts rendered in federal tort trials. See
supra note 256.
2 73 But see supra note 87 and accompanying text (suggesting that psychological defenses
may discourage jurors from finding in favor of these seriously injured plaintiffs).
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injury and verdict size once liability was established. In bivariate tests, injury
severity correlated significantly with verdict size for both product liability and
medical malpractice claims. Juries, in other words, awarded the highest damages
to the most seriously injured plaintiffs.
The only variation in this pattern was a tendency to undercompensate
wrongful death plaintiffs. Once again, this apparent distortion could arise from
settlement behavior. Alternatively, it could signal the grim reality that
catastrophic physical injuries impose higher economic costs than juries are
willing to assign to a lost life. Whatever the origin of the pattern, it does not
suggest excessive jury sympathy or pro-plaintiff bias. On the contrary, it may
suggest that plaintiffs who die from a defendant's negligence fail to recover the
full costs of that injury.
We detected some differences in recovery rates or verdict size based on
plaintiff characteristics. Men appeared more likely than women to prevail in
product liability trials, while women recovered higher verdicts from medical
malpractice juries. Minor plaintiffs may have been more likely than adults to win
malpractice claims. These differences, again, are as likely to derive from
settlement patterns as from jury prejudice. They also, however, counsel caution
in modifying tort rules without a fuller understanding of how those rules affect
different classes of plaintiffs.274
Perhaps most intriguing, we found no evidence that juries penalize deep
pocket institutional defendants either by imposing liability more readily or by
assessing heavier damages. Once we controlled for other variables through
regression analysis, institutional defendants were no more likely than individual
defendants to lose jury verdicts; nor did they pay significantly higher verdicts
when they did lose.275 The only potential defense bias we identified was one in
favor of medical doctors. Defendants with an M.D. degree appeared to win
medical malpractice trials more often than health care workers who lacked that
degree, even when we controlled for injury severity and type of alleged
malpractice.
Our findings are consistent with a plethora of other studies concluding that
civil juries are conscientious in their work and reach rational decisions. Social
scientists agree that a plaintiff's likelihood of winning a jury verdict does not
increase with the severity of injury; juries do not base fault decisions on injury
severity.276 On the other hand, verdict size for successful plaintiffs does increase
2 74 See infra notes 301-02 and accompanying text.
275 These comparisons depend exclusively on the medical malpractice verdicts in our
database. All of the product liability trials included institutional defendants, permitting no
contrast between those defendants and individuals.
276 See, e.g., Corinne Cather et al., Plaintiff Injury and Defendant Reprehensibility:
Implications for Compensatory and Punitive Damage Awards, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 189,
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with severity of the injury, suggesting that jurors rationally peg damage awards
to injury costs. 277 Several studies suggest that juries are quite similar to judges,
lawyers, physicians, and other professionals both in assessing liability and
valuing damages. 278 Indeed, there is some evidence that juries are more
conservative than these other decisionmakers in personal injury cases. 279
Much research on the "deep pocket" effect, moreover, is consistent with our
conclusion that bias against corporate or institutional defendants does not exist.
At the very least, any such bias depends upon the interplay of numerous factors.
One often quoted study identified a deep pocket effect against some corporate
defendants, but specifically noted that the effect did not hold in medical
malpractice actions: doctors paid higher jury verdicts in those actions than
hospitals did.280 A recent simulation conducted with potential jurors found no
significant difference in medical malpractice awards assessed against individuals
201-02 (1996); Mark I. Taragin et al., The Influence of Standard of Care and Severity ofInjury
on the Resolution of Medical Malpractice Claims, 117 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 780, 782
(1992). On the contrary, some research suggests that seriously injured plaintiffs are less likely
to recover than less seriously injured ones. See, e.g., Feigenson et al., supra note 87, at 608-12.
277 See, eg., Leticia Rodriguez & William R. Boggett, Societal Considerations in Scaling
Injury Severity and Effects, 20 J. SAFr' RES. 73 (1989); Frank A. Sloan & Chee Ruey Hsieh,
Variability in Medical Malpractice Payments: Is the Compensation Fair?, 24 L. & SOC'Y REV.
997, 1025 (1990) (injury severity is the dominant factor in a "systematic pattem[ ] underl[ying]
differences in awards").
278 See FRANK A. SLOAN ET AL., SUING FOR MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 167-68 (1993);
VIDMAR, supra note 2, at 221-35; Harry Kalven Jr., The Dignity of the Civil Jury, 50 VA. L.
REV. 1055, 1065 (1964); Taragin et al., supra note 276; Neil Vidmar & Jeffrey J. Rice,
Assessments of Noneconomic Damage Awards in Medical Negligence: A Comparison of
Jurors with Legal Professionals, 78 IOWAL. REV. 883, 896-901 (1993).
279 See, e.g., NEIL VIDMAR, supra note 2, at 169-70; Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore
Eisenberg, Trial by Jury or Judge: Transcending Empiricism, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 1124, 1137
(1977) (federal judges find in favor of plaintiffs in a higher proportion of cases than juries do);
Valerie P. Hans, The Contested Role of the Civil Jury in Business Litigation, 79 JUDICATURE
242 (1996); Valerie P. Hans & William S. Lofquist, Jurors'Judgments of Business Liability in
Tort Cases: Implications for the Litigation Explosion Debate, 26 L. & SOC'Y REv. 85 (1992)
(jurors scrutinize motives of personal injury plaintiffs with suspicion). There is also
considerable evidence that jurors undercompensate the most seriously injured accident victims
compared to less seriously injured victims. See Galanter, supra note 3, at 1116-20 (reviewing
studies); supra notes 86-8, 159-65 and accompanying text.
280 See CMN & PETERSON, supra note 254, at 44. Another study found that medical
malpractice defendants paid more, on average, than defendants in other tort categories-even
after controlling for injury severity and other factors. See Bovbjerg et al., supra note 167, at 21.
The authors, however, concluded that this relationship was unlikely to stem simply from jury
callousness toward a "deep pocket," in part because defendants also prevailed in most
malpractice cases. See id at 33-34. Instead, the authors proposed a special theory of case
selection by plaintiff's lawyers in malpractice actions. See id. at 35-36.
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or hospitals.28' Other simulations suggest that jurors sometimes impose liability
more readily on corporations than on individuals, but the difference derives from
jurors' perception that the corporations could have done more to avoid the
accident and thus are more at fault.28 2 Defendant wealth and commercial
conduct may also influence liability determinations, but these factors seem to
affect decisions about individual defendants as well as corporate ones.2 83
A defendant's institutional status, in other words, is one of many factors that
may affect liability in medical malpractice, product liability, and other tort trials.
Researchers agree that juries follow no simplistic rule of imposing more liability
or greater damages on corporate defendants. Indeed, as our findings suggest,
institutional status may be irrelevant to liability and damage determinations once
other factors (such as injury severity and liability admissions) are controlled.
8. Trends Favoring Defendants
Perhaps our most telling results are those showing strong pro-defendant
trends through 1996. Product liability filings declined dramatically during the
decade preceding 1997, and the number of verdicts also declined. The number of
jury trials in malpractice cases increased somewhat in the late eighties and early
nineties, but declined sharply after 1991. Thus, by 1996, the number of product
liability complaints had been diminishing for many years, and verdicts in both
product liability and medical malpractice cases were also on the decline.
The drop in plaintiff win rates and verdict amounts was even more striking.
Only one plaintiff won a product liability verdict in Franklin County after 1991,
and that award was for just $5,000. After 1991, medical malpractice defendants
won three quarters of the cases they tried and encountered only one verdict
exceeding one million dollars. Multivariate analysis of the malpractice claims
dramatically underlines these trends. Even after controlling for injury severity
and other factors, both the plaintiff s likelihood of prevailing at trial and the size
of a successful plaintiff's verdict declined significantly over the twelve years we
studied.
This result is particularly noteworthy because other researchers have noted
that the number of jury verdicts usually bears an inverse relationship to the
median size of those verdicts. As the number of verdicts decreases, in other
281 See VIDMAR, supra note 2, at 203-12; see also id. at 212-20 (describing additional
studies).
282 See, e.g., Valerie P. Hans & M. David Ermann, Responses to Corporate Versus
Individual Wrongdoing, 13 LAw & HuM. BEHAV. 151, 163 (1989); Robert J. MacCoun,
Differential Treatment of Corporate Defendants by Juries: An Examination of the "Deep-
Pockets"Hypothesis, 30 L. & SoC'Y REv. 121 (1996).
283 See Hans & Ermann, supra note 282; MacCoun, supra note 282.
[Vol. 60:315
1999] EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE& TORTREFORM 395
words, the verdict size tends to increase; this pattern emerges because small-
ticket claims are more likely to settle, leaving only the larger cases for jury
resolution.284 For verdict size to decrease while the number of awards was also
decreasing suggests a very strong pro-defendant trend.
Nationwide studies are less comprehensive, but similarly suggest that filings,
trials, win rates, and recoveries are either steady or declining in medical
malpractice and product liability actions. Tort filings in federal courts were
steady as of 1993, while those in state court appear to have begun a modest
decline.2 85 One analysis of complaints filed in twenty-seven states between 1991
and 1993 concluded that, on average, tort filings decreased by six percent during
those years.286 The number of verdicts also appears to be declining, although
there is some variation among counties.287
A few studies also signal falling victory rates and verdict sizes nationwide.
James Henderson and Theodore Eisenberg found that the success rate for federal
product liability plaintiffs declined from 40.5% in 1979 to 32.5% in 1987.288
During the same period, tort plaintiffs in nonproduct cases suffered a similar, but
less sharp, decline in their success rate, while plaintiffs pursuing nontort claims
enjoyed a modest increase in the percentage of cases they won.289
Jury Verdict Research, a nationwide verdict gathering service, found that
median jury awards for personal injury plaintiffs declined from $65,000 in 1990
to $55,660 in 1996.290 That report is particularly intriguing because commercial
reporters tend to gather information on the largest verdicts. 291 Another recent
study of civil verdicts concludes that award size has been relatively constant in
284 See, e.g., MARK PETERSON, CIVIL JURIES IN THE 1980s: TRENDS IN JURY TRIALS AND
VERDICTs IN CALIFORNIA AND COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS 29-31 (1987); Galanter, supra note 3,
at 1114.
285 See SMITH ET AL., supra note 1, at 2. Smith and his coauthors conclude that "[t]he
number of tort case filings has remained stable since 1986" and that "[f]ederal tort caseloads
have also remained fairly constant over the past 8 years." Id. The accompanying graph depicts
this stability, but also shows a drop in state filings after 1992.
2 86 See OsTROM & KAUDER, supra note 7, at 22; see also Eaton & Talarico, supra note 6,
at 643 (tort filings in four Georgia counties declined between 1990 and 1993).
2 87 See MOLLER, supra note 7, at 8.
288 See Henderson & Eisenberg, supra note 75, at 523. The authors excluded asbestos-
related claims from their study, but included cases resolved by motion, bench trial, settlement,
and jury verdict. See id at 522.
289 See id. at 527-28.
290 See 1 JURY VERDICr RESEARCH, INC., PERSONAL INJURY VALUATION HANDBOOK,
CURRENT AWARD TRENDS IN PERSONAL INJURY 3 (1997).
29 1 See supra note 46 and accompanying text. On the other hand, biases in commercial
databases make it difficult to draw firm conclusions from this report. We would be reluctant to
base conclusions on the Jury Verdict Research report alone.
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real terms over the last thirty years; any "increase in the dollar value of awards
over the past three decades can be attributed to a combination of inflation, and
increases in real income, real medical costs and life expectancy." 292
Our analyses go beyond these earlier studies and rather convincingly
demonstrate significant declines in both plaintiff win rates and verdict amounts.
We measured time by month rather than year, studied a full twelve years of
verdicts, obtained information on all verdicts from the studied jurisdiction, and
employed a method of multivariate analysis specially tailored to the
configuration of jury verdicts.2 93 Our findings are limited to state courts, and
perhaps to courts in urban counties similar to Franidin County, but the evidence
of a pro-defendant trend is compelling.
B. The Perils of Tort Reform
Advocates of tort reform maintain that "[w]e have become a crazily litigious
country" 294 in which plaintiff win rates and verdicts are "skyrocket[ing], ' '295
"awards for punitive damages... [have] spiraled into the millions, not to
mention billions of dollars,"296 and the entire tort system is "out of balance, tilted
to favor plaintiffs and reward their lawyers." 297 Our data, together with the
findings of every researcher who has systematically examined tort verdicts,
solidly refute these claims. There are problems in the tort system, just as there are
difficulties in every complex organization, but the crisis described by most tort
reformers does not exist.
To combat this illusory crisis, reformers most commonly propose: (1)
limiting or abolishing punitive damages in tort actions; (2) capping
compensatory damages, especially those for pain and suffering; (3) curtailing
joint and several liability; and (4) eliminating the collateral source rule.298 Each
2 9 2 MARK COOPER, THE VERDICT Is IN: JURY AWARDS UNCHANGED OVER 30 YEARS: A
RESEARCH REPORT BY CITIZEN ACTION, at ii (Apr. 1995); see also Bovbjerg et al., supra note
167, at 21 (after controlling for other factors, awards in malpractice cases did not rise during the
1980s); Eisenberg, supra note 32, at 446 (concluding that there is "no discernible time trend in
plaintiff win rates"); Sloan & Hsieh, supra note 277, at 1025 (stating that regression analysis
revealed that, after controlling for other factors, verdict size in medical malpractice cases was
not increasing as of 1990).
293 See supra note 66 (discussing the advantages of tobit analysis).
2 9 4 DAN QUAYLF, STANDING FIRM 312 (1994).
295 Franlin W. Nutter, The Fight for Civil Justice Reform, INS. REV., Nov.-Dec., 1984,
at 2, 5.
296 Mobil Corporation, Civil Justice: Balance the Scales, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 16, 1995, at
A27.
297 Id.
298 See, e.g., Galanter, supra note 3; Middleton, supra note 6; Philip Shuchman, It Isn't
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of these proposals raises complex policy issues beyond the scope of this Article.
Our findings, however, suggest two broad-based problems with these reforms.
First, current tort reform proposals uniformly and unabashedly favor
defendants. Yet our data demonstrate that the system already prefers those
litigants. Product manufacturers and health care providers, the defendants at the
center of the tort reform storm, currently enjoy higher jury success rates than any
other category of civil defendant. Although compensatory damages can be high
for these claims, those damages correspond with injury severity. The most
seriously injured plaintiffs, moreover, already suffer undercompensation.
Punitive damages, finally, are rare-even nonexistent in some jurisdictions.
Rather than restoring "balance" to the tort system, reform measures would
exacerbate trends that already favor defendants.
Defendants, moreover, benefit from their current advantages both at trial and
in settlement negotiations. Most medical malpractice and product liability
insurers are repeat players with experiential knowledge of low plaintiff win rates,
verdict distributions, and the scarcity of punitive damages. While tort reformers
deplore pro-plaintiff juries, defendants know better. The high percentage of zero
offers in medical malpractice cases, even on claims that plaintiffs eventually win,
suggests that defendants are well aware of their current dominance in the tort
system. Further analysis of claims that defendants settle and plaintiffs withdraw
must await more information on those claims. The data presented here, however,
strongly suggest that medical malpractice and product liability defendants
already enjoy considerable strength in both settlement negotiations and the
courtroom.
In this context, reforms that skew the balance further in favor of defendants
seriously threaten the interests of citizens who suffer debilitating injuries from
provable negligence. It is likely, for example, that although punitive damages
and million dollar verdicts are rare in tort litigation, the risk of those awards
helps bring some defendants to the settlement table. These are not necessarily, as
tort reformers suggest, defendants who are blameless. Instead, they may well be
defendants who have engaged in actionable negligence, but, without the risk of a
high jury verdict, would prefer to take their chances with the jurors who have
proven so sympathetic to defendants over the years. The proposals currently
favored by reformers, in other words, are as likely to depress verdicts and
settlements for seriously injured negligence victims as to discourage the
frivolous nuisance suits so prominently touted by reform advocates. 299 Indeed, if
that the Tort Lawyers Are So Right, it's Just that the Tort Reformers Are So Wrong, 49
RuTGERs L. REv. 485 (1997).
299 Nor will the reforms discussed above improve the distribution of economic resources
among tort victims. It is true that the current tort system allows some plaintiffs to recover high
verdicts in court, while others (vho may have suffered equally actionable negligence) recover
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the system already does a relatively good job of distinguishing meritorious and
nonmeritorious claims (as much research suggests),30 0 then the greatest impact
of these reforms will fall on plaintiffs with valid claims.
Our research suggests a second danger of current tort reform proposals. We
identified numerous gender distinctions in product liability and medical
malpractice trials, and we noticed at least one age-based distinction. Other
researchers have documented race differences in tort litigation;30 1 economic and
social class distinctions probably exist as well. Substantially more research is
needed to understand why these differences arise and how they can be combated.
Current reform proposals, however, fail to explore these differences, to take them
into account or to consider whether reform measures might aggravate these
tendencies. Before adopting proposals that will uniformly advantage defendants,
we should consider whether the burden of those proposals will fall
disproportionately on some plaintiffs-especially when we have evidence that
gender, age, race, and perhaps class matter in the courtroom. 30 2
CONCLUSION
Current tort reform is a blunderbuss. Based on anecdote and designed to
favor defendants, reform measures fail to address the tort system as it stands. Our
comprehensive analysis of medical malpractice and product liability verdicts
reveals a system of few trials, low win rates, declining verdicts, and rare punitive
awards. Our research includes all verdicts from a representative urban county
over a full twelve years, thus avoiding the biases of more selective databases or
restricted time periods. Our multivariate analyses, moreover, dramatically
illustrate pro-defendant trends by controlling for other relevant variables. In the
face of this evidence, exaggerated anecdotes and wild stories no longer have a
place in responsible review of the tort process. Rather than heed those fictions,
legislators and voters should turn their attention to our growing knowledge of
how the tort system truly operates.
low settlements or nothing at all. Conspicuously absent from current reform measures,
however, are any proposals to redistribute potential savings among tort victims. Instead,
potential defendants (or perhaps their consumers) reap all of the savings.
300 See, e.g., VIDMAR, supra note 2; Sloan & Hsieh, supra note 249, at 428; Taragin et
al., supra note 276.
301 See, e.g., CHIN & PErERSON, supra note 254; Sloan & Hsieh, supra note 249.
302 For a series of articles beginning this task, see, e.g., Chamallas, supra note 61;
Lucinda M. Finley, Female Trouble: The Implications of Tort Reform for Women, 64 TENN. L.
REV. 847 (1997); Koenig & Rustad, supra note 79; Troy L. Cady, Note, Disadvantaging the
Disadvantaged: The Discriminatory Effects of Punitive Damage Caps, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV.
1005 (1997); Lisa M. Ruda, Note, Caps on Noneconomic Damages and the Female Plaintiff
Heeding the Warning Signs, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 197 (1993).
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